🧵Here's a special Black Friday FATF Thread to complement @pmarca 's explainer on the Joe Rogan show about how the USG's "control mechanism" was applied to Big Tech by emulating the way it already controlled the banking system.
2/ FATF stands for the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). It originated in 1989 as a one-year fact-finding mission, championed by the United States during the “war on drugs,” but has since evolved into one of the most influential, yet opaque, financial regulators in the world.
3/ Its power stems not from formal authority but from the coercive force of economic exclusion. Nations that ignore its mandates risk blacklisting that shuts them out of global markets.
4/ Yet the FATF’s origins and methods reveal a troubling inversion of legal norms, where financial institutions have arguably supplanted judicial processes and presumed guilt has become the default. So how did all this start?
5/ The FATF’s roots lie in the 1980s, a period when the United States began treating financial flows as tools of law enforcement. In 1986, the US passed the Money Laundering Control Act, the first law to formally criminalize money laundering.
6/ This domestic initiative soon spilled into international forums, with the Basel Committee issuing statements in 1988 and the UN defining money laundering that same year. Despite these efforts, global coordination faltered.
7/ To address this, the US proposed the Financial Action Task Force as a temporary intiative under the auspices of the G7. Its initial mission was modest: cataloging the state of anti-money laundering (AML) laws worldwide.
8/ But the FATF’s role soon expanded dramatically. In the 1990s, its mandate grew to encompass broad AML objectives. By 2001, the “war on terror” provided a new pretext for intervention, transforming the FATF into a counter-terrorism financing (CFT) body.
9/ This shift was no coincidence. Around the same time, the US was losing the so-called “crypto wars” — a battle over the control of encryption tech. American attempts to mandate backdoors in encryption software had largely failed, weakening its capacity to surveil digital chat.
10/ The FATF’s expanded focus on financial flows filled this gap, providing a new channel for economic data collection on a global scale.
11/ The FATF’s power is subtle but immense. It operates not as a formal institution, but as a project hosted by the OECD in Paris, staffed by a few dozen officials. Critics say the lack of a formal structure is deliberate, shielding it from accountability mechanisms.
12/ Its influence flows from a deceptively simple mechanism: the creation of black and grey lists. Countries that fail to meet FATF standards are effectively ostracized from the global financial system.
13/ Compliance, therefore, is non-negotiable, even when FATF standards conflict with national legal norms or civil liberties.
14/ Critics say at the heart of the FATF regime is a profound usurpation of judicial authority. This is because the task force’s AML and CFT frameworks rely on financial institutions, rather than courts, to enforce compliance.
15/ Banks are required to assess the risk profiles of their clients and report “suspicious” activity. But these determinations are often subjective, informed by opaque algorithms and vague guidelines.
16/ The result is a system where accounts can be frozen, assets seized, or services denied without due process. Innocent until proven guilty — a cornerstone of the judicial system — is often replaced by its inverse.
17/ 👉This shift has redefined banking. Historically, financial firms served as neutral intermediaries, providing credit & processing transactions without moral or political judgment. Under FATF, banks have become enforcement agents of the state, tasked with policing customers.
18/ Compliance costs have ballooned, with billions spent annually on AML measures that often fail to achieve their stated aims. Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), for instance, are generated in vast quantities but largely ignored by underfunded law enforcement agencies.
19/ Meanwhile, the regime’s success at curbing actual crime — whether drug trafficking, terrorism, or fraud — remains dubious. There has been no notable suppression of criminal activity or sanctions abuse because of FATF.
20/ The costs, however, extend far beyond inefficiency. The FATF framework has politicized finance, undermining the principle of monetary neutrality. What qualifies as “terrorism” or “money laundering” often depends on geopolitical interests.
21/ Movements supported by NATO allies may escape scrutiny, while others face debanking and exclusion. This discretionary power has been wielded against figures as varied as crypto merchants and politicians like Nigel Farage, chilling dissent and innovation.
22/ Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the FATF’s evolution is its erosion of transparency and accountability. Banks are often forbidden from informing clients that they have been flagged as risks or Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).
23/ This secrecy compounds the sense of arbitrariness, transforming financial institutions into covert surveillance arms. For individuals, the implications are stark: loss of access to financial services, reputational damage, and no clear recourse.
24/ Yet the FATF marches on. Its latest incarnation sees the EU establishing a centralized anti-money laundering authority in Frankfurt.
25/ FATF’s trajectory is a cautionary tale. What began as a tool for financial integrity has morphed into unchecked economic control, undermining civil liberties and the principle of monetary neutrality. All without meaningfully reducing any of the criminal activity it was tasked to reduce.
26/ The other perverse consequence is that the de-facto outsourcing of policing to banking staff, has left the actual law enforcement agencies underskilled, complacent and under-resourced to fight real crime.
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THREAD: Why the private credit crisis is just the West’s version of “involution”
1/ In my latest piece for TBS I argue that the West's growing private credit crisis represents its own version of China's economic "involution" — a liquidity-driven form of economic growth that produces enormous activity and capital deployment but progressively weaker underlying returns.
