DoD released the 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) today.
Here’s a 🧵 of some portions I found noteworthy as I read it:
“The PLA is exploring a range of “neurocognitive warfare” capabilities that exploit adversaries using neuroscience and psychology.”
Here’s a 🧵 of some portions I found noteworthy as I read it:
“The PLA is exploring a range of “neurocognitive warfare” capabilities that exploit adversaries using neuroscience and psychology.”
“The PLA has recognized the importance of incorporating emerging technologies, such as AI, big data, brain science, and neuroscience into CDO as the PLA perceives that these technologies will lead to profound changes in the ability to subvert human cognition.”
“PLA articles on CDO state that seizing mind dominance in the cognitive domain and subduing the enemy without fighting is the highest realm of warfare.”
“The PLAAF is rapidly approaching technology typical of U.S. standards.”
“The PRC probably is developing advanced nuclear delivery systems, such as a strategic HGV and a fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) system.”
“By the mid- to late-2020s, the PRC may field higher power systems to extend the threat to the structures of non-optical satellites.”
“…growing PLA strike capabilities will attack an increasing array of targets and, thereby, attain international strategic effects by striking critical nodes of the global economy during a future conflict.”
“The PRC may be developing a YJ-18 launcher using a standard commercial shipping container for a merchant vessel.”
🚨
🚨
“The PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and can launch cyberspace attacks—
such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the United States.”
such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the United States.”
“The PLA sees coordinated employment of space, cyberspace, and EW as strategic weapons to “paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems” and “sabotage the enemy’s war command system of systems” early in a conflict.”
“The large growth of the PLA silo
force suggests Beijing is making progress in establishing its “early warning counterstrike” posture
to increase the survivability and responsiveness of these launch sites.”
force suggests Beijing is making progress in establishing its “early warning counterstrike” posture
to increase the survivability and responsiveness of these launch sites.”
“If a comingled PRC missile launch is not readily identifiable as a conventional or nuclear missile, it may not be clear what the PRC launched until it detonates.”
“In 2020, DoD estimated the PRC’s operational nuclear warhead stockpile was in the low-200s and
was expected to at least double by 2030. However, Beijing has accelerated its nuclear expansion,
and DoD estimates this stockpile has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads as of 2024, on
track to **exceed previous projections**.”
was expected to at least double by 2030. However, Beijing has accelerated its nuclear expansion,
and DoD estimates this stockpile has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads as of 2024, on
track to **exceed previous projections**.”
“Since the 2015–2016 military reforms, the PRC has expanded
its UGF (Underground Facility) program to support survivable and redundant nodes for its wartime contingency planning.”
its UGF (Underground Facility) program to support survivable and redundant nodes for its wartime contingency planning.”
“The PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign.
Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration, which could include some activities in the space and cyber domains, such as EW, network attacks, and IO.
In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement.”
Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration, which could include some activities in the space and cyber domains, such as EW, network attacks, and IO.
In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement.”
“The ASF, formerly subordinate the SSF, operates TT&C stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina, and Kenya. The ASF has a handful of Yuan-wang space support ships to track satellite and ICBM launches.”
Argentina… 🤔
Argentina… 🤔
“Guidelines exist to ensure PLA attachés have operational backgrounds; however, all PLA attachés were previously intelligence officers with the CMC Joint Staff Department Military Intelligence Directorate.
With the growth of the PLA attaché network overseas, some attaches are drawn from operational forces for work in foreign capitals and often **lack the requisite language skills**.”
lol
With the growth of the PLA attaché network overseas, some attaches are drawn from operational forces for work in foreign capitals and often **lack the requisite language skills**.”
lol
“The PLA is probably most interested in military access along the SLOCs from the PRC to the Strait of Hormuz and Africa.”
“The PRC is interested in increasing the use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to cut shipping times between Europe and the PRC by approximately a third. The use of the NSR enables the PRC to diversify shipping routes away from the strategic Strait of Malacca.”
“The PRC is the world's top ship-producing nation by tonnage and can produce a wide range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and electronic systems, which makes it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs.”
must be nice…😔
must be nice…😔
“The PRC is particularly focused on dominating a range of emerging, dual-use technologies that promise to be disruptive and foundational for future economies.
In its 14th FYP, the PRC prioritized the advancement of next-generation Al, quantum information, brain science and biotechnology, semiconductors, and deep space, deep sea, and polar-related technologies.”
The latter three don’t come up much in the conventional discourse, do they…
In its 14th FYP, the PRC prioritized the advancement of next-generation Al, quantum information, brain science and biotechnology, semiconductors, and deep space, deep sea, and polar-related technologies.”
The latter three don’t come up much in the conventional discourse, do they…
“In March 2024, a U.S. Army intelligence analyst was arrested for transmiting sensitive
documents pertaining to the tactics, techniques, and procedures manuals for the HH-60W helicopter, the F-22-A Raptor, ICBMs, and the HIMARS system. The analyst provided information on U.S. military exercises, studies on major countries including the PRC, hypersonic equipment, and **the United States' potential plans during a Taiwan contingency**.”
not great!
documents pertaining to the tactics, techniques, and procedures manuals for the HH-60W helicopter, the F-22-A Raptor, ICBMs, and the HIMARS system. The analyst provided information on U.S. military exercises, studies on major countries including the PRC, hypersonic equipment, and **the United States' potential plans during a Taiwan contingency**.”
not great!
“The military commander and political commissar are considered equals and share joint leadership over the unit in issuing orders and daily tasks. While the party committee makes decisions on major issues, the military commander is usually responsible for daily decisions on military and operational matters, whereas the political commissar is typically responsible for the unit's political work and personnel decisions.”
awkward…
awkward…
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