🧵 Clearing the Confusion: HTS, Turkish Proxies, and the Threat to Rojava (AANES)
1/ A lot of confused "experts": What are the goals of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Turkish-backed SNA? How do their actions threaten Rojava (AANES)? Let’s clarify.
2/ At the heart of this chaos are two key operation rooms, Al-Fath al-Mubin (الفَتح المُبين) and Fajr al-Hurriya (فجر الحرية). While both are rebel coalitions, their objectives and loyalties couldn’t be more different.
3/
- Al-Fath al-Mubin, led by HTS, is a jihadist coalition enforcing strict sharia law, focused on fighting Assad’s regime.
- Fajr al-Hurriya, however, is a Turkish-backed Islamist mercenaries, created to dismantle Kurdish autonomy and serve Ankara’s interests.
4/
The HTS led coalition has, since the fall of Aleppo, focused on holding Idlib.
But their forces are now sweeping through northern Syria, capturing in a few days more territory than they held in 2014. HTS isn’t just holding ground anymore—it’s reshaping the map of Syria.
5/ Despite its rapid advances, HTS operates—within certain parameters—independently of Turkey. During the 2018 Afrin offensive, HTS did not participate, as it was busy attacking rival factions, a move that angered Ankara.
HTS's goals do not always align with Turkey’s.
6/ In contrast, the Fajr al-Hurriya operation room is a rebranding of Turkish-backed militias, notorious for recycling ISIS veterans as with Ahrar al-Sharqiyah.
Their raison d’être? The destruction of the AANES, and the erasure of Kurdish identity from Turkey's border.
7/
Fajr al-Hurriya moved from al Bab, captured Taduf and Aran, cutting critical Kurdish supply lines.
Occupied Halap ar-Raqqah road and parts of the M4, to isolate the Kurdish Aleppo pocket and Tel Rifaat from the rest of Rojava to choke Kurds and prepare to siege them.
8/
These actions align with Turkey’s long-term goals:
Dismantling the AANES—a model of democracy, gender equality, and ecological justice—and ethnically cleansing the Kurdish population to resettle pro-Islamist Arab factions and their families.
9/
HTS opposes the AANES secularism, but under Jolani, it’s trying to rebrand as moderate and gain international legitimacy. A former ISIS commander besieging Sheikh Maqsoud—the same Kurds that defended Kobane? But this could change with shift in political dynamics / pressures.
10/ The stakes are high for Rojava. The Kurdish Aleppo pocket, including Tel Rifaat, is crucial. If Fajr al-Hurriya cuts supply routes, it could trigger a humanitarian disaster for 300k IDPs displaced by Turkey's Afrin invasion, now living in Shahba camp.
11/ Let’s not forget the war crimes by Fajr al-Hurriya’s militias. Ahrar al-Sharqiyah, a key group, brutally assassinated Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf in 2019. Linked to ethnic cleansing, and extrajudicial killings. Despite sanctions, Turkey still uses them as proxies.
12/ In 2014, Turkey’s MİT was caught smuggling weapons to jihadists in Syria, ISIS too, under the guise of 'humanitarian aid.' Journalist Can Dündar revealed the truth and was imprisoned for 'violating state secrets.' Now, they don’t even bother to hide it. But, they take part.
13/ With billions from Qatar, the best picks from Turkey’s arsenal, and years to select and train recruits from 2 million IDPs in Idlib, HTS’s overwhelming force suddenly feels less like a mystery and more like the product of cold, calculated backing.
14/
The two operation rooms—HTS’s Al-Fath al-Mubin and Turkey’s Fajr al-Hurriya—represent an existential threat to Rojava:
One looming, the other imminent. Both are wielded by the Turkish state.
But the fight for Rojava is far from over.
(End of Thread)
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That’s me in 2016, one of the founders of the Antifascist Internationalist Tabur—later dubbed Antifa Platoon by Rolling Stone magazine.
