1/9 Sometimes you just have to trust the arithmetic. Since March I have argued that Beijing had little choice but to engineer a large demand-side stimulus of at least RMB 1 trillion before the end of...
2/9 the year because – given trade and domestic investment constraints – more of the supply-side spending it had long favored wouldn’t allow it to achieve the 2024 GDP growth target.
3/9 Most China analysts disagreed, on the grounds that Beijing was unalterably opposed to “the idleness-breeding trap of welfarism”, and so would never initiate such a spending program, but I argued that the choice facing Beijing wasn’t between welfarism and no welfarism.
4/9 It was instead between welfarism and falling well short of the GDP growth target.
It had become so obvious that the Chinese economy was constrained mainly by weak demand that I told all my clients that any such announcement would probably set off a stock market rally.
5/9 From recent events it now seems that Beijing might have finally chosen to implement a large demand-side stimulus (although we still don’t have details, so we can’t say for sure). Sure enough, the stock market has reacted positively, but excessively.
6/9 Check out the rather shocking graph in the NYT article. But while we needed a rise, I don’t think a 16% surge in the CSI 300 in one week is at all a healthy stock market reaction. It just reinforces how highly speculative the markets are in China (and how volatile).
7/9 But that’s what we’re stuck with. This violent surge seems to leaves us where we were after the February rally. If it isn’t sustained and prices start to fall again, it will demoralize investors and further undermine the credibility of the stock markets and the regulators.
8/9 That is why I think this week’s stock market performance may not be what the regulators hoped for and may put even further pressure on Beijing to follow through with a substantial demand-side stimulus.
9/9 Not only is a demand-side stimulus the only effective way to boost economic activity enough before year end to allow China to reach the GDP growth target, but Beijing also cannot allow this week’s stock-market rally to fizzle out yet again.
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1/7 Interesting Caixin article: "China’s construction industry is reeling from a wave of defaults and financial turmoil as delayed payments and rising bad debts cascade through the sector."
2/7 The problems are especially severe for private construction firms, who are less likely to have access to credit than state-owned firms. This is another example of how soft-budget constrained parts of the economy are crowding out the hard-budget constrained.
3/7 Caixin writes that "construction firms are increasingly forced to accept unsold or unfinished properties as payment or collateral, leading to mounting non-performing assets on company balance sheets."
1/7 Amy Kapczynski argues that "everywhere you look in Washington today, there are signs that industrial policy is back. The presidential election is a fight not over whether we will have industrial policy, but over what kind we should have."
2/7 I would put it a little differently. Industrial policy has been especially powerful in driving the US economy in recent decades, but this industrial policy was mostly designed abroad. What's new is that the US is determined to regain control over how this policy is designed.
3/7 In a globalized world, changes in one country's trade and capital accounts must be automatically accommodated by opposite changes in the trade and capital accounts of its trade partners. That's because globally, external accounts must balance.
1/4 Bloomberg "China said it will give one-off cash handouts to people in extreme poverty before Tuesday, in a rare announcement of direct aid just a day after unveiling a sweeping program to stimulate the world’s second-largest economy."
2/4 These are just the kinds of fiscal transfers that will boost consumption spending in the short term. The problem is that the amounts are likely to be too small to matter and, more importantly, that these are one-off fiscal transfers that don't really address the underlying...
3/4 income distribution that has created the imbalances. Until structural reforms are implemented that eliminate the implicit and explicit transfers that force households to subsidize production and investment, the underlying imbalances won't really change.
1/8 An interesting debate between Elizabeth Pancotti, Todd N. Tucker and Matthew Yglesias on the pros and cons of tariffs. The problem I have with most debates over tariffs is that they often proceed as if tariffs were…
2/8 a unique (and often uniquely dangerous) form of trade policy. In fact tariffs are just like many other trade and industrial policies that operate through transfers from one sector of the economy (usually households) to another (usually manufacturers or other producers).
3/8 Tariffs affect the economy in the same ways as currency depreciation, subsidized borrowing costs, price controls, capital controls, export subsidies, support for specific industries or infrastructure, wage constraints, policies to support or undermine unions, and so on.
1/10
Good IMF blog that reminds us that trade imbalances are largely driven by domestic macro forces rather than by incremental price effects. It notes that China’s growing trade surpluses were driven by a rise in Chinese savings caused both by the...
2/10
weak household income share of GDP and the rise in precautionary savings as property prices crashed and economic uncertainty rose, while US deficits are caused by fiscal policies that drove down US savings.
3/10
But I have two problems with this analysis. First, the authors claim that while subsidies associated with Chinese industrial policy “do play some role in generating international trade spillovers in the respective sectors, the estimated effects are however modest, suggesting that…
1/8 China' private secret is suffering. Among other things, "“China used to be the best VC destination in the world after the US,” says one Beijing-based executive, but “the industry has just died before our eyes. The entrepreneurial spirit is dead.”
2/8 The article goes on to note that "in 2018, at the height of VC investment, 51,302 start-ups were founded in China, according to data provider IT Judi. By 2023, that figure had collapsed to 1,202 and is on track to be even lower this year."
3/8 While it has been clear for years that the role of the private sector in the economy has contracted relative to the role of the public sector, if you want to understand why China's adjustment has been, and will continue to be, so difficult, it is important to understand why this has happened.