Thread by @rcdatw

(1/7) The latest analysis of the PLA's Joint Sword-2024B exercise by RCDA Director MA Cheng-kun and associate @KTristanTang in @ChinaBriefJT examines the significance of PLA and Coast Guard maneuvers and compares them with previous exercises.
jamestown.org/program/joint-…

(2/7) 12 CCG vessels encircled Taiwan’s international ports, with first-division ships blocking the entrances to the Taiwan Strait and second-division ships patrolling the eastern waters and the Strait. Meanwhile,PLA Navy intensified efforts to control the waters east of Taiwan.

(3/7) The PLA simulated “comprehensive superiority” operations, launching aircraft from second-line airfields to test readiness if frontlines are compromised. Aircraft were rapidly rearmed, refueled, and redeployed, allowing up to five resupply missions.

(4/7) Comparing Joint Sword-2024B with three other PLA exercises around Taiwan since 2022 reveals differing goals. The “2024A” drill focused on seizing battlefield initiative with precision strikes, simulating an invasion's early phase to swiftly neutralize Taiwan’s defenses.

(5/7) The April 2023 exercise shared elements with 2024B, including A2/AD by the carrier group in the Western Pacific. However, 2024B operated much closer to Taiwan, shifting focus from A2/AD “beyond Taiwan” to control “toward Taiwan,” with forces positioned closer to the island.

(6/7) The August 2022 exercise aimed to instill fear among the populace. China launched 11 DF-15 missiles toward Taiwan, though official PRC media framed the exercise as a training effort to enhance combat capabilities, in contrast to the more advanced “2024B” drills.

(7/7) Since 2023, Joint Sword exercises have focused on training for a Taiwan assault, suggesting that future drills may further test the PRC’s amphibious capabilities. Current PLA patrols use Type 072 ships but may deploy Type 075 for multidimensional landings in the future.