🧵 Clearing the Confusion: HTS, Turkish Proxies, and the Threat to Rojava (AANES)
1/ A lot of confused "experts": What are the goals of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Turkish-backed SNA? How do their actions threaten Rojava (AANES)? Let’s clarify.
2/ At the heart of this chaos are two key operation rooms, Al-Fath al-Mubin (الفَتح المُبين) and Fajr al-Hurriya (فجر الحرية). While both are rebel coalitions, their objectives and loyalties couldn’t be more different.
3/
- Al-Fath al-Mubin, led by HTS, is a jihadist coalition enforcing strict sharia law, focused on fighting Assad’s regime.
- Fajr al-Hurriya, however, is a Turkish-backed Islamist mercenaries, created to dismantle Kurdish autonomy and serve Ankara’s interests.
4/
The HTS led coalition has, since the fall of Aleppo, focused on holding Idlib.
But their forces are now sweeping through northern Syria, capturing in a few days more territory than they held in 2014. HTS isn’t just holding ground anymore—it’s reshaping the map of Syria.
5/ Despite its rapid advances, HTS operates—within certain parameters—independently of Turkey. During the 2018 Afrin offensive, HTS did not participate, as it was busy attacking rival factions, a move that angered Ankara.
HTS's goals do not always align with Turkey’s.
6/ In contrast, the Fajr al-Hurriya operation room is a rebranding of Turkish-backed militias, notorious for recycling ISIS veterans as with Ahrar al-Sharqiyah.
Their raison d’être? The destruction of the AANES, and the erasure of Kurdish identity from Turkey's border.
7/
Fajr al-Hurriya moved from al Bab, captured Taduf and Aran, cutting critical Kurdish supply lines.
Occupied Halap ar-Raqqah road and parts of the M4, to isolate the Kurdish Aleppo pocket and Tel Rifaat from the rest of Rojava to choke Kurds and prepare to siege them.
8/
These actions align with Turkey’s long-term goals:
Dismantling the AANES—a model of democracy, gender equality, and ecological justice—and ethnically cleansing the Kurdish population to resettle pro-Islamist Arab factions and their families.
9/
HTS opposes the AANES secularism, but under Jolani, it’s trying to rebrand as moderate and gain international legitimacy. A former ISIS commander besieging Sheikh Maqsoud—the same Kurds that defended Kobane? But this could change with shift in political dynamics / pressures.
10/ The stakes are high for Rojava. The Kurdish Aleppo pocket, including Tel Rifaat, is crucial. If Fajr al-Hurriya cuts supply routes, it could trigger a humanitarian disaster for 300k IDPs displaced by Turkey's Afrin invasion, now living in Shahba camp.
11/ Let’s not forget the war crimes by Fajr al-Hurriya’s militias. Ahrar al-Sharqiyah, a key group, brutally assassinated Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf in 2019. Linked to ethnic cleansing, and extrajudicial killings. Despite sanctions, Turkey still uses them as proxies.
12/ In 2014, Turkey’s MİT was caught smuggling weapons to jihadists in Syria, ISIS too, under the guise of 'humanitarian aid.' Journalist Can Dündar revealed the truth and was imprisoned for 'violating state secrets.' Now, they don’t even bother to hide it. But, they take part.
13/ With billions from Qatar, the best picks from Turkey’s arsenal, and years to select and train recruits from 2 million IDPs in Idlib, HTS’s overwhelming force suddenly feels less like a mystery and more like the product of cold, calculated backing.
14/
The two operation rooms—HTS’s Al-Fath al-Mubin and Turkey’s Fajr al-Hurriya—represent an existential threat to Rojava:
One looming, the other imminent. Both are wielded by the Turkish state.
But the fight for Rojava is far from over.
(End of Thread)
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Deep-dive | Thread
Several major Kurdish opposition parties from Iran (Rojhelat/Eastern Kurdistan) have held a high-level coordination meeting to discuss Iran’s political crisis, the ongoing protest wave, and Kurdish strategy under repression. 1/14
The meeting was chaired by Mostafa Hijri, Secretary General of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), in his capacity as rotating coordinator of the Dialogue Center for Cooperation among the Kurdish Parties of Iran. 2/14
Participants included senior leadership from across the Kurdish political spectrum in Iran, notably:
[see image]
These are not minor actors, and they are not ideologically aligned. 3/14
The Palmyra Green on blue attack raised Senate risks around the Caesar repeal
So, al-Julani is showing movement to Washington on paper, not on the ground, while official Syrian channels haven't confirmed anything.
Classic tactic: plausible deniability with Western legibility.
3/9
The military integration fiction (3 divisions / 3+2)
What SDF wants (and has consistently wanted)
Unit integrity, Geographic anchoring, Internal command continuity, No individual dissolution into MoD meat-grinder
That’s why the insistence on:
3 divisions tied to Hasakah / Raqqa / Deir ez-Zor
plus YPJ + CT units as distinct formations
This is not autonomy, but corporate survival.
What STG/HTS wants
Symbolic sovereignty, Flag planting, A claim they can sell domestically and to Turkey, The ability to say “the state is everywhere”
Hence:
Ambiguity on central force deployment east of Euphrates, insistence on MoD hierarchy without defining command chains
No defined Command & Control = future leverage point for coercion.
🧵 1/
#Syria 🇸🇾 today is a chessboard where every actor claims survival, security, or ideology — but the actual game is pure Machiavellian statecraft.
Nobody embodies that better than Netanyahu, who just openly laid out Israel’s Syria strategy in a way few leaders dare. ↓
2/ After touring the occupied Golan and Quneitra front, Netanyahu declared:
“Southern Syria is now our buffer zone… under our control. Neither the Syrian army nor Turkey will be allowed in.”
Spelling out the new doctrine of permanent Israeli protectorate carved out of Syria.
3/ This statement didn’t happen in a vacuum.
Turkey (the single most disruptive foreign actor inside Syria) has spent a decade weaponizing proxy factions, running intelligence networks, engineering demographic change, and blocking every attempt at Syrian reunification.
1/ I was recently contacted about a man who claims to have been “in my battalion.” He rose on stolen valor, built a social platform, crowdfunded a boat—and then used other activists as his security blanket. I won’t make his name the story. This is.
2/ But before anyone labels me a spoilsport: I do not support the genocide in Gaza. My critique comes from a decolonial, field-worn anthropology — from fighting alongside Kurds in Syria and watching how solidarity is co-opted.
3/ The Sumud/Global flotilla is being praised as courageous. Yet it is being escorted — at least for part of the voyage — by the Italian navy. That matters. Reuters reports Italy will stop escorting only when the flotilla reaches ~150 nm from Gaza, and has already deployed ships.
ASSESSMENT OF HAMAS VIDEO RELEASE 1/ Drawing on my experience as a former commander with the YPG International Battalion during the Raqqa campaign, I assess several key elements in this video.
2/
Much of the operational picture is deliberately absent. For example, sniper teams are not shown but were almost certainly employed to suppress defenses around the target site — a construction facility likely serving as a forward IDF outpost.
3/ The terrain provided unobstructed 360-degree visibility, and it is plausible that 20 or more IDF personnel were stationed there.