For Symbolic Capital(ism), I just published a piece pulling together lots of empirical data to answer questions like:
Did Trump win because of racism?
Did Trump win because of sexism?
Did Trump win because "elites" bought the election?
Did Trump win because of third-party "spoilers"?
Did Trump win because of weak turnout?
Did Trump win because Harris chose the wrong running mate?
As the essay details at length, the answer to all of these questions is "no." It's easy to see how people would be drawn to these questions, but none of these hypotheses do a good job of explaining what actually happened in 2024 (or the previous Trump cycles, for that matter). 🧵
Did Trump win because of racism?
Did Trump win because of sexism?
Did Trump win because "elites" bought the election?
Did Trump win because of third-party "spoilers"?
Did Trump win because of weak turnout?
Did Trump win because Harris chose the wrong running mate?
As the essay details at length, the answer to all of these questions is "no." It's easy to see how people would be drawn to these questions, but none of these hypotheses do a good job of explaining what actually happened in 2024 (or the previous Trump cycles, for that matter). 🧵
Let's start with race: Democrats saw gains with white people this cycle. Harris did about as well with whites as Democrats typically do. She saw improvement with whites across gender lines relative to 2020: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
So why did she lose? Well, that would be because of shifts among non-whites. Non-whites across gender lines moved away from the Democratic Party. Harris put up weak numbers with Black women (relative to Hillary or Obama). Democrats' margins with Hispanic women shifted dramatically towards the Republicans. They saw losses with Asian women. And non-white men shifted even further (even as white men shifted heavily towards Democrats over Trump's tenure in office).
The preferred narrative on race is helpless to explain the trendlines among whites and the trendlines among non-whites. But put simply, Harris didn't lose because of the whites. She lost despite solid (and growing) support among the whites, because non-white voters had other ideas.
So why did she lose? Well, that would be because of shifts among non-whites. Non-whites across gender lines moved away from the Democratic Party. Harris put up weak numbers with Black women (relative to Hillary or Obama). Democrats' margins with Hispanic women shifted dramatically towards the Republicans. They saw losses with Asian women. And non-white men shifted even further (even as white men shifted heavily towards Democrats over Trump's tenure in office).
The preferred narrative on race is helpless to explain the trendlines among whites and the trendlines among non-whites. But put simply, Harris didn't lose because of the whites. She lost despite solid (and growing) support among the whites, because non-white voters had other ideas.
What about gender? This is two female nominees Trump has bested, but he lost to Joe Biden. A clear sexism story, open and shut case, right? Here, again, the voting data beg to differ: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
Gender polarization in the electorate was down since 2016. Harris' voteshare among men was consistent with typical Democrat performance (an outcome driven heavily by white men moving Democrat over the last decade, even non-white men across the board went the other direction). Trump's margins with men were not historic.
The reason Harris lost is because she performed abysmally with women. She got the lowest share of the female vote of any Democrat of the last 30 years other than John Kerry. And it wasn't white women: they actually shifted towards the Democrats this cycle. It was Hispanic and Asian women who shifted most towards the GOP -- although Harris also significantly underperformed Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama with black women too.
Since 2016, men shifted 2 percentage points towards the GOP. Meanwhile, women shifted five percentage points towards the GOP (i.e. more than twice as much!). But rather than analyzing this latter trend -- rather than exploring how women exercise their agency, the focus is intensely on men. Even though they are objectively less important: they are a smaller share of the overall adult population, they are registered to vote at lower levels, among registered voters they turn out at lower levels. Put simply, if we want to understand how any race went the way it did, we need to look at women and how they exercise their agency. But this isn't done. Not even by feminist scholars -- perhaps especially not by feminist scholars in this case -- because the actual data pattern is super inconvenient for the preferred narrative.
Gender polarization in the electorate was down since 2016. Harris' voteshare among men was consistent with typical Democrat performance (an outcome driven heavily by white men moving Democrat over the last decade, even non-white men across the board went the other direction). Trump's margins with men were not historic.
The reason Harris lost is because she performed abysmally with women. She got the lowest share of the female vote of any Democrat of the last 30 years other than John Kerry. And it wasn't white women: they actually shifted towards the Democrats this cycle. It was Hispanic and Asian women who shifted most towards the GOP -- although Harris also significantly underperformed Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama with black women too.
Since 2016, men shifted 2 percentage points towards the GOP. Meanwhile, women shifted five percentage points towards the GOP (i.e. more than twice as much!). But rather than analyzing this latter trend -- rather than exploring how women exercise their agency, the focus is intensely on men. Even though they are objectively less important: they are a smaller share of the overall adult population, they are registered to vote at lower levels, among registered voters they turn out at lower levels. Put simply, if we want to understand how any race went the way it did, we need to look at women and how they exercise their agency. But this isn't done. Not even by feminist scholars -- perhaps especially not by feminist scholars in this case -- because the actual data pattern is super inconvenient for the preferred narrative.
