I will do a piece for @Diplomat_APAC in time, but for now -- preliminary thoughts on the role of CAC's new generation combat aircraft ("J-36").
We've had rumours of this for a while now, via the same sourcing and methods that predicted J-20 14 years ago and many PLA projects. 1/
This grapevine gave us characteristics of this "J-36" (I called "J-XD"), including its rough size, engine configuration, and yes its role and its descriptor as "6th generation".
I view numerical generations as neither here nor there, so I will refer it as "new generation". 2/
Role discussion is less fluid: this CAC aircraft is spoken of as A2A oriented (though as with all modern tactical aircraft, a degree of multirole capability is expected).
I observe many have made arguments that this may be a fighter-bomber/striker, or an outright bomber. 3/
The rationale is fair -- J-36 is large. It's a dorito flying wing, without overt control surfaces poking out. It doesn't "look" like a traditional air superiority aircraft.
One might be reminded of B-21/B-2, but with a narrower wingspan for supersonic intent. 4/
All this depends on how one views the "air superiority" mission of the future.
It's no secret that everyone, including the USAF, is pursuing a system of systems approach involving progressively more capable and distributed UCAVs/CCAs and other platforms.
The PLA is too. 5/
Those advances may lower the relative value of traditional maneuvering compared to previous "generations".
The higher yield characteristics may be signature reduction, sensing, networking, friendly CCAs, weapons, power generation, processing, range/endurance. 6/
There is evidence of that with contemporary aircraft upgrades -- F-35 Block 4's focus lies more on software, avionics, power management, weapons suite than pulling more Gs or bleeding edge kinematics. Same is rumoured for the new J-20A even though it benefits from WS-15. 7/
At this stage, estimates of J-36's size puts it maybe a bit longer than J-20 at 21-23m, with a wingspan of 20m or so. For a blended delta flying wing with a rather thick fuselage, that is a big plane.
Even with three engines, that is plentiful internal volume and mass. 8/
That capacity can be for fuel, networking, sensors, processing, power generation, cooling, and yes weapons.
Even with poor imagery, we can see J-36 has a larger IWB than J-20. But that is not decisive towards the A2A or strike role. 9/
For the A2A role, a large IWB means internal carriage of large weapons such as the PL-17 VLRAAM, or a greater no. of traditional sized BVRAAMs or emerging shorter length BVRAAMs.
In the strike role, a large IWB means internal standoff weapons, or even a rotary launcher. 10/
However, those options can exist on the same multirole aircraft if large enough, and logical to pursue especially if the air superiority mission is enabled by your weapons, sensors, networking, and friendly CCAs/UCAVs. 11/
Or -- what is the difference between a modern long range air superiority aircraft versus a modern theater strike aircraft?
I would offer the answer -- possibly very little, barring an air superiority aircraft may have slightly higher AoA/kinematic needs vs a striker. 12/
I.e.: you'll still need to account for some high AoA maneuvers, so you might not put your intakes on the dorsal fuselage (J-36 has two side intakes, and possibly a single intake, likely feeding one engine each).
But it means you probably won't be pulling cobras at airshows. 13/
And while other new generation combat aircraft in the world are not yet flown and aren't yet conclusive, trends to VLO, larger size, seems consistent: such as with the latest GCAP design (p1), industry concept art of NGAD (p2), or think tank visions of NGAD (p3). 14/
I propose, the near future of air superiority manned combat aircraft are large, stealthy, command+processing platforms to direct friendly UCAVs and other manned fighters, with its own capable weapons+sensors to engage, and enough kinematics to engage on its own terms. 15/
As UCAVs/CCAs become more autonomous and onboard processing advances, the benefits of a manned air superiority combat aircraft are likely to grow too -- the rate limiting factor will be human attention in the cockpit.
But "fighter aircraft" may become an anachronistic term... 16/
... and it will be "combat aircraft" that exerts the highest yield effects by acting as linchpins of your aerial warfare system-of-systems, in a manner where they can command in a stealthy, persistent way -- yet possessing organic lethality and sensing in their own right. 17/
Finally, on a different note, many have compared the USAF NGAD demonstrator(s) described by DoD as flown in years past, with J-36 (and the SAC new gen aircraft), in terms of "first to 6th/next gen" milestones.
