Regarding reports about ICBM fired by Russia to Dnipro. My take is that one must be skeptical and cautious. Regarding the "intercontinental" claim, the distance from Kapustin Yar to Dnipro is about 800 km. It's not an intercontinental range. But it's complicated. Short thread 1/
Some reports mentioned the RS-26 missile. Even if we believe them, RS-26 is not really an intercontinental missile. It was tested at the range of more than 5500 km, but it is in effect an intermediate-range missile, (think of it as SS-20 2.0): 2/russianforces.org/blog/2017/07/r…
The RS-26 program was mothballed in 2018 One cannot rule out that RS-26 was taken out of its "retirement" for a strike. This implies that Russia had a number of these missiles in storage for almost ten years. Not impossible, but rather unlikely. 3/russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/b…
But it doesn't have to be RS-26. Most ICBMs have the minimum range and it appears that 800 km would be possible for modern Russian ICBMs . Some Topol-M and Yars ICBMs are road-mobile, so a launch from Kapustin Yar is possible. 4/ russianforces.org/blog/2017/07/r…
Using these kinds of missiles, whether RS-26 or a true ICBM, in a conventional role does not make a lot of sense because of their relatively low accuracy and high cost. But this kind of a strike might have a value as a signal. 5/
I would urge people to keep calm, not assume automatically that "intercontinental" is something inherently and immediately dangerous. But it should be taken seriously. Everyone should be cautious about making claims or sending and interpreting signals. 6/6
As Andrey @baklitskiy noted, if it was a true ICBM, Russia had to provide a launch notification notice to the US 24 hours in advance. But probably not to China, since the missile was not launched in its direction. 7/6
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I said it before and will say it again - had the US seriously engaged with Russia's October 2020 INF+9M729 moratorium proposal (like, by forming negotiating teams at the July 2021 summit), the war in Ukraine would have been averted. 1/
If you want to say something like "but Russia had already deployed 9M729," make sure you read the actual proposal (there is maybe one person in the US who has actually done so). Note this on verification. Has anyone tried to come up with something? 2/ en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…
Also this - Yermakov in Dec 2020: "Russia is open to discussing procedures that would allow to confirm the absence of systems with this missile [9M279] in the European part of the country - first of all in the Kaliningrad oblast." 3/ ria.ru/20201225/ermak…
People are getting excited about Macron's offer "to open a strategic debate" on how France could protect Europe with its nuclear weapons. But I don't see how this debate can come to any conclusion other than that it cannot. Let's take a closer look... 1/
One scenario that people seem to have in mind is that Russia moves its forces to a NATO country, eg one of the Baltic states, in the way it did so in Ukraine in February 2022. What the point of this would be escapes me, but let's set this aside for a moment. 2/
How would France's nuclear weapons help here? Let's assume that France would take this as a threat to its "vital interests." And? Presumably France could threaten to use its weapons against Russia. It could even launch its frappe nucléaire d’ultime avertissement. And? 3/
My take on this Oreshnik business is that the Kremlin is not necessarily concerned about ATACMS et al strikes, since everybody, including the US and Russia, says that these won't change much. Rather, it is concerned about the implied intent. 1/
Moscow seems to have interpreted the authorization as a signal of the West's willingness to involve itself more deeply and directly in the war. Oreshnik is a signal that Russia is prepared to escalate by taking the conflict to NATO territory in response. 2/
It might be prepared to escalate indeed, especially if the West goes significantly beyond the current relatively limited strikes. Of course, nobody, including Moscow, knows what "significantly" means in this context. 3/
There are a few things about the doctrine. While the changes have been in the works for some time, it does appear that the timing of the decree was chosen deliberately, to send a (strong) signal of disapproval of the decision to give the authorization. 1/
It's hard to say whether this signal will be followed by specific actions, of course. It's quite possible that Russia will take some escalatory steps outside Ukraine that would pose a serious challenge to the United States. 2/
What exactly those steps may be nobody knows but there are a number of options, from something demonstrative to something covert and ambiguous. I believe that these steps, if taken, will be non-nuclear, but the threat of escalation to nuclear would be strongly implied. 3/
Interestingly, NotebookLM did not see this as the most important (it's at the end of the thread). It also picked up a few more. Some are quite telling. I'll post them below. 1/
The "potential adversaries" is quite important. The mention of Belarus is less so (and NLM didn't get it quite right). 2/
This is interesting. I thought it was "reliable" in 2020 too. Drones etc. were expected, although I would say (I hope) that the launch must be massive enough to pose a threat to sovereignty etc. 3/
By the way, in the current version of Russia's nuclear doctrine there is no distinction between an aggression by nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon state. All you need is an aggression that threatens the existence of the state. However, there were/are negative security assurances 1/
These date back to 1995, but apparently still valid - Russia will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state except when it acts "in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State" 2/undocs.org/A/50/151
"In association" is not defined, of course, so it appears that the current formula - "with participation or support" - would apply. So, what's new? As far as I can tell, in the past, the implicit assumption was that an NWS would be the primary aggressor, joined by NNWSs 3/