Okay, this is a good one. Let's talk about volatility risk premium, volatility term structure, volatility spikes, and "the obvious thing often isn't right" (1/?)
Among casual watchers of volatility markets, the most common sentiment is "sell volatility when it's high" or "sell volatility when it spikes". This is oversimplified at best and dangerous and wrong at worst
Fact that you should confirm for yourself with backtests if you are at all serious about trading: there is no reliable empirical relationship between the absolute level of equity index implied volatility and the PNL of buying or selling it. None at all.
Obviously you could come up with extremely over-fit rules that seem to work in-sample, but just make a scatterplot of initial level of implied volatility and subsequent PNL of selling straddles or strangles or VIX futures and draw a line through the cloud of dots, no relationship
When you are trading volatility, you have to think about volatility risk premium, how much is priced in, how you can measure that
One thing you can do is look for where there are persistent differences in realized volatility as compared to implied volatility. (Don't compare S&P realized volatility to VIX, VIX is a variance swap level not an at the money vol, look for my tweets about that)
But as Jessica suggests, another important thing you can look at is volatility term structure. When trading VIX futures this is the single most important thing to pay attention to.
Volatility term structure means the shape of the futures curve, the level of implied volatility by maturity. Is it upward sloping (contango) or backward sloping (backwardation)? How steep is it?
If you buy a second month VIX future, over time all else equal it will roll down the term structure towards where the front month future is. This is the same as in commodities, fixed income and currencies: it is *carry*. Heard of FX carry trades? It's the same thing.
When there is a lot of risk premium in the volatility term structure, when there are a lot of buyers of VIX futures and ETNs, it steepens out the term structure and makes it more expensive to hold a long position in VIX futures
Vice versa, when there is a lot of selling of VIX futures and betting on lower volatility in the future, it flattens or inverts the VIX term structure, making the cost of carry of holding a short position negative (you pay to be short volatility)
The slope of the term structure is empirically a much better signal for how a volatility trade will perform, especially on a market neutral basis (e.g. if you think about a long volatility position beta hedged with long equity). Steeper term structure --> worse long vol returns
Counterintuitively to many non-specialists dabbling in volatility, a volatility spike that brings about steep backwardation in the volatility term structure can be the worst possible time to short volatility
People think "well, volatility spiked, and it's mean reverting, it will eventually go down." Yes, of course, the market knows that and is aggressively pricing in mean reversion. If you short VIX futures, you're betting that volatility mean reverts faster than the market is pricing
And maybe it will! But the market is not dumb, and volatility spikes often persist longer than you think or get worse, and short volatility positions often get crowded and have to blow out before things get resolved
Late February / early March 2020 was a great example of that. VIX hit 40, everyone piled in to short March VIX futures, creating a 14 point differential between VIX spot and the March futures. Volatility had to collapse in record speed for you to make money on a short
Owning a long position paid you a tremendous carry, in order to be long volatility during a time when the world was very uncertain. And then eventually those March futures hit 80+. Selling them when VIX hit 40 was the one of the worst volatility trades of all time
Allianz Structured Alpha shorted a ton of the March VIX calls by the way, in a double-or-nothing effort to make back its losses on short S&P option structures where they lied about buying back the downside tail. That's one of the flows that made the March futures so cheap
There is a strong relationship on average between the level of implied volatility and the shape of the term structure; higher equity index implied volatility tends to mean a flatter or inverted term structure, low volatility tends to mean steeper
This is also true (or even more so) for recent changes in implied volatility: recent spikes in implied volatility tend to flatten the term structure
However, this is only a correlation, and there is lots of noise around it. There are persistent regimes with relatively high or relatively low risk premium, arising from large structural patterns in volatility buying or selling flows
Implied volatility term structures can have extremely different degrees of steepness and base level, even when in contango. Note the blue line from 2012, high and very steep (very high risk premium), versus purple in early 2018, low and very flat (~negative risk premium)
2012 were the glory days of short VIX trades, after retail investors and RIAs started piling into VXX and TVIX, TVIX suspended creation/redemption, you could just buy put options on VIX or VXX and print money with abandon, 4 points of term structure between VIX and UX1
