1/11
If you want to understand the effects of trade intervention, its ok to ask economic historians, but never ask economists. That's because their answer will almost certainly reflect little more than their ideological position.
2/11
Depending on their ideology, they will either only explain how trade intervention affects consumers (it lowers the consumption share of GDP) or how it affects producers (it raises the production share of GDP). They will never explain that it matters to both.
3/11
In this interview, for example, the interviewees only discuss the short-term impact of tariffs on prices, as if this were the only possible effect tariffs could have on the economy. From there, they make the rather glib claim that tariffs will make Americans worse off.
4/11
That's not true, as even a minimal knowledge of the history of tariffs would show. It was direct and indirect tariffs that in 10 years transformed China's EV production from being well behind that of the US and the EU to becoming the largest and most efficient in the world.
5/11
What the interviewees don't seem to understand is that tariffs "work" by shifting income from consumers to producers. This matters because total US consumption depends not on consumer prices but mainly on production. The more Americans produce, the more they consume.
6/11
The proper way to understand tariffs, in other words, is to recognize that while they shift the balance from consumption to production, the goal is to increase both by increasing production more quickly than consumption.
7/11
Tariff policy is "successful" if it causes a rise in domestic production that, in turn, drags up consumption with it -- i.e. if it causes Americans to consume more by producing more. The difference between the two, by the way, is likely to show up as a reduction in debt.
8/11
Tariff policy is a "failure" if it fails to cause a rise in production, in which case tariffs shift the balance from consumption to production mainly by causing consumption to fall. It is in that case that consumers are worse off.
9/11
Tariffs may not be an especially efficient way for industrial policy to force this rebalancing from consumption to production, but it has a long history of doing so, and it is either very ignorant or very dishonest of economists not to recognize the ways in which they work.
10/11
That means that economists can oppose specific forms of tariff, but mainly on the grounds that they will not cause a rise in US production. To oppose all tariffs on principle shows just how ideologically hysterical the discussion of trade is among mainstream economists.
11/11
That is probably why trade has become the most important economic issue about which neither the Republicans nor the Democrats (nor, it seems, many policymakers in the EU) pay much attention to mainstream economists.
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1/6 Warning BRICS nations against replacing the US dollar suggests just how confused the incoming administration is about the global trade and capital system. Maintaining USD dominance is completely inconsistent with stated US trade policies.
2/6 That's because, first, foreigners don't transact in USD out of an act of generosity. As long as the US is the only country willing and able to offer unfettered access to its domestic financial markets, and is willing to run huge trade deficits to accommodate foreign...
3/6 mercantilism and maintain the supremacy of the USD, BRICS nations have little choice. It is their own mercantilist policies that force them to acquire USD assets to balance the huge surpluses on which their economies are so overly reliant.
1/14
While there are indeed a number of things China can do to retaliate against the prospect of a worsening trade conflict with the US, and these are things China, the US and the world should worry about, this article makes the common mistake of...
2/14
failing to consider the systemic impact of incremental policy changes. For example it asserts that "Possibly the most destructive Chinese action would be to offload all or a large part of its stockpile of US Treasuries — holdings that now amount to around $734 billion."
3/14
The article continues: "That would likely put upward pressure on US bond yields and be disruptive to global financial markets. China has already cut its direct holdings of the debt by more than a third since 2017."
1/7 According to the FT, "China’s long-term bond yields have fallen below Japan’s for the first time, as investors bet that the world’s second-biggest economy will become bogged down by the deflation that has long afflicted its neighbour."
2/7 The FT continues: "Beijing has long fought against the “Japanification” of its economy, and has made huge investments in its high-tech, green and electric vehicle sectors with the goal of boosting long-term growth."
What isn't said is that this was also Japan's strategy.
3/7 Some analysts claim that the main difference between China today and Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s is China's high-tech growth strategy, which Japan didn't have.
This claim can only be taken seriously by those who know very little about Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s.
1/9 "The Bank of Korea on Thursday cut interest rates unexpectedly in a rare back-to-back move reflecting concern over the impact of Donald Trump’s second presidency," according to the FT.
2/9 We'll be seeing a lot of this. Countries like South Korea, whose economy is heavily reliant on its large, persistent trade surpluses, will be forced to react to policies designed to cut the US trade deficit (which accounts for roughly half of the global total).
3/9 But there are two very different ways they can respond. The "good" way is for them to implement policies that boost the domestic demand share of GDP. In that way they reduce the adverse global impact of their domestic demand deficiency and help relieve global trade tensions.
1/14
It is hard to pick up a newspaper in China without seeing exhortations to increase consumption and assurances that consumption is inexorably rising, but while there is the occasional reference to the difficulty of... chinadaily.com.cn/a/202411/27/WS…
2/14
raising the consumption share of GDP in China, there seems to be little discussion of why it will be so difficult, i.e. why it will require a major transformation of political and economic institutions, and how this transformation will occur.
3/14
Today's China Daily, for example, has Zhu Min, former PBoC deputy governor, saying that "consumption will become the primary focus and the most important driver of growth." Zhu is a highly respected economist and he fully understands that these imbalances cannot persist.
1/6 NYT's @KeithBradsher writes: "Beijing has a powerful tool for responding to Donald Trump’s threatened new tariffs on Chinese goods: It could start a currency war, a step that poses formidable risks for China as well as the United States." nytimes.com/2024/11/26/bus…
2/6 He points out that if China retaliated against US tariffs by depreciating the RMB, one risk for China is that a weakening RMB could further undermine confidence in the Chinese economy while setting off a wave of flight capital, like that of 2015-16.
3/6 This would force the PBoC to balance the outflows by selling dollars which, in turn, would put downward pressure on the domestic money supply at a time when China's extremely high debt levels would make tighter money very risky.