1/ It’s going to be a wild ride for executive power during Trump 2.0. Here is a quick list of important issues where executive power is likely to be pushed hard, rethought, resisted, and/or, when possible, litigated. What am I missing?
2/ The statutory law of civil service protection and, relatedly, the scope of POTUS’ removal power in the face of statutory restrictions—both for career & non-career officials. (Also: presidential authority to redesignate the head of the Fed.)
3/ The complex Federal Vacancies Reform Act, especially as it operates at outset of the administration. How aggressive and imaginative can Trump be in putting in loyalists atop departments on 1-20? How deeply can he deploy loyalists on 1-20?
4/ Related to last two points: Congress in 2022 made it harder for the president to remove inspectors general and to replace them with presidential loyalists. Are these restrictions consistent with Article II?
5/ Trump has refused to sign agreements under Presidential Transition Act (including ethics pledges), isn’t participating in formal transition, and is cutting out FBI background checks, w/ uncertain legal/political implications for what happens on 1-20, and Sen. confirmations.
6/ Relatedly: What is extent of the president’s control over the secrecy system? Any limits on POTUS’ authority to discard, rethink, or order the conferral of security clearances? Can scattered statutory restrictions on release of classified info constrain POTUS?
7/ The law of impoundment: Can Trump cancel elements of agency budgets or otherwise refuse to spend appropriated $? Implicates Impoundment Control Act, old Rehnquist OLC op. on Art. II power, & recent Supreme Court decisions expanding POTUS’ discretionary law enforcement power.
8/ Many already-much-mooted questions about recess appointments.
9/ DOGE as described by Trump should be governed by the transparency and recordkeeping requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Will OLC deem all or some of FACA unconstitutional (as OLC head Scalia once argued)? Will DOGE be enjoined for FACA noncompliance?
10/ Will DOGE (as Ramaswamy suggested) corral major questions doctrine and Loper Bright to help kill agency rules? Or will those precedents stand in the way of DOGE’s initiatives? Some of both? (Same questions for other Trump deregulatory initiatives.)
11/ Relatedly: Will major questions doctrine check Trump’s tariffs pursuant to super-broad congressional authorizations? Many other questions on relationship between MQD and broad presidential statutory authorization in foreign affairs/national security.
12/ Relatedly: Can (and will) POTUS declare that ByteDance has performed a “qualified divestiture” under the PAFACAA, and, since the law makes that a presidential “determin[ation],” can courts review the decision, assuming someone has standing?
13/ Many questions on the various legal bases for the use of the National Guard and the regular armed forces inside US for various ends, including quelling violence, deportation, and border management.
14/ What are the effective substantive and procedural legal hurdles to deportations, mass or otherwise, and the contemporary relevance (if any) of the Alien Enemies Act, etc.
15/ What are the effective legal or other hurdles (if any) to DOJ investigating/ prosecuting government officials for acts in office (beyond the ones that Trump himself deployed in trying to resist his various investigations/prosecutions)?
16/ Is Congress’s prohibition on the president withdrawing from the North Atlantic constitutional? If Trump withdraws from the treaty, can the issue be tested in court? (Standing, political question doctrine, etc.)
17/ We are going to learn a lot about the contours of Article II in the next four years. (We are also going to learn a lot more about Supreme Court doctrine on standing and emergency orders.) Again, what am I missing?
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1. Quick speculation about the QU the Court crafted in Trump v. US: “Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.” supremecourt.gov/orders/courtor…
2. First, the Court crafted the question to focus on “conduct alleged to involve *official acts*,” as the Trump team suggested, and not “crimes committed while in office,” as Smith had suggested in December. (The Court also cut out some “out there” Trump arguments)
3. Second, the Court asks whether the president enjoys “presidential immunity,” not, as the Trump team had construed the case, “absolutely immunity.” In addition, the question asks “Whether, *and to what extent*,” a former president enjoys this immunity.
1/Prediction: The interpretation of a criminal statute used to convict hundreds of J6 rioters, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2), won't survive appellate review. The Sup Court—which interprets statutes like this narrowly—will eventually interpret 1512(c)(2) in this way.
2/ To get a flavor why, listen to the oral argument in this DC Circuit case. lawfareblog.com/dc-circuit-hol… (Oral argument here. cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/rec…). The government didn’t have great answers to two judges’ concerns about “corruptly” in the statute.
3/ I’m *not* saying this DC Circuit panel will throw out this conviction, since the “corruptly” arguments are not squarely presented. And I think it will take a while for the issue to reach the Supreme Court.
1/ I wrote here about how the special counsel system is not well-suited to the task of investigating Biden and Trump—and now possibly Pence—for mishandling classified information. nytimes.com/2023/01/24/opi…. But the real problem is the broken classified information system. Thread.
2/ A well known problem is massive overclassification. Too many things are made secret that shouldnt be, and secrecy lasts too long. Pathologies follow: excessive leaks, corrupt manipulation of secrets, things hidden from the American people that shouldnt be, bad governance, etc
3/ A related problem is the amazing degree of abuse of classified info rules at the top: Biden, Trump, Pence, Clinton, Gonzales, Petraeus, Berger, Deutch. I am prob leaving well-known cases out, and these are ones we know about it. Surely there is much more abuse at the top.
2/ It is hard to exaggerate how outside the box this episode is. There have been disputes in discrete contexts about Prez Records Act compliance and whether and how POTUS or VP declassified a document or program.
3/ But there’s been nothing I know of like this—especially Trump’s persistent “lack of respect for the strict rules for [classified] document handling,” washingtonpost.com/national-secur…, and
It's not just "that a Democratic president cannot deter a Democratic House speaker from engaging in a diplomatic maneuver that his entire national security team — from the C.I.A. director to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs — deemed unwise." nytimes.com/2022/08/01/opi…
@tomfriedman focuses on Biden's fear of asking Pelosi not to go. But is the executive branch facilitating the congressional visit, as it usually does?
Typically, DOD "reserves available military aircraft for transportation, while [State Department] ... works with local embassy staff to arrange accommodations and other logistical assistance," & "local embassy staff also play an important supporting role" repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewconten…
Three more terrific papers in the @HooverInst Aegis series on the (understudied) topic of government access to marketplace data as a tool for circumventing the 4th Amendment.
First, @elizabeth_joh on the rise of “gig surveillance work,” and an analysis of its legal and policy implications, esp. for government reliance on the private information market. hoover.org/research/gig-s…
Second, @OrinKerr argues that 4th Am. today permits govt to buy biz records w/o a warrant, but “a sea change in how often govt can buy records to conduct detailed surveillance might someday justify a more restrictive approach” under equilibrium-adjustment.hoover.org/research/buyin…