(π§΅, CAN WE TALK ABOUT IT?):Over the last 5yrs, we as a society have developed a set of norms about πππππ. As someone who's been actively publishing on the subject, I notice it very strongly. People will ask "why are you still masking", then wince when they hear my reply(1/)
I find it almost amusing, because our friends & famly know I work on the subject, & they're usually the ones that bring it up first. But my reply is obviously not what they want to hear, so I often get the "that was too much" look from my wife & kids in these situations (2/)
This plays out in the public sphere as well. "Expert" opinion that's soothing or reassuring is platformed, even if it's repeatedly wrong. This is a form of propaganda ("Calm-mongering" @Tryangregory ), & distracts us from the reality : (3/) typingmonkeys.substack.com/p/calm-mongeriβ¦
Calm-mongering serves to form an Overton Window about what futures are - and are not- discussable in polite conversation, when it comes to The Virus That Must Not Be Named. "Experts" have debated seasonality, herd immunity, hybrid immunity & viral attenuation for years. (4/)
Much of this is closer to fantasy in the context of πππππ. The chance this virus will attenuate (evolve to become milder), to pick one example, is very low.
We discussed in an earlier 𧡠about what evo bio teaches us about emergent diseases:
But risk is not being discussed in the public sphere.
The conversation that needs to happen in public is "is it a good idea to let this virus spread without mitigation?What are the potential downside risks of untrammelled viral evolution?"
This topic seems to be off limits.(7/)
So let's do it then. Let's talk about downside risks.
Taleb's Turkey teaches us that it's important to be able to have rational conversations about downside risks, particularly ones that haven't happened yet.
There are 2 major risk scenarios worth discussing-attritional risk is the 1st.
Repeated πππππ infections over a lifetime can only cause cumulative damage.(It should be obvious, but) additional infections can't undo existing LC damage (sequelae).(9/)
We can debate whether damage will accumulate faster or slower, but lower per-infection frequency of LC doesn't mean much if the plan is for everyone to get it 1-2x/yr. And we don't know how long LC effects last- some last at least 3yrs ("up to" ;>)
Many viruses have health effects that take decades to manifest. For slow-onset (delayed) sequelae, the extent of the health burden visible today may be a very small fraction of the total locked-in burden, as explained in this π¬ from @gckirchoff &me:
(11/)peertopublic.com/posts/the-dangβ¦
Just to be clear, there's many plausible candidates for "long term damaging effect of πππππ that's not fully visible yet". Cancer , e.g.- you can make the case that πππ π-πππ-π may be carcinogenic- could be decades before that epidemiological "signal" is visible.(12/)
We don't know how long the sequelae last, or if we're done with finding new sequelae.
The true burden of 1-2x infections/yr is still unknown. (Known burden<total burden).
For any kind of rational risk mitigation though, the downside of the situation has to be discussable. (13/)
Might the health burden of repeated infections be larger than is visible today? By how much?
How much additional disease burden of Long πππππ can our societies accept?
These are questions that should be being discussed now in the public domain. (14/)
The risk of sudden catastrophe is also on the table. Repeated viral evolution leaves the risk of higher IFRs open.
(Note that IFR doesn't have to reach SARS levels- a Delta-like IFR (1.5%) could still rival the 1918 flu in death toll)
Of course, such a "glancing blow" can be delivered more than once by this virus. Let's see what happens if we let the pandemic run for years,with repeated waves of disease. As we've seen, the worst historical pandemics killed 10-40% of people & caused decades of instability (18/)
If every wave has a chance of leading to "attenuation" or a Gray Swan event (GSE) as described in our preprint, it turns out that collapse is a distinct risk unless the odds of a GSE is & odds of attenuation are high (h/t @gckirchoff again, full post on this coming soon) (19/)
This simple thought exercise speaks to the idea that the house always wins if you gamble long enough. To allow repeated waves of πππ π-πππ-π is to place a bet on viral evolution. We'll return to this topic in much greater detail later, but the bottom line is: (20/)
We are engaged on an uncontrolled experiment without historical precedent. We are allowing ourselves to be repeatedly exposed to a substance (this virus) that we don't fully understand. We don't know what the long-term consequences of that exposure are. (21/)
Is there any other substance that we do this with?
It's a wildly irresponsible & reckless course of action and - get this - asking "what's the risk here?" is now the imprudent & dangerous thing to do.
"War is peace". Orwell's 1984 was not intended as a how-to manual. (22/)
That's compounded by the fact that the virus itself is changing, it's evolving. It's doing the thing that experts assured us that it wouldn't do, and it's doing it in ways that experts assured us it wouldn't. Still we debate whether it will become mild or seasonal or polite.(23/)
The question we should be asking is "what are the consequences of another punc eq event like Omicron BA.1? " Because it's not off the table, not by a long shot. What's the plan if it comes to pass?
