@LysolPionex @Authy Sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer does not require using a work profile, user profile or Private Space for the apps to be sandboxed. They're sandboxed if you use them in your main Owner profile too. Putting it in a separate profile just keeps it a bit more separate.
@LysolPionex @Authy SafetyNet Attestation API was deprecated a while ago and is nearly entirely phased out. It was replaced by the Play Integrity API. Both of these things work fine with sandboxed Google Play. The issue is they largely exist to support services banning any non-Google-ceritifed OS.
@LysolPionex @Authy The weak Play Integrity API level used by most of the services enforcing it can be spoofed, but it requires pretending to be an old device without hardware attestation which they can detect and block with their Play Integrity API hardware fingerprinting. Enforcement is delayed.
@LysolPionex @Authy Doing this kind of spoofing would be quickly blocked if it was deployed in an OS with over 250k users where around half of those are using sandboxed Google Play and would be triggering the spoofing for the fingerprinting to detect. We can't solve this problem ourselves.
@LysolPionex @Authy App developers should stop banning using non-Google-certified operating systems. If they insist on still checking the operating system, they can follow our guide at to use hardware attestation for permitting using GrapheneOS in addition to the stock OS.grapheneos.org/articles/attes…
@LysolPionex @Authy It's unrealistic to get every app developer to do this or even most of them since they do not care and largely do not even understand what the Play Integrity API does. It's a fake security feature and being adopted as such to pretend to care about security, often by contractors.
@LysolPionex @Authy The solution is regulatory or legal action against Google forcing them to permit GrapheneOS to pass the device and strong integrity levels without us doing their restrictive certification with highly inappropriate requirements. Alternatively, the OS enforcement could be banned.
@LysolPionex @Authy It has nothing to do with security since they permit devices with 8 years of no security patches but not a much more secure OS than the most secure OS they certify. Google shouldn't get to choose where apps can be compatible based on their anti-competitive certification system.
@LysolPionex @Authy Regulatory action against Google stopping them from doing this is the solution. Legal action could be a substitute for that if governments continue being far too slow at acting on Google cracking down on any form of new mobile OS wanting Android app compatibility with this API.
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A false narrative is being pushed about GrapheneOS claiming we're ending operations in France due to the actions of 2 newspapers. That's completely wrong. If both newspapers and the overall French media had taken our side instead of extreme bias against us, we'd still be leaving.
We're ending operations in France and ending our use of French companies (mainly OVH) to provide services because of direct quotes by law enforcement in dozens of French news publications. Their inaccurate claims about GrapheneOS and thinly veiled threats were our sign to leave.
French law enforcement hijacked the servers of companies selling secure phones multiple times and is comparing us with those companies. They've made it clear they expect access to phones and will go after us if we do not cooperate. Cooperating with that means adding a backdoor.
We no longer have any active servers in France and are continuing the process of leaving OVH. We'll be rotating our TLS keys and Let's Encrypt account keys pinned via accounturi. DNSSEC keys may also be rotated. Our backups are encrypted and can remain on OVH for now.
Our App Store verifies the app store metadata with a cryptographic signature and downgrade protection along with verification of the packages. Android's package manager also has another layer of signature verification and downgrade protection.
Our System Updater verifies updates with a cryptographic signature and downgrade protection along with another layer of both in update_engine and a third layer of both via verified boot. Signing channel release channel names is planned too.
Our update mirrors are currently hosted on sponsored servers from ReliableSite (Los Angeles, Miami) and Tempest (London). London is a temporary location due to an emergency move from a provider which left the dedicated server business and will move. More sponsored update mirrors are coming.
Our ns1 anycast network is on Vultr and our ns2 anycast network is on BuyVM since both support BGP for announcing our own IP space. We're moving our main website/network servers used for default OS connections to a mix of Vultr+BuyVM locations.
We have 5 servers in Canada with OVH with more than static content and basic network services: email, Matrix, discussion forum, Mastodon and attestation. Our plan is to move these to Netcup root servers or a similar provider short term and then colocated servers in Toronto long term.
France isn't a safe country for open source privacy projects. They expect backdoors in encryption and for device access too. Secure devices and services are not going to be allowed. We don't feel safe using OVH for even a static website with servers in Canada/US via their Canada/US subsidiaries.
We were likely going to be able to release experimental Pixel 10 support very soon and it's getting disrupted. The attacks on our team with ongoing libel and harassment have escalated, raids on our chat rooms have escalated and more. It's rough right now and support is appreciated.
It's not possible for GrapheneOS to produce an update for French law enforcement to bypass brute force protection since it's implemented via the secure element (SE). SE also only accepts correctly signed firmware with a greater version AFTER the Owner user unlocks successfully.