Now, as Trump announces he’s designating Antifa a major terrorist organization, I want to share my own experience. You be the judge. Thread 🧵
As an Italian antifascist, I carry a heritage. When I sang “Bella Ciao” with my Kurdish comrades during the siege of Kobani, I was using the same words my father had sung on the hills of Tuscany with his partisan comrades as they fought against the Nazi-Fascist occupation. /2
We fought within the "The Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS". Despite media sensationalism, in reality we were little more than a small fire team within the YPG, flying the Antifa flag for a photo op. We disbanded around the time of the Tabqa battle, which was our first real engagement. /3
These operations incorporated air-delivered munitions and artillery fire support. Simultaneously, persistent unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) activity was observed across the battlespace, in support of strike coordination & damage assessment. [HPG sources]
/2
During this period, a Turkish parliamentary commission was already in motion to formalize political engagement, while the PKK undertook visible steps toward de-escalation, including a disarmament ceremony and its formal declaration of organizational dissolution.
/3
Picture a bar in Nepal. Modam Kumal serves tea, makes barely enough to live. Then comes the offer: “security job in Russia.” A contract he can’t read. He signs. Weeks later, he’s not guarding doors in Moscow — he’s crawling through mud in Donetsk, under fire.
Now imagine Sierra Leone. Richard Kanu sells what he can, pays $3,000 for a visa. A new beginning, he thinks. Instead, recruiters hand him a rifle. His dream of wages becomes a trench. His labor — stolen, militarized. 2/8
Flash to Kyiv. A man walks to work, papers in his pocket. A van pulls up. Draft officers grab him, no warning. This isn’t rumor — it has a name: “busification.” A one-way ride from the street to a barracks, from routine life to the front. 3/8
Mehmet is yet another Kurdish activist getting extradited by Germany under the absurd Art. 302 of the Turkish penal code (“disrupting the state’s unity”). Why is Europe outsourcing its borders to Erdogan’s Clepto Sultanate — a regime breaking records for jailing journalists? 🧵
Italy extradited him to Germany on the promise he’d never be sent on to a third country—and his Italian asylum case is still pending. Now, in just 7 days, Berlin plans to hand him to Turkey, where Art. 302 = life without parole. /2
Germany banned the PKK in ’93. Then came §129b: a law to charge “membership in a foreign terrorist organization.” No act of violence required—being Kurdish, organizing, even raising a flag can be enough. That’s how you criminalize a people without firing a shot. /3
Welcome to the theater of the absurd: on one stage, Trump crowns an al-Qaeda figure as Syria’s “new face of governance.” On the next, they insist it’s all about counterterrorism.
Let’s pull back the curtain on the latest OIR report. From someone who’s worn an SDF patch. 🧵
2/9 The reports begins with the OIR objectives in Syria:
☑️ Prevent Syria from being used as a base for ISIS, Iran, or other terrorist groups;
☑️ Complete and verifiable destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons program;
☑️ Determine the fate of U.S. citizens missing in Syria.
3/9 Literally on the next line, Trump crowns Jolani in Riyadh. And offers a deal...
Normalization & sanctions relief, in exchange the Syrian govt
☑️ joins the Abraham Accords
☑️ kicks out foreign fighters & Palestinians
☑️ fights ISIS
☑️ takes over ISIS prisons from the SDF
Combat Readiness of “SAA 2.0” — A Clausewitzian Lens 🧵
The fighting strength of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has undergone a severe degradation by absorbing 90,000 opportunistic, undisciplined SNA troops. This is how HTS has diluted its own military core. ↓
2/ Clausewitz wrote that combat strength lies not only in numbers, but in cohesion, discipline, and will. In this merger, HTS traded away its professionalism for bulk. Numbers became the enemy of force.
3/ Commanders once hardened by years of brutal battles against Assad found themselves outranked by men whose greatest “victory” was extorting civilians and seizing property. Authority without merit corrodes an army from within.