On August 6th, Russia organized a successful breakthrough campaign of the southern Donbas following the fall of Vuhledar. In this long thread, I will breakdown how it happened 1/42
Map credit @clement_molin
The Ukrainian unit responsible for this area is the Operational Grouping Tavria’s 72nd Mechanized, 79th Air Assault, 118th TDF, 127th TDF, and smaller battalions. 2/
The Russians utilized the 8th, 29th CAA, and 68th Army Corps with additional supporting units. 3/
The phases of the Russian operation in Vuhledar can be defined as probing, shaping, and exploitation for organizational purposes. 4/
Useful acronym definitions: NE (north east), MRR (Motor Rifle Regiment), NIB (Naval Infantry Brigade), MRB (Motor Rifle Brigade), TDF (Territorial Defense Brigade), OG (Operational Grouping) 5/
To start, Russia launched a number of probing attacks in the NE and W of Vuhledar. The 1472nd MRR attacks the NE towards Vodyane with a supporting action in the south by the 139th Assault and the north 39th Motor Rifle 6/
1472nd MRR’s captures 1km of territory that was defended by a Ukrainian platoon and this is significant because the Russians have had disastrous after disastrous pushes on Vodyane. 7/
The surprise Kursk offensive did disrupt Russian offensive operations in the short term, but soon resumed the following week with armored pushes from the 57th Motor Rifle Brigade into Kostyantnivka. 8/
Kostyantnivka’s natural barrier and logistics center served as one linchpin for Ukraine’s southern Donbas defensive operations. The other being Vuhledar. 9/
The Russians hold a foothold in the town but after heavy losses (about a battalion worth) and shifting Ukrainian forces to defend against their attack, they pause operations here. 10/
The 139th Assault Brigade then launched an attack against a Ukrainian stronghold in the center of the line between Kostyantnivka and Vuhledar against a defending infantry battalion. 11/
To do so, the Russians flanked the stronghold from the west with a small unit, reduced Ukrainian defensive positions with artillery, then attacked with a large mechanized force, usually platoon-sized but when they’re bold, company or even battalion sized. 12/
Russian doctrine heavily emphasizes pincer movements for attacks at all echelons. But this new take on an old tactic was used knowing the Ukrainians did not have enough infantry to defend their position. 13/
From now on, I will refer to this tactic as “spear and hammer” for redundancy purposes as it’s used quite a bit not only in Vuhledar, but front wide. These operations are intended to find weak points in Ukrainian lines, then exploit them with reserves. 14/
Artillery activity picked up and those reserves came in the third week of August. Now comes the shaping operation. 15/
Ukrainian forces were heavily outnumbered and elected to conduct a withdrawal from the stronghold. 16/
Following this, Ukraine concentrated their forces to their vulnerable NE. This left OG Tavria’s flank vulnerable to attack and the Russians exploited that vulnerability. 17/
Following the withdrawal, Russian forces from the 37th MRB and the 40th NIB attack the right flank of Vuhledar (from the south) against the 118th TDF. 18/
Using the same spear and hammer assault tactics, a platoon of the 37th MRB probes TDF lines while the 40th NIB performs a company attack against the thinly manned positions. 19/
This was a purposeful operation to confuse Ukrainian commanders at where the Russian main effort may fall, as any position could collapse if the Russians dedicate their forces there. 20/
In September, Russia commits its main effort against Vodyane with 68th Army Corps artillery fixing Ukrainian units and a supporting operation against the Vuhledar’s coal mine from the 1472nd MRR. 21/
Then they launch a frontal assault against the town, the hammer. The success is attributed to the improved ISR and kill chain of Naval Infantry units frontwide and lack of Ukrainian infantry. 23/
Now comes exploitation. 139th Assault and 1472nd MRR fully commit to a spear and hammer attack against Vodyane. 24/
The under strength 72nd Mechanized is defending Vuhledar. Their commanders requested reinforcements, but the General Staff did not reinforce the already depleted OG Tavria. 25/
Led by the 5th Tank Brigade, the main effort shifted to Vuhledar, where adjacent 40th NIB units assumed blocking positions while 5th Tank attacked the 118th TDF west of Vuhledar. 26/
Reserve units from the 29th CAA formed the hammer in the SE suburbs and on September 26th, Vuhledar was nearly encircled. The problem at this point was the battlefield saturation of ISR and artillery to intercept retreating Ukrainian units. 30/