We would have zero legal obligation to do it but it's not even possible. We have a list our official hardware requirements including secure element throttling for disk encryption key derivation (Weaver) combined with insider attack resistance. Why aren't they blaming Google?
The FBI ran a string operation in Europe where they created their own 'secure' phone and messaging platform. Their OS used portions of our code and was heavily marketed as being GrapheneOS or based on GrapheneOS.darknetdiaries.com/transcript/146/
Through this operation, the FBI provided criminals in Europe with a communication network they heavily trusted. It gave them much more confidence to coordinate and commit crimes. The vast majority of this crime was ignored for years to avoid exposing ANOM as being a honey pot.
In cooperation with many European governments, the FBI heavily encouraged and facilitated organized crime in Europe. US and European governments facilitated drug trafficking, human trafficking, murders, rape, kidnapping and much more for years while claiming it was GrapheneOS.
We were contacted by a journalist at Le Parisien newspaper with this prompt:
> I am preparing an article on the use of your secure personal data phone solution by drug traffickers and other criminals. Have you ever been contacted by the police? Are you aware that some of your clients might be criminals? And how does the company manage this issue?
Absolutely no further details were provided about what was being claimed, who was making it or the basis for those being made about it. We could only provide a very generic response to this.
Our response was heavily cut down and the references to human rights organizations, large tech companies and others using GrapheneOS weren't included. Our response was in English was translated by them: "we have no clients or customers" was turned into "nous n’avons ni clients ni usagers", etc...
GrapheneOS is a freely available open source privacy project. It's obtained from our website, not shady dealers in dark alleys and the "dark web". It doesn't have a marketing budget and we certainly aren't promoting it through unlisted YouTube channels and the other nonsense that's being claimed.
GrapheneOS has no such thing as the fake Snapchat feature that's described. What they're describing appears to be forks of GrapheneOS by shady companies infringing on our trademark. Those products may not even be truly based on GrapheneOS, similar to how ANOM used parts of it to pass it off as such.
France is an increasingly authoritarian country on the brink of it getting far worse. They're already very strong supporters of EU Chat Control. Their fascist law enforcement is clearly ahead of the game pushing outrageous false claims about open source privacy projects. None of it is substantiated.
iodéOS and /e/OS are based in France. iodéOS and /e/OS make devices dramatically more vulnerable while misleading users about privacy and security. These fake privacy products serve the interest of authoritarians rather than protecting people. /e/OS receives millions of euros in government funding.
Those lag many months to years behind on providing standard Android privacy and security patches. They heavily encourage users to use devices without working disk encryption and important security protections. Their users have their data up for grabs by apps, services and governments who want it.
There's a reason they're going after a legitimate privacy and security project developed outside of their jurisdiction rather than 2 companies based in France within their reach profiting from selling 'privacy' products.
There's another article posted at . We don't have a subscription to access it so we can't evaluate whether the coverage is fairer. Need our community to check. There's an ongoing attempt to smear GrapheneOS by French government agencies so there will be more articles.lefigaro.fr/secteur/high-t…
The reality is that a tiny proportion of the GrapheneOS userbase are criminals, clearly far below 1%. It's a rounding error. The vast majority of criminals use Android and iOS. French law enforcement contains a vastly higher proportion of criminals than the GrapheneOS userbase.
We published this response to a recent article promoting insecure devices with /e/OS with inaccurate claims, including inaccurate comparisons to GrapheneOS:
We made a post with accurate info on our forum in response to inaccurate information, that's all. There's a lot more we could have covered. See for several examples such as /e/OS having unique user tracking in their update client not communicated to users.kuketz-blog.de/e-datenschutzf…
The founder of /e/OS responded to the post we made on our forum here:
Gaël Duval has repeatedly personally targeted the founder of GrapheneOS in response to us posting accurate information responding to misinformation from /e/OS and their supporters.mastodon.social/@gael/11487468…
European authoritarians and their enablers in the media are misrepresenting GrapheneOS and even Pixel phones as if they're something for criminals. GrapheneOS is opposed to the mass surveillance police state these people want to impose on everyone.
There are ongoing coordinated attempts at misleading people about GrapheneOS and Signal in multiple European countries. A consistent pattern are completely unsubstantiated claims about exploits with no evidence. These are contradicted by actual evidence, leaks and their behavior.
GrapheneOS is not immune to exploitation, but the fearmongering done in these ongoing attacks on it is very clearly fabricated. They feel threatened enough by GrapheneOS to engage in coordinated attempts at convincing people that it's unable to protect their privacy and security.