A 1998 @nytimes op-ed by John Gaddis on NATO expansion warned that shutting Russia out of the West — unlike Germany & Japan post-WWII — would have consequences. Bill Clinton's plan was to block Western integration for Moscow (which very much wanted it at the time) to keep NATO relevant by ensuring it had an enemy.
After all, what’s a military bloc without a foe?
The US State Department's claim that Russia 'wouldn’t react' was, as he put it, as believable as pigs flying.
Decades later, here we are.
Credit to @VladislavZubok1, who unearthed the original.
In 1997, the @nytimes (it was clearly a very different paper then) exposed how NATO expansion was a windfall for arms manufacturers, who had seen contracts dry up in the post-Cold War peace.
With billions at stake, weapons giants like Lockheed Martin lobbied hard for NATO’s growth, funding nonprofits and wining and dining senators to push the agenda.
Expansion wasn't just about security or strategy—it was about selling fighter jets, helicopters, and military tech to new member states.
The biggest winners were defense contractors cashing in on a manufactured need for 'Western integration.'
Post-Cold War peace? Bad for business. NATO expansion? Perfect for profits.
In 1998, the @nytimes revealed that NATO expansion wasn’t just about ‘security’—it was a jackpot for US arms makers like Lockheed Martin, who spent millions lobbying Congress to push it through.
Expansion meant billions in jet and weapons sales to new members, subsidized by U.S. taxpayers. Poland wanted 150 F-16s at $20M each.
A senator even joked that landlocked Hungary might get a navy!
NATO’s eastward push wasn’t just geopolitics—it was big business.
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