Pavel Podvig Profile picture
Nov 21, 2024 7 tweets 2 min read Read on X
Regarding reports about ICBM fired by Russia to Dnipro. My take is that one must be skeptical and cautious. Regarding the "intercontinental" claim, the distance from Kapustin Yar to Dnipro is about 800 km. It's not an intercontinental range. But it's complicated. Short thread 1/
Some reports mentioned the RS-26 missile. Even if we believe them, RS-26 is not really an intercontinental missile. It was tested at the range of more than 5500 km, but it is in effect an intermediate-range missile, (think of it as SS-20 2.0): 2/russianforces.org/blog/2017/07/r…
The RS-26 program was mothballed in 2018 One cannot rule out that RS-26 was taken out of its "retirement" for a strike. This implies that Russia had a number of these missiles in storage for almost ten years. Not impossible, but rather unlikely. 3/russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/b…
But it doesn't have to be RS-26. Most ICBMs have the minimum range and it appears that 800 km would be possible for modern Russian ICBMs . Some Topol-M and Yars ICBMs are road-mobile, so a launch from Kapustin Yar is possible. 4/ russianforces.org/blog/2017/07/r…Image
Using these kinds of missiles, whether RS-26 or a true ICBM, in a conventional role does not make a lot of sense because of their relatively low accuracy and high cost. But this kind of a strike might have a value as a signal. 5/
I would urge people to keep calm, not assume automatically that "intercontinental" is something inherently and immediately dangerous. But it should be taken seriously. Everyone should be cautious about making claims or sending and interpreting signals. 6/6
As Andrey @baklitskiy noted, if it was a true ICBM, Russia had to provide a launch notification notice to the US 24 hours in advance. But probably not to China, since the missile was not launched in its direction. 7/6

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More from @russianforces

Nov 24, 2024
My take on this Oreshnik business is that the Kremlin is not necessarily concerned about ATACMS et al strikes, since everybody, including the US and Russia, says that these won't change much. Rather, it is concerned about the implied intent. 1/
Moscow seems to have interpreted the authorization as a signal of the West's willingness to involve itself more deeply and directly in the war. Oreshnik is a signal that Russia is prepared to escalate by taking the conflict to NATO territory in response. 2/
It might be prepared to escalate indeed, especially if the West goes significantly beyond the current relatively limited strikes. Of course, nobody, including Moscow, knows what "significantly" means in this context. 3/
Read 4 tweets
Nov 19, 2024
There are a few things about the doctrine. While the changes have been in the works for some time, it does appear that the timing of the decree was chosen deliberately, to send a (strong) signal of disapproval of the decision to give the authorization. 1/
It's hard to say whether this signal will be followed by specific actions, of course. It's quite possible that Russia will take some escalatory steps outside Ukraine that would pose a serious challenge to the United States. 2/
What exactly those steps may be nobody knows but there are a number of options, from something demonstrative to something covert and ambiguous. I believe that these steps, if taken, will be non-nuclear, but the threat of escalation to nuclear would be strongly implied. 3/
Read 10 tweets
Nov 19, 2024
Interestingly, NotebookLM did not see this as the most important (it's at the end of the thread). It also picked up a few more. Some are quite telling. I'll post them below. 1/
The "potential adversaries" is quite important. The mention of Belarus is less so (and NLM didn't get it quite right). 2/ Image
This is interesting. I thought it was "reliable" in 2020 too. Drones etc. were expected, although I would say (I hope) that the launch must be massive enough to pose a threat to sovereignty etc. 3/ Image
Read 4 tweets
Sep 25, 2024
By the way, in the current version of Russia's nuclear doctrine there is no distinction between an aggression by nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon state. All you need is an aggression that threatens the existence of the state. However, there were/are negative security assurances 1/
These date back to 1995, but apparently still valid - Russia will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state except when it acts "in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State" 2/undocs.org/A/50/151
"In association" is not defined, of course, so it appears that the current formula - "with participation or support" - would apply. So, what's new? As far as I can tell, in the past, the implicit assumption was that an NWS would be the primary aggressor, joined by NNWSs 3/
Read 6 tweets
May 3, 2024
I think we can tell which satellite is responsible for the "Russian nuclear something in space" scare. It's Cosmos-2553. Let's start with Mallory Stewart's statement earlier today at CSIS 1/
The US "has been aware of Russia's pursuit of this sort of capability but only recently have we been able to make a more precise assessment of their progress." What happened? "Russia has publicly claimed that their satellite is for scientific purposes." So, there's a satellite 2/
And it's an unusual satellite: "The orbit is in the region not being used by any other spacecraft." That's interesting. A satellite like that would stick out. There is more - "the orbit is in the region of higher radiation than normal lower Earth orbits." 3/
Read 8 tweets
Dec 13, 2023
Colleagues reminded me that the Aegis Ashore system in Poland is about to become operational. The purpose of this entire project has always escaped me. Or, rather, I find it puzzling that a purely political enterprise with little or no utility has survived for so long. 1/
It was, of course, a political project from the very beginning. Obama had to do something about missile defense in Europe. The old GBI (in Poland and Czechia) was not particularly popular or capable. And it was a US mainland defense, so it had zero utility for Europe. 2/
Poland, of course, was happy to host, but Czechia - much less so. The old Europe was not happy about this at all, first because GBI was circumvented all NATO mechanisms and, second, because it was a serious irritant in US/NATO-Russia relations. 3/
Read 10 tweets

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