The inaugural Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea was just held in the Philippines. I attended the conference at the invitation of @kasphilippines (🙏@braun_daniela). Here are some of my takeaways. /1
- Several countries are committed to a rules-based order in the maritime domain but they do not always agree on whether and how to punish transgressors.
(I'll comment on the term "rules-based order" at the bottom of this thread.) /2
While there is strength in the multiplicity of measures against the aggressor, disagreement and lack of coordination often undercut the effort. There is, therefore, /3
a need for more dialogue, not so much with the transgressors, but among like-minded nations to facilitate more agreement and coordination in a joint effort to safeguard the rules-based international order. (This controversial term will be explained at the bottom of the thread) /4
- Despite being the foremost regional organization in the area, ASEAN has been unable to mitigate tensions or stabilize the situation in the South China Sea. Several ASEAN members appear to embrace the view that as a small country, the Philippines must accommodate China /5
rather than seek support from “outsiders” for its cause in the SCS. Hence, these fellow ASEAN members tend to blame the Philippines, rather than China, for raising tensions in the SCS. The inclusion of those ASEAN members in the dialogue can help improve mutual understanding. /6
- A promising line of effort to promote the rules-based order is “middle power diplomacy.” More cooperation among the “middle powers” such as Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, Germany, France, the UK, and Canada with “frontline” states /7
such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Taiwan would not only complement great power leadership but also avoid the various disadvantages that often accompany great power leadership. /8
Now to the controversy about the term "rules-based order."
* The term “rules-based order” is not accurate because all orders have rules and so can be seen as “rules-based.” The term has been invented to contrast with an order based on might or power where “might makes right.” /9
But the terms “might-based order” or “power-based order” are also inaccurate because no order is effective without enforcement and enforcement requires power, thus all effective orders can be seen as “power-based.” /10
More accurately, what we wish to call “power/might-based order” is hierarchical, with the most powerful on top and the most powerless at the bottom. What we call the “rules-based order” can more accurately be called “lateral” as opposed to hierarchical. /11
The characterization “lateral” reflects the structure of power in the order: everyone is equal before the law. The rules of the lateral (a.k.a. “rules-based”) order are largely neutral regarding the size and power of the countries. /12
The rules of the hierarchical international order reflect, ritualize, and reinforce the asymmetry of power among the countries. So, yes, all orders are based on rules, but it's in the nature of its rules that an order gets its characterization. /13
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🧵Some asked me to comment on what Vietnam’s politics and future will look like under the new leader, To Lam. To answer this question, we must look at the tendencies of Vietnam’s new leadership and the trends and potential changes ...
... in the domestic and international environments, then assess their interactions. This is hugely complex, so I will only talk about some broad contours.
I've addressed some tendencies of the new leadership in a previous thread (below). /2
This thread will provide some additional comments.
Vietnam’s immediate future is not a period of normal politics but one of power competition. Much of it will reflect the new leadership’s need to consolidate power. /3
🧵For more than 13 years (2011-2024), Nguyen Phu Trong was Vietnam's Communist Party chief and the country's top leader. His era has ended & the country now faces an uncertain future.
What are Trong's legacies? Will they outlive him? What is Vietnam's post-Trong direction?
Future generations will remember Trong for his two famous metaphors: a "blazing furnace" and a "bamboo diplomacy." The two signify Trong's major fingerprints in the country's domestic and foreign policies. /2
The "blazing furnace," Trong's metaphor for his anti-corruption campaign, started less than a year after he became General Secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party (2011). It was not blazing at first. The furnace became bright and intense only after he ... 3/
🧵Notes on Vietnam's domestic politics & foreign policy. Vietnam has been experiencing an unprecedented political turmoil that is intertwined with an anti-corruption campaign. It started in 2022 with the investigations of major corruption cases related to the procurement ... /1
of COVID-19 test kits and repatriation flights during the pandemic, which led to the forced resignations of President Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh in Jan 2023. Intriguingly, Phuc and Minh were among the 7 Communist Party Politburo members who ... /2
were eligible on paper to succeed the 79-year old and ailing Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong. Early this year, anti-corruption investigations also led to the forced resignations of President Vo Van Thuong and National Assembly Chair Vuong Dinh Hue, two other Politburo members who /3
🧵Vietnam has agreed to build a "community with a shared future" with China. It was the 8th and possibly the last country in Southeast Asia (after Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia) to join the China-led community.
Singapore and the Philippines are unlikely to take China's side anytime soon in this respect.
With 8/10 members within China's "community with a shared future," ASEAN is shrinking deeper into irrelevance, as demonstrated in the ongoing South China Sea conflict. /2
Many think that a "community with a shared future" is different than a "community of common destiny." But no, they are 2 English renditions of the same Chinese phrase 命运共同体, which translates literally as "community of common destiny." /3
🧵Interesting to see how Vietnam is dancing between the giants.
Vietnam and Japan just elevated their ties from an "extensive strategic partnership" (announced in 2014) to a "comprehensive strategic partnership" at a visit of President Vo Van Thuong to Japan. /1
This "half upgrade" is, arithmetically speaking, 4 times easier than the "double upgrade," also to a comprehensive strategic partnership, of US-VN ties in Sep (from a mere "comprehensive partnership"). /2
The "fundamental principles" guiding both US-VN and JP-VN CSPs are "respect for the United Nations Charter, adherence to international law, and mutual respect for each country’s political systems, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity." /3
🧵Between the 11th and the 12th hour, Vietnam moved from agreeing to a mere "strategic partnership" to a full "comprehensive strategic partnership" with the US, which will be announced next weekend by President Joe Biden & Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong in Hanoi.
This will elevate the US to the same level as China & Russia in Vietnam's formal hierarchy of foreign relations. This "balance" is unprecedented in the history of Communist Vietnam. China is the ultimate author of this feat, in two major ways, one short, the other much longer.
Short way: China's encroachment on Vietnam's exclusive economic zone causes Vietnam to move closer to the US. Beijing's increased presence at Vanguard Bank in the SCS and the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia are some last drops in the glass.