Thread by @michaeldweiss

New "Karl" thread, with @holger_r: 🧵

"The situation on the frontlines has not significantly changed in the last month. For UA, the most difficult area remains the southern part of the eastern front—Pokrovsk and Kurakhove. RU continues to advance there, but very slowly and at the cost of heavy losses."

"Some bloggers claim that Kurakhove has already fallen into RU's hands, but it seems that this is not yet the case. UA continues to resist, but after some time, RU will take the town. Pokrovsk is farther away, and urban battles there could last a long time. There is no real threat of RU capturing it within a couple of months."

"Pokrovsk is a larger city and a transportation hub. There is much more urban infrastructure and property in which to hold positions. RU on their part, has more to destroy, and this takes time."

"In Kursk, RU is also pushing, but it is harder to assess the front line there. There are no well-established defensive fortifications, and both sides are conducting dynamic attacks into the other's rear. RU has not achieved significant success in Kursk."

"In Kursk, North Korean soldiers are involved in the fighting, but they do not bring any major changes. It only allows RU to recruit fewer of its own people. North Koreans are cheaper cannon fodder."

"There are likely to be further incidents, such as the one where North Koreans allegedly fired on Kadyrovites. The language barrier is so significant. Allegedly, NK units have been integrated into RU battalions. They do not have enough proper interpreters for every 200–300 men. In an actual combat episode, there is no time for interpreters to act anyway."

"RU has no hope of reclaiming Kursk within a month. There is no sign of such successful offensives. On other parts of the front, the situation is relatively stable. In some places, RU is applying pressure, but no significant advances have been made."

"For the next 2-3 months, air force activity will also be more limited than usual. With cloudy weather the air force cannot operate very actively."

"The current war dynamics are such that what happens on the battlefield is far less important than the political game surrounding it. Militarily, there is no reason to believe that the front lines will see major surprises in the next 3–4 months."

"Another Kursk-style offensive is unlikely. Further developments depend on what plan Trump proposes and how long it takes him to do so. Currently, Trump does not have a comprehensive plan ready."

"I believe that Trump’s administration will try to present some sort of plan within a month of taking office. What follows will depend on the reactions of the parties involved. UA will at least take it into serious consideration."

"But RU will continue its rhetoric about revising the entire European security structure and returning to its December 2021 ultimatum. This position is a nonstarter, and no one will negotiate on it. RU itself understands this as well."

"The question then becomes what Trump will do next. If he wants to force RU to negotiate, he will need to provide significantly more military aid to UA. Whether he does this, whether aid to UA increases slightly, decreases slightly, or remains at its current level, is unknown."

"The key is to ensure that if RU responds with a rigid "no," the U.S will punish RU, not UA. There is a risk that it might be easier to pressure those who are more easily influenced. This was also the downside of the Minsk negotiations: GER and FRA put more pressure on UA than on RU. I would hope Trump does not do the same."

"I think U.S. aid to UA will continue as it does today, and there will not be a complete cessation of aid. The war will continue in its current form for a considerable time."

Regarding Trump's criticism of Biden allowing UA to use missiles on RU territory: "I think it more reflects opposition to Biden rather than Trump's true thoughts. Previously, several of Trump's close associates criticized Biden's administration for not making this decision. What Trump will do when he’s in office remains highly unpredictable."

"That said, Trump's statement was unnecessary. It emboldens RU. In theory, Trump could reverse this decision, but he can control UA only if he offers something in return. Biden could control UA because general military aid from the U.S. to UA continued. If Trump decides to end general military aid as well, UA is unlikely to listen to him in the long run."

"Contacts between VZ and DT certainly exist. Signals from people who have met with Trump's circle indicate a message of "peace from the position of strength." This theme runs through many discussions. It is an adequate approach. RU can only be forced into peace from a position of strength."

"The GER chancellor is playing a very domestic political game. Statements from Scholz, such as the need to communicate with RU and that it should not be left solely to Trump, will likely emerge before elections. This is aimed at keeping the party's left wing on his side."

"There is much talk about sending EUR peacekeepers to UA, but this is not a relevant topic right now. It can only be discussed if some kind of peace or ceasefire is in place, and we are far from that. At present, this discussion only creates confusion."

"If Europe must eventually take on this role, it will be a significant challenge. EUR ground forces are not particularly strong, and a peacekeeping mission would rely heavily on ground troops."

"Another issue is that it would be very dangerous to undertake this without the U.S. If such security guarantees are to be provided to UA, they must include the U.S. to some extent. This is also in EUR's strategic interest."

Regarding Rutte's warnings about an approaching war and the need to prepare for it: "I am not confident that Rutte's words are having an effect in Europe. EUR defense budgets are gradually increasing, but I do not see the arms industry experiencing significant acceleration."

"We are still planning procurements for 2028 rather than for March 2025. I do not sense a shift in routine. True, GER's defense industry has significantly increased its pace, but the French and British industries have not done so to the same extent."

"For RU, a noteworthy event is the collapse of Assad's regime. This demonstrates the classic weakness of dictatorships. Two weeks earlier, no one believed this could happen. TUR did perceive the weakness of RU and IRN."

"The process that began on October 7, 2023, led to a situation where IRN and its allies were so weakened that they could not ensure Assad's survival. TUR recognized this and strongly supported opposition movements."

"From the moment relatively small units moved out of Idlib, the regime collapsed in ten days. While RU’s operation to capture Kyiv in three days and UA in two weeks failed, Turkey and HTS succeeded in Syria."

"Now, it is worth observing what happens to RU’s bases in Syria. Will RU leave them completely? The naval base in Tartus has been in their possession since 1971 and is RU's only base in the Mediterranean."

"This would be an absolute loss of RU prestige. It demonstrates that RU's resources are far smaller than it has managed to project. However, the events in Syria do not have a direct impact on the war against UA."

"The Oreshkin missile is purely a propaganda tool. RU certainly does not have many of these missiles. They are also certainly not capable of putting Oreshkin into serial production at this time. It is not even clear how successful this one launch was."

"Some say that it exploded before hitting ground and failed to demonstrate any significant destruction power. It is also uncertain whether Oreshkin would reach a target in areas with UA's best air defense systems. This may be why Dnipro was chosen as the target."

"Oreshkin is being hyped far beyond its actual importance. It is largely about playing on Western fears, just like RU’s entire nuclear deterrence narrative. It does not have a substantial impact on the course of the war."

"Last week, there were warnings of a new Oreshkin attack, but it did not materialize. Instead, there was a missile attack on Western Ukraine and its energy infrastructure, where UA’s air defense is weaker."

"Even there, the consequences of the attacks were quite limited. A prolonged collapse of energy systems, like the one at the beginning of 2023, did not occur."

"UA's energy infrastructure is holding up. Interruptions occur, but RU’s attacks are not frequent enough. UA handles cruise missiles well, but ballistic missiles pose more challenges except where air defenses are very strong."

"However, RU does not have enough ballistic missiles to cause a complete blackout of UA’s electrical system. Such attacks might lead to temporary restrictions on electricity use, but the hits are not that massive, and UA is able to restore power supply."

"It is almost certain that RU will not be able to destroy UA's energy system to the extent that it significantly affects the war by the end of winter. There will be no catastrophe." /END