New joint TAG/Mandiant research on a hybrid Russian espionage/influence campaign (UNC5812) targeting potential Ukrainian military recruits with malware and spreading anti-mobilization narratives
UNC5812 is using the persona Civil Defense to (a) deliver commodity malware masked as software that claims to share crowdsourced locations of Ukrainian military recruiters and (b) solicit & share content it can use to discredit the 🇺🇦 military and its mobilization efforts.
To maximize the reach of its campaign, we judge UNC5812 is likely purchasing promoted posts in legitimate, established Ukrainian-language Telegram channels like the missile alert and news channels shown below.
At the time of analysis, only Android and Windows malware was available. But the group’s website points to likely future intent to expand capability to macOS and iPhones as well.
Notably, some significant effort was invested in social engineering here. Take for example, the below video posted on the CIvil Defense FAQ section to encourage victims to circumvent Google Play protections / justify the extensive permissions for the Android malware to run.
We judge this campaign part of wider 🇷🇺 efforts to undermine Ukraine’s recruitment drive. See here UNC5812's Telegram and a Russian government X account sharing the same video in close proximity, underscoring Moscow’s cross-cutting focus on promoting anti-mobilization narratives.
Much credit in making sure this campaign failed goes to Ukraine's national authorities, who took swift action to disrupt the campaign's reach by blocking resolution of the actor-controlled "Civil Defense" website nationally. #StrongerTogether
Also known commonly as the GRU’s Main Centre for Special Technologies (GTsST) or Unit 74455 - APT44 has been at it for the better part of 15 years. Publicly available images of its anniversary insignia place the unit’s formation in 2009.
This tenure has involved a series of the most brazen cyber operations known to date - a series of firsts that have set precedents for future network attack activity and that continue to carry significant proliferation risk.
Today, Mandiant is sharing research on the GRU’s Disruptive Playbook, drawn from insights into GRU’s full-spectrum cyber operations in Ukraine over the past year.
The takeaway: The GRU has followed the same five phase disruptive playbook throughout the war. Alternatives have existed, but the GRU has opted for the same tradecraft on repeat. We assess that these choices are calculated adaptations to a wartime operating environment.
We judge that this standard concept of operations highly likely represents a deliberate effort to increase the speed, scale, and intensity at which the GRU could conduct offensive cyber operations while minimizing the odds of detection.
Grateful to @IISS_org for the opportunity to share some thoughts around the success of Ukraine’s cyber defense. At this stage of the war, Ukraine has decisively won the adaptation battle in cyberspace.
To understand Ukraine’s defensive success, we must account for the GRU’s approach to offensive cyber operations, firmly rooted in its information confrontation doctrine and the broad Russian definition of information warfare.
Russia emphasises the psychological potential of its cyber capabilities. This resulted in an early cumulative approach to offensive cyber operations, attempting to amass disruptions against civilian infrastructure and ‘disorganise’ Ukraine’s response.