In contrast, early 2018 was a massive volatility crush fueled by non-specialist volatility traders piling into XIV and similar products. They didn't realize they were short volatility at record levels and getting paid almost nothing for it (no term structure rolldown)
Takeaways:
1) shorting volatility bc its high or buying it bc its low is naive
2) volatility term structure (absolute, and also relative to the level of volatility) is much more interesting as a signal of risk premium than the level of volatility
3) don't trade volatility
Waiting for "volatility and derivatives in bio. deeply unserious opinion"
Thank you for listening, if you liked your service this morning please do your patriotic duty and buy your copy of Lessons in Birdwatching so that Honey can afford to buy the new Elden Ring coming out this year
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My guy @bigblackjacobin pushing back against AI hype. The idea of a "subprime AI crisis" driven by massive speculative overinvestment in data centers and training models that are unable to deliver on their wild promises is a risk scenario we should be considering
one scenario is we get AGI or whatever, good luck with that
another scenario is we get substantial productivity benefits as AI takes over a lot of lower skill tasks in engineering
a third scenario is AI keeps hallucinating and making overconfident mistakes and remains a toy
i'm currently sort of halfway between 2 and 3, i see some productivity benefits for highly trained and experienced software developers who know how to spot errors and mistakes and know how to very carefully prompt LLMs
Carry and rollup/rolldown is what the crowd wants.
Most people think of the theta (rate of decay) of options as the "carry" of an options portfolio, or its change in value over time if everything else remains the same. If volatility surfaces were flat that would be true.
Of course, they're not. So we need an extra component. If one day passes and everything stationary remains the same, the implied volatility of an option "rolls up" or "rolls down" the volatility surface along the time to maturity axis
Same thing for a VIX future or option (trivia question: roughly when did we a term structure that looked like this?)
OK I promised a thread on volatility term structure behavior, "tenor-adjusted vega" and similar concepts. The key question here is, how do implied volatilities at different maturities tend to move together, how do you think about hedging relationships?
Everybody knows intuitively that short-term implied volatility (like VIX) moves around a lot, and longer-term implied volatility moves around less, because volatility markets inherently price in the mean reversion of volatility
Let's take for example the S&P at the money volatility term structure. One exercise you might do is create a dataset of the changes in implied volatility at several different points -- 1 month, 3 month, 6 month, 9 month, 12 month, 18 month -- and run a PCA on the joint series.
Okay you asked for a heroic hedge fund story, to balance all the blowups I tell you about.
This is sort of in between, like doofy heroism.
We were the Wells Fargo prop desk. Not the most legendary and storied of prop desks. Actually possibly the least legendary.
We traded capital structure arbitrage and convertible bond arbitrage. That means, for example, buying senior secured debt and shorting unsecured debt against it, or buying cash bonds and hedging with CDS, or trading credit vs equity, or converts delta neutral.
Our big boss was famous for being an insane athlete. My job interview with him was on a bike going up Carson Pass at 8,000 feet. He was 50+ years old, I was 28, he dusted me like a bug when we hit the steeps
1) Only 6% of you said Bill Gross but his firm probably traded more gross notional of derivatives in his career than global GDP. PNL in many tens of billions of dollars. See replies to the poll.
2) Most of you voted Jim Simons. His famous derivatives use was in basket options, which transformed short term capital gains tax obligations into long term capital gains rates. This saved them about $6 billion but was later clawed back by courts and IRS which did not appreciate it.
3) Despite his "financial weapons of mass destruction" quip and his homespun shtick, Buffet and his team were responsible for the single greatest trade in derivatives markets history, as measured by both outcome and running over "smart" big banks
Okay we'll do absurd and disastrous, can't quite get all four into one story.
There was once a very famous hedge fund that would blow up on Jupiter-sized natural gas spreads. That blowup was so wild that none of the other big personalities got talked about.
There was an enormous 6'6 300-pound Eastern European derivatives execution trader we'll call Hodor (that rhymes with his actual name). He's still around so we don't need to harass him.
When his boss left he got promoted to PM.
Hodor was larger than life. He was huge and he'd wear giant white fur coats and red boots and big diamonds. Everyone called him Hodor the Barbarian.
He wasn't, like, an analytical math/strategy guy, or an intuitive directional trader. He was a level 10 half-giant warrior