Risk mitigation is best done with worst-case scenarios, not wishful thinking.(24/)
Thisπ§΅was grim af, I know, but the first step in mitigating risk is acknowledging it exists, and making it discussable.
False promises can only go so far, action -not spin- is what's needed to fix the problem.
In the next π§΅, I talk about how the problem remains fixable.(25/)
This is the 5th 𧡠out of 6 in the βHow does it endβ series.
H/T to @TRyanGregory & @madistod for stimulating discussions that led to the creation of this series, @gckirchoff for the very cool interactive widgets & @0bj3ctivity for thoughtful feedback (26/)
@TRyanGregory @madistod @gckirchoff @0bj3ctivity Earlierπ§΅s here (27/):
(π§΅NO ONE COULD HAVE PREDICTED THIS): To answer the question "What does the future hold for πππ π-πππ-π?" it's worth examining how predictable its evolutionary trajectory has been so far. Evolution is stochastic, but stochastic processes can still yield predictions. (1/)
Paradoxically, while evolution is highly unpredictable at a molecular level, predicting its consequences and anticipating its risks is actually quite easy. We'll dive a lot deeper into this idea in a later TT, as it's a crucial one for understanding our current situation. (2/)
While "expert" prognostications from the early pandemic were wildly off-base, it was possible to reason deductively. We (my collaborators & I, h/t in particular @madistod & @debravanegeren) called out many of the risks within the first year, in the peer-reviewed literature. (3/)
(π§΅2/5, HISTORY): What does history teach us about pandemics?
This is a topic that's been covered by others, but much of what's been said is worth taking a closer look at, in context.
Let's look at some historical pandemics/epidemics & see what we can learn. (1/)
It's worth starting by defining what a pandemic is- and isn't. To quote Michael Osterholm (in '09): β(A) pandemic is basically aβ¦novel agent emerging with worldwide transmission.β
It's an epidemiological, not a social, construct. Pandemics don't go away if you ignore them. (2/)
In the last π§΅, we looked at what biology tells us about emergent pathogens.
The key take-home: the evolution of their virulence is unpredictable- it often increases.
Host & pathogen are locked in a Red Queen's Race (3/). It's not a stable equilibrium.
(π§΅1/5, EMERGENCE): What happens to virulence after a new pathogen emerges? Popular thinking on the subject is that pathogens evolve become less virulent over time when they co-exist with their host species, based on the logic that virulent pathogens don't spread effectively.(1/)
This perception is occasionally echoed by experts as well, for example in this Science article: βπππ π-πππ-π is going to become a common cold. At least thatβs what we want.β (If wishes were horses, then zoonotic spillover would be nothing to worry about, I guess?) (2/)
The idea dates back to the "Law of Declining Virulence", propounded by medical doctor Theobald Smith in the 19thC (far from the last MD to confidently hold forth on the topic of evolution). Unfortunately, it's not supported by experimental data (see screenshots for example). (3/)
It's been ~5yrs since πππ π-πππ-π, the virus that causes πππππ, made its fateful jump into humans. Now seems as good a time as any to ask "is it over yet?" (For the 10th time, but who's counting?)
Let's talk about how this ends, shall we? (1/)
Every few months over the past 5 yrs, we've been reminded that the pandemic is over now, or perhaps it ended a long time ago, no one really knows.
The important thing is that it'll never go away, so we have to learn to live with it.
But not to worry, it's all very mild. (2/)
The dead moth buried in that word salad is the belief that newly emergent pathogens must eventually become endemic, that this process is about managing our own feelings about the situation.
A seven-stages-of-grief thing that we must all eventually accept. For our own good. (3/)
Been doing some thinking about how the pandemic will end (@TRyanGregory & @madistod have been great sounding boards).
In particular, focusing on two questions relevant for sc2:
1. What does biology teach us about emergent pathogens? 2. What can past pandemics teach us?
(1/)
TL; DR is weβre all gonna die.
Just kidding. (Actually true if you wait long enough, but that thought is not an original one).
Some interesting titbits, details to follow): (2/)
1. There is a wealth of biology literature on pathogen emergence & what happens to virulence.
Itβs a very well studied problem and the stuff you hear βexpertsβ say on the topic is quite different from what the literature says on it. The βexpertsβ are using 1980s textbooks. (3/)
In a recent paper, my colleagues and I assessed the effectiveness of contact tracing during the early stages of the Covid pandemic. We found that contact tracing identified 1-2% of all transmission events. (2/)
So, if the CDCβs is as successful with monkeypox contact tracing as it was with Covid, you would expect pretty much the same finding (1 out of 113) even if every one of those people had contracted it. (3/)