1) Pandemic caused by bat SARS-like coronavirus emerged in Wuhan--city 1000 km from wild bats with SARS-CoV-2-like coronaviruses, but that contains labs conducting world's largest research program on bat SARS-like coronaviruses.
2) In 2015-2017, scientists and science-policy specialists expressed concern that the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) was conducting and contemplating research that posed an unacceptable risk of lab accident and pandemic (nature.com/articles/natur……; nature.com/articles/natur……).
3) In 2017-2018, with NIH funding, WIV constructed a novel genetically modified SARS-like coronavirus that was able to infect human cells and that had 10,000x enhanced viral growth in lungs, 1,000,000x enhanced viral growth in brains, and 3x enhanced lethality.
4) In 2018, in an NIH grant proposal, WIV and collaborators proposed to construct additional novel genetically modified SARS-like coronaviruses, proposing to construct viruses with higher binding affinities to human cells, seeking viruses with higher pandemic potential.
5) Also in 2018, in a DARPA grant proposal, WIV and collaborators proposed to construct novel "consensus" SARS-like coronaviruses, to insert an furin cleavage site (FCS) at the spike S1-S2 border, and to do so by assembling six synthetic genome segments.
6) In 2017-2019, WIV constructed and characterized novel SARS-like coronaviruses at biosafety level 2, a biosafety level grossly inadequate for work with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens and grossly inadequate to contain a virus having transmission properties of SARS-CoV-2.
7) In 2019 a novel SARS-like coronavirus having spike with high binding affinity, FCS at spike S1-S2, and genome with restriction sites for genome assembly from six synthetic segments--a virus having the features of the 2018 NIH and DARPA proposals--emerges on doorstep of WIV.
8) SARS-CoV-2 is the only one of more than 800 known SARS-like coronaviruses that contains an FCS. This feature does not rule out natural origin, but is more easily--much more easily--explained by lab origin. Especially since 2018 DARPA proposal explicitly proposed inserting FCS.
9) The FCS of SARS-CoV-2 has codon usage that is highly unusual for a bat SARS-related coronavirus but that is as expected for a genetically engineered construct. This does not rule out natural origin, but is more easily--much more easily--explained by lab origin.
10) The genome of SARS-CoV-has BsmBI and BsaI sites consistent with assembly from six segments. This does not rule out natural origin, but is more easily explained by lab origin. Especially since 2018 DARPA proposal explicitly proposed assembling six segments and using BsmBI.
11) No--zero--sound evidence has been presented that SARS-CoV-2 has a natural origin. No natural
reservoir host or intermediate host has been identified, and claims
that SARS-CoV-2 first entered humans at the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan are unsound.
12) In 2020-present, WIV and its funders/collaborators at EcoHealth Alliance have withheld information, misrepresented facts, and obstructed investigation...even though, if not connected to origin, they easily could have cleared their name though cooperation with investigation.
All statements in all posts are demonstrable facts. Sources for posts 1-2 include the following:
@Publius0001 Additional information on gain-of-function research of concern is available in my August 3, 2022 US Senate testimony at .hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/upl…
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"Potential pandemic pathogen...research conducted at an inappropriate biosafety level should be considered an abnormally dangerous activity subject to strict liability."
LASST (Legal Advocates for Safe Science and Technology) Amicus Brief Project lasst.org/2024/12/23/las…
"Applying a strict liability standard to an activity means that the person or entity conducting the activity will be held liable for any harm the activity caused, even if they were not negligent in conducting the activity."
"We believe a body of law that applies a strict liability standard when irresponsibly unsafe research causes harm could serve an important role in disincentivizing unreasonably dangerous research in the future."
"Hundreds of vials containing live viruses have gone missing from a lab…in Australia, sparking an investigation…323 samples of live viruses—including Hendra virus, Lyssavirus and Hantavirus—went missing…in a 'serious breach of biosecurity protocols.'"
"The breach was discovered in August 2023, with nearly 100 of the missing vials containing Hendra virus, which is deadly. Two of the vials contained hantavirus, while 223 vials contained samples of lyssavirus."
"Hendra virus has a 57 percent fatality rate in humans"
"While we may not be aware of all the instances in which Fauci funded gain-of-function experiments despite the ban, we do know of at least one hugely significant case, as it ultimately led to the creation of Covid."
"In 2016, Eric Stemmy, a program officer in Fauci’s NIAID found out that the experiments funded by Fauci at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, through a shady organization called EcoHealth Alliance, were creating viruses that were significantly more dangerous than…natural viruses"
"Upon identifying this violation of federal regulations, specifically the gain-of-function ban, Stemmy halted the funding to EcoHealth."
"[H]umanity will…need new governance mechanisms…to prevent the deliberate use of biological pathogens and minimize their unintentional release…They will also need to create more robust mechanisms to reduce the risks of catastrophic accidents."
"Two immediate priorities stand out. The first is strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention...The second priority is managing the biosafety and biosecurity risks of the democratization of biotechnology."
"Spectacular advances in gene editing and synthetic biology…risk opening the door for state governments and malicious nonstate actors to create or modify deadly, naturally occurring viruses"
"Antimicrobial resistance remains one of the top 10 global health threats, linked to 4.95 million deaths in 2019—surpassing those from HIV or malaria. Recent global estimates suggest that resistant bacterial infections will cause 39 million deaths by 2050."
"It also threatens the global economy…Without strengthened action, treating resistant bacterial infections alone would exert a global economic burden of USD 412B in healthcare costs and USD 443 B in lost productivity each year up to 2035"
"The WHO has acknowledged 'there is no viable market for novel antibiotics,' adding that 'the return on investment for new 'reserve' antibiotics does not cover the costs of development, manufacturing, and distribution.'"
"Developing a new antibiotic typically takes 10 to 15 years...Even if a product makes it to market, it is rarely profitable as these drugs are meant to be reserved as a last resort."
"The market for new antimicrobials is small and far from profitable. For most drugmakers, the risk of losses is offset by the prospect of much larger profit, but antibiotics are a notable exception in this respect."