I think this is a very valid point to make... 18/
... but the true measure of this comparison IMO depends on how representative the NGAD demonstrator(s) are of the final NGAD article procured by the USAF -- and same goes for J-36 and SAC's new gen airframe too for the PLA. 19/
Also, we know flight demonstrators relevant to 6th/new gen planforms preceded J-36 and SAC aircraft. We may have seen one of them at CAC a few years ago; a tailless, near J-10 sized airframe.
This is not a case of "instinctively showing off" the newest toy they had. 20/
There is more to be said about this plane in coming weeks/months/years: from procurement in PLA context, to rationale of its unique three engine configuration, to complementary aircraft (PLA's UCAVs/CCAs), and SAC's new plane.
But for now, this is my view of J-36's role.
21/end
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First, I think the blogpost and FP article titles could be something more like "PRC views science and technology as central to economic growth and geopolitical competitiveness". Less snazzy, but more accurate. 1/
The articles do not argue why science and technological advancement are not central to economic growth or national competitiveness -- i.e.: there's no convincing argument as to why science/tech/industry are *not* worth state led advancements... 2/
Comparisons with the USSR are sensible on the surface but lacks comparison of the vast differences -- geopol circumstance, economic model, domestic and foreign markets, ideological flexibility and rigor.
After all the USSR had many flaws that led to its demise... 3/
Recent images give weight to rumours that Y-20B may be a MRTT (so called Multi Role Tanker Transport) -- that is, all Y-20B airframes may be capable of conversion to a tanker role through wing pods. This could prove rather meaningful. (1/16)
As of late 2023, the PLA's tanker fleet includes (from oldest to newest): 20+ HY-6s (turbojet engines, old, small), 3 Il-78s (some converted to a transport role), and 8+ YY-20As... so, 20+ obsolete small tankers, with 12+ large-ish tankers that still use old D-30 engines. (2/16)
Relative to the PLA's air fleet size (PLAAF + PLANAF), especially their fighter fleet, the current tanker fleet size very small. Compared to the USAF, the difference is even more stark, even if one accounts for a lack of an expeditionary mission for the PLA. (3/16)
Thread: the Ru-Ukr war has shown many lessons, one of being the importance of A2G ISR+PGMs.
For PLA, most of their combat aviation development in last 20 years was prioritised for air control systems, with precision A2G being mostly ALCMs.
Only one type of 500kg LGB as PGM.
1/n
Priority on air control (BVR, AEWC, EW/EA, air superiority) makes sense, and short range PGMs needs air control to employ them anyhow.
But with some 40 and counting AEWC, 700 new modern fighters in last decade (still growing), very mature BVR, widespread AESA use...
2/n
... a growing stealth fighter fleet (~100 J-20s in service as of early this yr), a varied EA/EW capability (SOJs on Y-8/9 types, tacjammers/wild weasel in J-16D+JH-7A) - it may be sensible to finally embark on modernizing A2G the same way they did for A2A in the last 20 yrs.
An awaited video for me, and I hold both @MilAvHistory and @Justin_Br0nk in high regard; the video is worth watching.
However, also a few observations/caveats, based on my base of knowledge... /1
Re - buying Su-35s to RE the engines, IMO is very dubious.
While 117S is a capable engine, by the time they bought the Su-35s, work on uprated WS-10 iterations and WS-15 would've been sufficiently ahead that RE-ing 117S is almost certainly not worthwhile.
/2
Re - canards and LO vs VLO, while arguments about J-20's all aspect stealth or VLO can be made WRT rear aspect (interim engine nozzles currently), the idea of canards being categorically "non-stealthy" goes against many designs pursued by likes of LM, NG etc (JAST, NATF)...
/3
1. At Falcon Strike 2015, they sent vintage J-11As, equipped w/ R-27 or early R-77 at best. Up vs Gripen Cs w/ superior radar and AIM-120Cs, obviously J-11As would've been destroyed in BVR domain. nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/one-…
1/5
2. The big margin of victory in WVR being so lopsided for the J-11As is somewhat surprising given Gripens are far from sluggish.
3. Context for the J-11A -- in terms of avionics and weapons, the closest peer would be an F-15A but with Russian avionics and cockpit of the era. 2/5
4. Situational awareness + BVR is highly dependent on: avionics, BVR capability, and pilot workload (cockpit design). In all those domains, the J-11A is leagues behind Gripen C.
5. J-11A is easily the oldest + least capable 4th gen fighter in PLA arsenal, for above reasons. 3/5