Yādavācārya (16th century), disciple of Rāmakṛṣṇa Cakravartī, refutes his opponent who says that teaching Nyāya philosophy to Śūdras would lead to sin. The issue is that sage Gautama is said to have created this for the benefit of 'all', which would include Śūdras also.
(1/5)
Yādavācārya specifies 'teaching' as an act directed to a specific person. If another person listens to it, it doesn't count as teaching. When the opponent points out that if 'all' includes Śūdras, it would be inevitably directed towards them also. Yādavācārya responds
(2/5)
Yādavācārya responds by that even in the thesis of the opponent, being directed toward Ātman of a Brāhmaṇa, it is directed towards the Ātman of a Śūdra also. So the same fault could be found with opponent too.
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He then quotes a sarcastic statement of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi who says that such directed-ness happens even in the case of insects and so forth.
In conclusion, there's no sin on the teacher on account of teaching Nyāya philosophy to Śūdras.
(4/5)
It is rather interesting that such issues were being raised in the first place, although they were being responded to in one way or the other.
Reference: Yādavācārya's commentary on Jānakīnātha Bhaṭṭācārya's Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī.
(5/5)
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Based on Vācaspati's argument, Udayana cites a belief that because the anumāna of Nyāyaśāstra has to be unopposed to Vedas, and the knowledge of such non-opposition requires knowledge of Vedas, Śūdras are not eligible for studying Nyāyaśāstra. +
Although this is the pūrvapakṣa, but he accepts it at the end.
The flaw in this argument is twofold.
Firstly, to know that the some idea or behaviour is unopposed to Vedas can be known even through Itihāsas, Purāṇas, and verbal testimony of Śiṣṭas.
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If not, Śūdras and others couldn't even practise their dharma, which should be unopposed to Vedas, because of the lack of direct access to Vedas. +
Manu says, “सन्तोषं परमास्थाय सुखार्थी संयतो भवेत्” (the one desirous of happiness should be disciplined while having contentment).
Why?
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He says, “सन्तोषमूलं हि सुखं दुःखमूलं विपर्ययः” (contentment is the cause of happiness, non-contentment is the cause of suffering).
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He briefly defines happiness and suffering as, “सर्वं परवशं दुःखं सर्वमात्मवशं सुखम्” (all that is in someone else’s control is the cause of suffering, all that which is in one’s own control is happiness).
The definitions are like; 'A Brāhmaṇa is the one born of duly wedded Brāhmaṇa & Brāhmaṇī'. Now someone may ask; on what basis is his father a Brāhmaṇa (similar about his mother)?
Such questioning and lack of a definitive proof will lead to an infinite regress.
(2/5)
At this point Medhātithi brings in the idea that collective unbroken memory of a people as being of 'X-jāti' is the definitive proof of them being of 'X-jāti'.
That jāti cannot be identified by merely looking at someone, rules out the possibility of it being biological.
A Pāraśava man (son of a Brāhmaṇa father & Śūdra mother) marries a Pāraśava woman, begets a Pāraśava son, who similarly marries a Pāraśava woman. If this process continues for 6 generations, the 7th generation will be born a Brāhmaṇa.
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Also, Ganganatha Jha's notes in the second screenshot show how the traditional commentators of this Manusmṛti-verse differ significantly in their interpretations.
My tweet contains Nandana's interpretation. He also cites Baudhāyanadharmasūtra which states something similar.
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It says that if a Niṣāda (Pāraśava) man marries a Niṣāda woman, both beget a Niṣāda son who marries a Niṣāda woman, then if such tradition continues, the 5th generation wouldn't be a Śūdra and would get Upanayana, so on and so forth.