Thread by @yarbatman

1. Coming events may prove me wrong, but I continue to believe that Iran seeks to avoid a war with Israel.

Israel may now have the pretext to take the fight to Iran, but if Iran considered a war inevitable, tonight's attack would have looked very different.

2. Tonight's attack was not what the opening salvo of a war looks like.

It was less telegraphed than the April attack than I expected and used more advanced missiles, but the strike came only from Iran and was limited in scope, a point Iranian officials are now emphasizing.

3. There has been no declaration of war, no messages to begin mobilizing Iranian society for war, and no sign that further attacks are imminent.

Compared to April, we are one rung higher on the escalation ladder, but no more.

4. It seems unlikely that Nasrallah's death is the event that will lead Khamenei to suddenly abandon his long preferred doctrine of "strategic patience" and to move headlong into a direct confrontation with Israel.

Time and again he has shown himself to be highly risk averse.

5. For Khamenei to see war as unavoidable, it would require a decisive offensive action by Israel.

I'll point to a text recently published on Khamenei's website on the lessons of the Iran-Iraq War. If there's any zeal for war, it centers on the righteousness of self-defense.

6. But questions of resolve aside, Iranian leaders understand that they are in a weak position.

Israel, acting boldly and somewhat unpredictably, has total escalation dominance.

Iran can lob more ballistic missiles at Israel, but that's about it.

7. Iran has no means to move its manpower to take the fight to Israel.

Its drones and missiles can cause damage, but its defense industrial base won't be able to keep up with the demands of a protracted conflict.

Its Resistance Front allies are already on the back foot.

8. Even without the US backing it, Israel can overwhelm Iranian air defense, hit military facilities, and target civilian infrastructure.

Most importantly, Israel has nuclear weapons.

Bibi is happy committing genocide in Gaza. I wouldn't put it past him to use a nuke on Iran.

9. So why would Iran risk giving Israel a new casus belli with tonight's strike?

Iran will be banking that, like in April, the US will be able to constrain Israel, largely by making it clear that Israel won't have US support for a full-blown offensive war on Iran.

10. Iran will also be hoping that the prospect of a missile war will create domestic pressure that could constrain Netanyahu.

I don't see this strike being fundamentally about deterrence. The approach didn't really work in April. It won't work now.

11. Instead the strike is about injecting urgency in the US, regional countries, and domestic stakeholders in Israel to constrain Netanyahu and force him off the warpath.

It's the kind of gamble a risk averse actor must make.

If Iran can't deter Bibi, others can constrain him.

12. Of course, the gambit might fail.

It sounds like Israel is going to strike back, taking the initiative after Iran opted for another limited response, and after Biden has apparently consented to Netanyahu widening his war, at least in Lebanon.

13. So let's say Israel does strike back at Iran, is that going to be the opening salvo of the war?

Even then, it seems to me Iran can decide to absorb a larger Israeli strike.

This is because Iran can still pursue a nuclear deterrent as a way out of its strategic dilemma.

14. The question is whether Iran thinks an Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities is inevitable, even if a war is not.

If that is the case, it should be moving towards weaponizing its nuclear program now and preparing its facilities for the possibility of such a strike.

15. There is a scenario where Israel strikes major Iranian infrastructure, including the nuclear facilities, but where Iran doesn't respond by entering a war.

Instead, the Israeli strike becomes the impetus to finally build and test a nuclear weapon.

16. A major reason Iran has not tried to build a nuclear weapon is that it was in a sense deterred from doing so by the possibility of a devastating and humiliating Israeli or American strike on its nuclear facilities.

Iran would also face costs for becoming a nuclear power.

17. But so many of the costs are now baked in.

Israel is threatening to strike Iranian nuclear facilities even when Iran has yet to make a decision to weaponize and when Iran is transparently trying to avoid war.

Iran may now be resigned to absorbing such an attack.

18. The crucial point is that an Israeli airstrike on Iran's underground nuclear facilities, if conducted without US support, may very well fail.

It would setback Iran's program, but will probably still leave Iran in a position to reconstitute and pursue weaponization.

19. I just don't see the US joining Israel in major strikes on Iran in response to tonight's attack.

That's why the US will advise Israel against going for major strikes alone, especially on nuclear facilities, precisely because they could fail and spur Iran to weaponize.

20. So if Iran wants to avoid war with Israel, it still has the means to do so.

It will hope that Israel's retaliation is limited because of constraints put on Israel by other actors, who are gaming out these scenarios.

21. If Israel's response is substantial, Iran can still choose to absorb the attack, avoiding the trap of a war it can't win.

Even if the attack targets nuclear facilities, it may fail, and Iran can pursue a nuclear deterrent as the last best chance to prevent a full-blown war.

22. Overall, it seems more likely to me that we get an Iranian nuclear weapon than a full Israel-Iran war.

23. The great tragedy is that these are the potential outcomes now facing the region.

It is even more tragic that both outcomes seem more likely than a ceasefire.