I was in NE Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan for much of this year. Some observations:
1) SDF (especially Kurd elements YPG/J and PYD) aren’t “pro-regime.” Many Kurdish leaders spent time in prison or political exile. Talk to anyone in the admin about life before 2011 — you’ll hear a million stories of oppression, cultural erasure, artificial poverty.
2) SDF wasn’t able to work with the opposition because no opposition force was ever willing to offer Kurds anything more than that bad pre-2011 deal— and because some opposition forces were more interested in ethnically cleansing Kurds on behalf of 🇹🇷 than on fighting to free 🇸🇾.
4) Friends are saying the Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo are relatively calm, if on edge. YPG/J will protect their people if they have to. They have been doing so against brutal government and opposition attacks in those areas for over a decade.
5) Shahba seems to be more at risk with SNA threatening an operation. This is where tens of thousands of Efrini IDPs live — people already forced from their homes by Turkish bombs and SNA gangsterism. They live in tents with minimal resources due to government blockades.
6) SDF objectives are a) protect their main territories and Kurdish enclaves in the short term and b) be included in a political resolution that leads to a more democratic and multiethnic Syria in the long term. They’ll make deals and calculations based on this.
7a) Talk of a return to the peace process in Turkey makes the Kurdish situation even more complicated. Erdogan likely thinks pressure on SDF and Kurdish civilians in Shehba could push the Kurdish movement accept a deal more favorable to Turkey. But…
7b) …this situation makes normalization with the Syrian government worth very little for Turkey. A peace deal with the Kurdish movement and subsequent “normalization” with a strong SDF could benefit both sides of the border.
8) No one in Syria wants more war. People in SDF/DAANES areas want it least of all. They are exhausted. Everyone I spoke to wanted to rebuild, get the power and water running again, and start the political work for a better future, however defined.
If you are an analyst or journalist and you want to include the perspectives of the Kurdish communities in Shehba and Aleppo in your analysis, reach out. Our @KurdishPeaceOrg Qamishlo office can connect you.
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🚨Turkey-backed SNA militias are launching attacks on SDF-held Shehba and Tel Rifaat. If they are able to advance, a humanitarian catastrophe is imminent.
Since 2018, this region has housed tens of thousands of predominantly Kurdish IDPs forced out of Efrin by Turkey’s invasion.
These IDPS live in 5 camps (Serdem, Berxwedan, Vegere, Efrin and Shehba) and in surrounding villages.
The vast majority of Efrin IDPs survived or witnessed Turkish/SNA abuses—including the bombing of populated areas, theft of land and homes, torture, disappearances, sexual and gender-based violence—either during the initial Turkish invasion of Efrin or later under occupation.
1. Yesterday, Turkey made an explicit threat against all public infrastructure in northeastern Syria, which it falsely claims is “YPG infrastructure.” Targeting civilians and civilian objects is a war crime, as are indiscriminate attacks.
2. Turkey also said that “third parties” (read: the Coalition) should avoid sites that may be targeted—a threat against the Coalition presence there, and very much not the first one.
3. Turkey claims that it is responding to an attack on the Interior Ministry that claimed by the HPG (armed wing of PKK). That’s false. There’s zero evidence suggesting the attack had anything to do with NES—and targeting infrastructure/the Coalition is established TR behavior.