In today's thread, we will see why Trump or no Trump, 🇪🇺Europe's security can no longer depend on US extended deterrence, not for political reasons but for strategic ones.
And its not a bad thing.
A thread 🧵
Since the 50s, Europe mostly depends on US nuclear weapons for its security, if we exclude the French and to some extend British cases.
This extended deterrence, also sometime called US nuclear umbrella, is made concrete with the deployment of ~100 B61 ☢️gravity bombs...
...hosted in 5 European countries. Those weapons can be loaded on "Dual-Capable Aircraft", both US and European (F-16, F-35, Tornado).
The utility of those weapons in the case of a conflict is questionable, mostly because of the low survivability...
While Russia still has an equivalent number of strategic nuclear weapons as the US, Chinese arsenal is growing every passing year and could reach parity with the US soon, meaning Washington will soon faces ...
...two nuclear-armed peer competitors, the main one being China.
Hence, the question. Would the US use even part of its strategic nuclear weapons to protect Europe against Russia, taking the risk to have its remaining weapons being destroyed by a Chinese strike that would...
...let it disarmed and unable to retaliate ?
This question was already valid with current US administration and will only be more significant with the coming one.
US and European leaders know this, but most importantly, their adversaries too.
Does this mean Europe is at its adversaries' mercy ?
Thankfully, no.
US point on the need for Europe to take over is more than valid. With the rise of China as a major nuclear power, there is a real need for a strong fourth nuclear power to maintain strategic balance if...
...we want to avoid an arms race between the USA, Russia and China.
Europe is only good to the US as a strong power, able to defend itself and to keep Russia at peace if a major crisis happens in the Pacific.
This is why an autonomous deterrence in Europe should have...
...the support of Washington.
The good thing is Europe has two nuclear powers, France and the UK, that could, and should, easily take over at almost no additional costs on its basic form.
That's what we'll see in the next thread on a "European Integretad Deterrence Initiative".
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In this thread we will discuss how French deterrence currently works, starting from its doctrine, followed by the means (weapons and carriers) used to enforce it.
A new (very long) thread 🧵
Images from @800Tonnes (🙏)
This follows yesterday's thread on suggestions on how France could extend part of its deterrence to Europe.
My main source was @BrunoTertrais's book 👇 but of course content here only commits myself.
French ☢️ deterrence only purpose is to defend 🇫🇷 "vital interests". Those are deliberately vague in order to deny a potential adversary the possibility to remain just under the nuclear threshold.
🇫🇷 president E. Macron stated on several occasions that those vital interests...
Dear European friends, times are tough and I know we French people can be a pain to deal with (working on it). But here are some ideas on how to work together to build a new nuclear umbrella over Europe.
A thread 🧶
First, in order to remain realistic, let's be honest and clear. French leadership will never share the decision on engaging 🇫🇷 nuclear weapons. So French deterrence will remain 100% French.
Why is this not an issue ? Because this is already the case for the US ☢️umbrella.
However, the nuclear weapon is just small part of many different systems and means that are needed in order to have a credible deterrence. France has all of them (could write a thread on this later), but could greatly benefit from additional capabilities.
🚀 The Worst-Case Scenario - How Russian engineers envisioned last week SARMAT failure 🇷🇺
Thanks to a document found by the talented @La_souris_DA, we have concrete data on what would happen if a SARMAT heavy ICBM exploded during launch.
Let's dig into it 🧶
The source is an environmental study published in 2023 in order to assess the potential dangers of testing SARMAT at Plesetsk test ground. Many different aspects are studied, from stages drop zones to propellant leaks, including impact on Earth's ozone layer.
This is the same document that allowed us to find out Russia plans to test SARMAT as far as the Southern Pacific Ocean.
Une image du 21 septembre montre le site d'essais du SARMAT complètement dévasté avec un énorme cratère là où se situait le silo, témoignant d'un évènement très violent.
Pour mémoire, le RS-28 SARMAT est un missile intercontinental (ICBM) lourd en développement depuis de nombreuses années. Destiné à remplacer le RS-36M2 (plus connu sous son nom OTAN de "SATAN") il faisait partie des "super armes" stratégiques présentées par Poutine en 2018.
Or, jusqu'à présent, seul un essai semble avoir réussi le 20 avril 2022, pour deux échecs suspectés auquel s'ajoute désormais celui-ci.
20 avril 2022 --> succès
Fév. 2023 --> échec probable
Nov. 2023 --> échec supposé
Sep. 2024 --> échec
As noticed by several enthousiasts (kudos to @MeNMyRC1, @tillykium & @AirAssets ), tracking assets including MDA's HALO51 and 53 aircraft have recently deployed on the East Coast. About at the same time, NOTAM started to pop-up far in the Ocean.
Those NOTAMs are almost identical to the ones of previous launch attempts (as this test has been postponed several times), though last time HALO aircraft could not attend due to another test happening at the same period in the Pacific.
Following a question from @ShineThorin here is an explanation on what happened on Jun 23rd 🧶
The 🇺🇸US Navy regularly simulate the launch sequence of ☢️balistic missiles (SLBM) from a submarine (SSBN) at sea. All the information (targets, time of the attack, authentification...
..codes) needed for the launch is contained inside an Emergency Action Message (EAM), a short highly encrypted message broadcasted via a network called HFGCS that uses high frequency radio signal.
Fun fact, everyone can listen to those EAM, some people like @neetintel do an...
...impressive job collecting them, even if it's impossible to decypher them.
Let's go back to the transmission. High frequency radio signal can't go through water. Of course, that's a huge problem as the most important aspect of a SSBN mission is to remain undetected...