In terms of age, it wasn't "the olds" that shifted towards Trump while the young people held their ground against "fascism." That's basically the opposite of what happened: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
The GOP has seen consistent losses with seniors, there was very little difference between 2016 and 2024 with respect to 45-64 year olds. But there was IMMENSE change in people under 45.
Margins with 30-44 year olds shifted 9 percentage points towards the GOP. Margins with Americans under thirty shifted 8 percentage points towards the GOP. Democrats margins with Americans under 30 are less than half what they were four years ago. This wasn't a case of Boomers and Gen X stopping progress. This was a case of younger voters growing increasingly alienated from the Democratic Party.
The GOP has seen consistent losses with seniors, there was very little difference between 2016 and 2024 with respect to 45-64 year olds. But there was IMMENSE change in people under 45.
Margins with 30-44 year olds shifted 9 percentage points towards the GOP. Margins with Americans under thirty shifted 8 percentage points towards the GOP. Democrats margins with Americans under 30 are less than half what they were four years ago. This wasn't a case of Boomers and Gen X stopping progress. This was a case of younger voters growing increasingly alienated from the Democratic Party.
Trump is a billionaire. He was backed by the world's second richest man. The real story must be that elites bought the election, right? Well... actually the elites were lined up overwhelmingly behind the Democrats. And their preferred candidate lost: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
Harris had 60 percent more billionaires backing her than Trump. People with six-figure or higher incomes broke decisively towards Democrats -- they were the economic constituency they performed best with this cycle, even as middle class and poor people shifted to the GOP. Highly educated people went for the Democrats. White collar professionals and their employers went for the Democrats. However you want to measure "elites" -- the elites lined up primarily behind Kamala.
And in terms of fundraising, it wasn't even close. Democrats raised twice as much money overall. When Kamala took over, they raised three times as much in the closing months. Largely from Wall Street, Silicon Valley et al. They outspent Trump in almost all the swing states, often by multiples. But they lost every single one of these states anyway.
If anyone tried to simply buy their way to the White House, it was Democrats. Unsuccessfully.
Harris had 60 percent more billionaires backing her than Trump. People with six-figure or higher incomes broke decisively towards Democrats -- they were the economic constituency they performed best with this cycle, even as middle class and poor people shifted to the GOP. Highly educated people went for the Democrats. White collar professionals and their employers went for the Democrats. However you want to measure "elites" -- the elites lined up primarily behind Kamala.
And in terms of fundraising, it wasn't even close. Democrats raised twice as much money overall. When Kamala took over, they raised three times as much in the closing months. Largely from Wall Street, Silicon Valley et al. They outspent Trump in almost all the swing states, often by multiples. But they lost every single one of these states anyway.
If anyone tried to simply buy their way to the White House, it was Democrats. Unsuccessfully.
What about third party "spoilers" like @DrJillStein or @CornelWest? Well, for one, the whole "spoiler" narrative is really presumptuous. The reason people vote third party is because their priorities and concerns aren't being addressed by the major parties, who are not, by the way, entitled to anyone's votes.
But in reality, there were only two states where third-party support could have plausibly flipped the state (Michigan and Wisconsin): musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
Many of those people wouldn't have voted for Harris if their preferred candidate was on the ballot. But even if we just give Harris those two states -- guess what? She still loses the election.
She lost decisively, both at the electoral college level and in the popular vote -- regardless of whether third parties were on the ballot or not.
But in reality, there were only two states where third-party support could have plausibly flipped the state (Michigan and Wisconsin): musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
Many of those people wouldn't have voted for Harris if their preferred candidate was on the ballot. But even if we just give Harris those two states -- guess what? She still loses the election.
She lost decisively, both at the electoral college level and in the popular vote -- regardless of whether third parties were on the ballot or not.
What about the VP pick? Could Shapiro have won the race where Walz failed? Unlikely. VP picks tend not to matter much outside their home state. Sometimes not even within their home state (see what happened in Minnesota this cycle). But even if Shapiro flipped Pennsylvania, Harris would have still lost: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
In all likelihood, appointing Shapiro would've made the ticket less appealing in, say, Michigan. And there almost certainly would've been major drama -- campaign derailing conflict -- if Kamala had an ambitious A-type personality like Shapiro on the ticket instead of someone like Walz.
Every institution and campaign Harris has ever presided over has been absolutely riven with dysfunction, strife, and extraordinary turnover. This happened even with Walz on the ballot this cycle. It would've been much worse with Shapiro -- and any perceived tensions with the popular governor would likely have hurt her in Pennsylvania. And even more drama would have further derailed her already ineffective campaign.
She likely made a good choice, given her... leadership style.
In all likelihood, appointing Shapiro would've made the ticket less appealing in, say, Michigan. And there almost certainly would've been major drama -- campaign derailing conflict -- if Kamala had an ambitious A-type personality like Shapiro on the ticket instead of someone like Walz.
