Every election in the US attracts huge global attention. People in Pakistan, people in Paraguay, people in Poland, people in Papua New Guinea are monitoring the course of elections and tend to hold strong opinions regarding whom they would prefer to win
Why would that be the case? Well, one obvious reason would be that the US elections are, in fact, seen as the world elections. People in Paraguay do not vote in the US and yet, the US elections have a very strong impact on the fortunes of Paraguay.
Or Russia, in this case:
And I am not discussing the economic fortunes only. In terms of politics, in terms of culture, in terms of discourse, American relations with the rest of the world tend to be strikingly one-directional. Much or most of the global discourse comes downstream from the Unites States
Modern America is the global hegemon to the extent even the British Empire had never been. The only comparison that comes to my mind is Rome. Foreign countries care about the American politics for the same reason provincials used to care about the politics of Rome.
There is, however, another, less obvious aspect of this problem.
Russian elections do not attract much global attention. But Russian coups, or coup attempts actually do
In June 2023, half of the internet was monitoring the course of Prigozhin’s march, and debating its nuances as fervently, as they were now debating nuances of the American electoral campaign.
So, it is not that the world does not really care over who rules in Kremlin. It actually does. A potential transition of power in Moscow might be consequential, and, therefore, interesting. It is that nobody believes this could happen as a result of election.
I believe this comparison may help us to understand why people care about the US elections (or any elections) at all. We care about the elections only to the extent they serve as a substitute and an alternative for the civil war.
Under the normal conditions, transition of power does often take an armed insurrection.
You mobilise your supporters, you charge, you brute force your way to the capital and to the high office.
Now you are the boss.
Or you may not go that far. You may not even want to go that far. Many insurrectionists do not aim to replace the supreme power. What they aim for is negotiating with it. Make your demands, back up your claim, extract the concessions.
The armed rebellion is the way to get heard
It goes without saying that many attempts to get heard result in a full scale war, without even an intention of doing so. They did not want to fight, they just wanted to bargain. And yet, they could not find another way to open negotiations without taking arms.
Many such cases.
Elections do not really serve as an expression of the people's choice or of the popular will (I always found it to be more of a rhetorical construct, and saw it as a category of political theology rather than that of the political mechanics)
What they serve for is being a a substitute for the armed insurrection
Elections is how you fight a civil war without bloodshed
And that is the sole reason why you should care about the elections in the first place
Fake jobs are completely normal & totally natural. The reason is: nobody understands what is happening and most certainly does not understand why. Like people, including the upper management have some idea of what is happening in an organisation, and this idea is usually wrong.
As they do not know and cannot know causal relations between the input and output, they just try to increase some sort of input, in a hope for a better output, but they do not really know which input to increase.
Insiders with deep & specific knowledge, on the other hand, may have a more clear & definite idea of what is happening, and even certain, non zero degree of understanding of causal links between the input and output
I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.