2/ In China the mechanism was domestic financial repression. Cheap household savings were channeled into low-return industrial investment, producing massive overcapacity and exports sold abroad at razor-thin or even negative margins.
3/ In the West the mechanism looked different but produced a similar outcome. Extremely cheap capital and abundant liquidity fueled a private-equity, venture, and later private-credit ecosystem that allowed large numbers of structurally unprofitable firms to keep expanding.
Nice to see that @HyunSongShin has officially recognized that stablecoins open the door to an "Uber Surge Pricing" type liquidity market. [Actual gas markets also clear in a similar way, notably the NBP balancing point system.]
The below screenshot is from his latest BIS paper "Tokenomics and blockchain fragmentation".
This is something I've been pointing to for years, though I've seen it as eventually leading to dynamic pricing and markets for intraday funds in general.
The paper is more concerned about the fragility and fragmentation risk introduced in systems that rely on many different networks using surge pricing mechanisms to ration entry and exit across systems.
And of course turkeys don't vote for xmas, so the central bank perspective is that all this "congestion" and cost uncertainty can be avoided if programmable money just shifts to cbank ledgers where the cbank balance sheet can absorb congestion shocks in a way that can regulate transaction costs.
The BIS concludes: "These [programmable money] innovations do not require decentralised consensus among anonymous validators. They can be implemented on unified ledgers anchored by central banks, which benefit from the institutional trust of the
traditional monetary system."
THREAD 🧵I know everyone is very excited about aliens this morning, but I ask you, is it really as exciting as super wonky insights on dollar liquidity plumbing, Federal Reserve balance sheet policy, and stablecoin statecraft?
I think not. I interviewed Fed governor Stephen Miran this week and those were just some of the topics we discussed. For those who can't be bothered to wade through the transcript, I thought it might be useful to highlight the wonkiest bits.
1) Top wonky insight for me is that Miran is as perplexed as me about the ongoing role of the Fed Funds Market. "I’m not quite sure why we hold on to the Fed funds rate, but we do. Maybe someday someone will explain it to me," he said.
2) I asked him if the current environment calls for greater awareness of how debt management policy is interacting with monetary policy.
He said that while the two don’t require explicit coordination, because the Fed should be pursuing monetary policy for monetary purposes, and Treasury should be pursuing fiscal policy for fiscal policy purposes, they do require awareness, because what "the one does can depend on what the other does, because the choices from the one can affect conditions that matter for the choices of the other."
And "In theory, you could run up against a time in which there are constraints."
🧵1/ I wonder how many people realise that what's really going on with stablecoins is a massive US statecraft play to re-dollarize the world on its own terms. You could even call it a "re-stablization op" (yep - there's a gag in there).
2/ My analysis is that the reason why many countries are panicking about the upcoming dollar onslaught is because it's a backchannel way to rebase the system, and force 2008-era capital holes to be finally written down.
3/The intent is also to re-establish the supremacy of the dollar in markets where people can't trust their own governments, via a freely floated currency that can actually offer proper price discovery against domestic currencies.
1/ Just a short recap of why it pays to watch your blind spots.
On Feb 23 we argued that the Mar-a-Lago Accord was gearing up to be more of a Bretton Woods 2.0 affair than a Plaza Accord. But also that the real challenge was how to get everyone to the table.
2/ March 1 we explained the real struggle was between two systems, both of which independently believe are liberating the other from oppression. We called it mutual liberation syndrome.
3/ On March 8, we explained that to get everyone to the table a controlled demolition of the stock market was necessary using Xi’s own strategy of shaking down the system to highlight its vulnerabilities and keep wealth imbalances in check.
1/ Amid the endless and breathless commentary today, worth remembering this is a giant game of high stakes Liar’s Poker.
It’s also an exercise in mutual assured economic destruction. MAED.
This means it’s not about markets or valuations, it’s almost exclusively about game theory and who can withstand the pressure longer.
The idea this hasn’t been war gamed is naive though.
A few things to remember: Officially China doesn’t own much long dated paper so it can claim plausible deniability re the long-end sell off. But in reality we have no idea what China really owns, because of its use of offshore proxies.
2/ As I set out in the Great Simplification podcast in March, for “MAED” theory to work you need to present the perception you really are MAD enough to do the unthinkable.
I also argued that there is a paradoxical stability in the game theory equation from having a consistently reliable Liar at the table.
3/ If the objective is creating a steady and stable state or drawing multiple players to a negotiation where trust is the missing variable there is a paradoxical stability associated with the presence of what I would call a “known liar”.
The introduction of a predictably deceptive agent can paradoxically create a common knowledge dynamic. The liar becomes a fixed variable — a strategic constant — whose motivations are well-understood. This transforms higher-order uncertainty into first-order predictability, enabling the formation of a new, more stable Nash equilibrium.
In other words, if there are two negotiations about to take place about how to structure the new financial system and trust is lacking, the preference should be to gather at the table of the known liar.
And who has the world been saying is greatest liar of them all?