Every institution and campaign Harris has ever presided over has been absolutely riven with dysfunction, strife, and extraordinary turnover. This happened even with Walz on the ballot this cycle. It would've been much worse with Shapiro -- and any perceived tensions with the popular governor would likely have hurt her in Pennsylvania. And even more drama would have further derailed her already ineffective campaign.
She likely made a good choice, given her... leadership style.
What about turnout? There is a fantasy many progressives have that America is full of people who really embrace all of their policies, they just need to be persuaded to the ballot box. The reality is basically the opposite of that: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
In recent cycles, low-propensity voters (less affluent, less educated, less female, less urban, less white) have been trending towards the GOP even as high-propensity voters have gone the other way.
Turnout among high-propensity voters (who are among the most likely to go for Kamala) was slightly *up* this cycle. The people who sat out where from populations who have been trending towards the GOP. It would not have improved Kamala's prospects to mobilize more of those folks to the ballot box.
There is no reason to think that the voters who sat out this cycle didn't trend right alongside the rest of the country. If they were turned out to the polls, many former Biden supporters probably would've voted for Trump this cycle, like other low propensity voters, and following the general trendlines in the population writ large, across most demographic lines.
Moreover, turnout was actually not down in the states that decided the election -- many swing states saw record turnout. And Kamala lost every single one of them.
Again, low-propensity voters are increasingly a GOP constituency, and they benefit from high turnout. Democrats are increasingly the party of high-propensity voters, and they overperform polls in races with low turnout (like midterms and special elections). Neither party's strategy has really caught up with this empirical reality yet.
But the bottom line is: turnout was not likely to be Kamala's problem. Higher turnout probably would have made her defeat even worse.
In recent cycles, low-propensity voters (less affluent, less educated, less female, less urban, less white) have been trending towards the GOP even as high-propensity voters have gone the other way.
Turnout among high-propensity voters (who are among the most likely to go for Kamala) was slightly *up* this cycle. The people who sat out where from populations who have been trending towards the GOP. It would not have improved Kamala's prospects to mobilize more of those folks to the ballot box.
There is no reason to think that the voters who sat out this cycle didn't trend right alongside the rest of the country. If they were turned out to the polls, many former Biden supporters probably would've voted for Trump this cycle, like other low propensity voters, and following the general trendlines in the population writ large, across most demographic lines.
Moreover, turnout was actually not down in the states that decided the election -- many swing states saw record turnout. And Kamala lost every single one of them.
Again, low-propensity voters are increasingly a GOP constituency, and they benefit from high turnout. Democrats are increasingly the party of high-propensity voters, and they overperform polls in races with low turnout (like midterms and special elections). Neither party's strategy has really caught up with this empirical reality yet.
But the bottom line is: turnout was not likely to be Kamala's problem. Higher turnout probably would have made her defeat even worse.
If none of these popular narratives explain what happened in 2024, how would *I* explain it?
First, I would urge folks to notice that many of the trends explored here didn't happen suddenly, they've been going on for a while. So I'd encourage people to get out of the mental habit of trying to explain things happening right now purely in terms of other things that just started happening right now: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
My book gives people, I think, lots of frameworks for understanding not just this electoral outcome, but broader observed trends over the past decade(s), and how various electoral outcomes and other sociocultural struggles and socioeconomic trends over this period relate to one-another: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/we-have-neve…
First, I would urge folks to notice that many of the trends explored here didn't happen suddenly, they've been going on for a while. So I'd encourage people to get out of the mental habit of trying to explain things happening right now purely in terms of other things that just started happening right now: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
My book gives people, I think, lots of frameworks for understanding not just this electoral outcome, but broader observed trends over the past decade(s), and how various electoral outcomes and other sociocultural struggles and socioeconomic trends over this period relate to one-another: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/we-have-neve…
Taking a longer view -- looking not just at the patterns from this cycle, but the trendlines over time -- I think there are basically two important stories for understanding political and cultural trends over the past several years: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/a-graveyard-…
1. Growing alienation among many Americans with symbolic capitalists, our institutions, our communities, and our preferred political party (The Democrats)
2. Backlash over the "Great Awokening" -- backlash that has been most pronounced among the very populations we like to envision ourselves as champions for and allies of.
The book develops and substantiates both of these stories in great detail, so for people who'd like to do a deeper dive into these issues and their relevance for ongoing sociopolitical struggles, I'd definitely recommend picking up a copy: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/we-have-neve…
/End
1. Growing alienation among many Americans with symbolic capitalists, our institutions, our communities, and our preferred political party (The Democrats)
2. Backlash over the "Great Awokening" -- backlash that has been most pronounced among the very populations we like to envision ourselves as champions for and allies of.
The book develops and substantiates both of these stories in great detail, so for people who'd like to do a deeper dive into these issues and their relevance for ongoing sociopolitical struggles, I'd definitely recommend picking up a copy: musaalgharbi.substack.com/p/we-have-neve…
/End
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