It appears that foreign influence operations on this platform are picking up, as expected. So here are a few high-level observations. Under normal circumstances I would write a proper longer piece. But in the interest of time, here you go. A few trends, questions, and hypotheses:
Most of the exposed Russian tradecraft is sloppy, and often the engagement on X is fake. But not always. One day after this remarkable WIRED story came out, the U.S. IC confirmed the attribution to Russia to reporters (Confirmation npr.org/2024/10/22/nx-…) wired.com/story/russian-…
The U.S. IC is reacting very fast. They expose content as foreign malign influence without amplifying it at the same time. That is excellent. It would be even better if there was one central reference point for all announcements, including press-call drops, perhaps with delay.
Foreign malign influence actors appear to use X as their disinformation platform of choice, for both seeding and amplification. Users then amplify from X to other platforms—if correct, then Meta, Google, and Microsoft will have degraded telemetry and a degraded ability to counter
Also note that X's reportedly weak threat intelligence team, the platform's libertarian approach, and even small changes like hiding "like" accounts—while retaining a lot of influential users, journalists, and official accounts—make it an ideal active measures proving ground.
The IC and platforms other than X are facing hard choices on a regular basis: expose foreign influence ops or not? Because exposure adds amplification—as some big but genuine fringe accounts will then look for the posts on X to amplify, claiming to "counter censorship."
My hunch there, eg: once a fake foreign video gets significant genuine amplification, the IC and even firms should expose, thus put a damper on reasonable mainstream coverage—assuming the follow-on fringe amplification will only reach echo chambers, changing no or v few minds.
Finally, we should not expect foreign (esp. Russian) influence operations to stop after the election. We see two types right now: smearing of one side, and undermining the legitimacy of the vote. Depending on what happens next, legitimacy-attacks might increase post-vote.
One more: the main target audience of Russian IO operators is not the U.S. voting public, it's their own funders. They need contracts & budgets. They care more about pretending to be influential than about actual influence. Don't overestimate them. foreignaffairs.com/russia/lies-ru…
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