This became more apparent when Russian glide bomb strikes saturated the town to pressure a withdrawal and destroy what remaining defensive positions the Ukrainians had. 31/
During the withdrawal from Avdiivka, the 3rd Assault made short but intense attacks supported by mortars and artillery against Russian units to fix them in place while Ukrainian units conducted a fighting retreat. 32/
But this didn’t happen. Without reserves and adjacent Ukrainian units already being decisively engaged, OG Tavria’s commander should’ve ordered a breakout. However, the order never came and it was incumbent on the 72nd Mechanized’s commander to do so. 33/
Under fire and ISR, Ukrainian troops left in small groups in the middle of the night, probably on the 28th & 29th, north of the town. There was an attempt by the 72nd to fix 5th Tank forces in the west, but it was inadequate in my opinion. 34/
Ukrainian forces were intercepted by drones and artillery. Of the original ~1,000 brigade members, less than 200 break out of Vuhledar. 35/
By October 1st, Russia is in control of Vuhledar, the once stalwart linchpin of Ukraine’s southern defense then becomes the site of a wider Russian breakthrough in the southern Donbas. 36/
The brigade commander who ordered the withdrawal was “promoted”. This is conjecture, but this exemplified Ukraine’s destructive “not one step back” policy in lieu of good decision making at the operational and strategic level. 37/
Regardless, the Russians may of conducted their first operational-level “spear and hammer” attack against prepared Ukrainian positions, previously only done at Pokrovsk on the tactical level. 38/
The Russians utilized a number of attacks to probe Ukrainian positions on the operational level, fix and draw in those units, out flank them since they lack infantry, then overwhelm remaining defenders with artillery and assaults. 39/
The saturation of glide bomb strikes to essentially bomb a town into submission will be a common exploitation going forward. Vuhledar informed Russian commanders of how to wage a successful campaign against urban areas. 40/
I believe the Russians will try to replicate this success against Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in the coming weeks, as the ongoing southern Donbas offensive is shaping in preparation for that battle. 41/
I’ll leave you with this final touching post. Vuhledar wasn’t nothing. Combat experienced Ukrainian infantry who fought tooth and nail against the Russian onslaught were killed here, especially during the withdrawal. 42/
In honor of a year following this incredible piece of footage we got on textbook defeat of a Russian company attack, because they failed to use their own doctrine, some key takeaways from a former U.S. Army company-level Fire Support Sergeant. 1/26
A Russian company from the 15th Motor Rifle Brigade receives an operation order (OPORD) to assault through a minefield and take Ukrainian positions near the city of Avdiivka. 2/
Due to rigid timetables set by battalion or possibly even brigade command, the company is only allotted one mineroller to support the line of advance while NATO doctrine usually necessitates at least three for an armored company attack. 3/
The long anticipated arrival of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) in Ukraine seems inevitable as U.S. officials discuss sending the system. As a former U.S. Army Fire Support NCO, I will explain what this system can do for Ukraine. 1/28
Sources are all publicly available and include ATP 3-09.32 (JFIRE) October 2019 edition as well as conversations with weapon experts and my own personal knowledge from years in the fire support community. 2/28
The MGM-140 ATACMS is a U.S.-made tactical ballistic missile system, with a range spanning 165km to 300km, depending on the variant. Production rates since 2020 have been 38 ATACMS monthly. For more specifics, check out @ColbyBadhwar thread. 3/28
DPICM’s are not a weapon of mass destruction and the fears about its usage resulting in civilian death is overblown. As a former US Army fire support NCO, I will explain in detail the risks and benefits involved in its employment. 1/
Sources: ATP-3.09-30 “Observed Fires” and ATP-3.09.32 “JFIRE” collectively known as the “FiST Bible” in the the fire support community and are publicly available for download. 2/
I won’t go into detail on what DPICM is or how it’s employed as many of you probably already read articles on it and I won’t insult your intelligence. Here’s an article if not. 3/ thedrive.com/the-war-zone/w…