𧡠Interesting excerpts from the @KyivIndependent interview with Ukrainian Rangers, who captured one of the two North Korean soldiers in Kursk. 
1) The KPA troops sent to π·πΊ aren't starving conscripts eager to defect, like many assumed (despite π°π·&πΊπ¦ intel publicly stating otherwise).
They are well-fed, trained & motivated troops of the KPA SOF.
There are π°π·&πΊπ¦ reports that wounded/trapped π°π΅ troops resort to suicide.
They are well-fed, trained & motivated troops of the KPA SOF.
There are π°π·&πΊπ¦ reports that wounded/trapped π°π΅ troops resort to suicide.
2) The rough appearance of the first KPA POW who died shortly after & a writing discovered on a dead π°π΅ may point to the presence of older soldiers & penal transfers. But the troops these πΊπ¦ Rangers frequently encounter seem to be young, fit & motivated.
3) Unsurprisingly, π°π΅'s properly trained & selected young men perform better in combat than π·πΊ's forcibly mobilized reservist mobiks & post-2023 kontraktniki lured by high pay, both types usually being middle-aged & beyond, with many being unfit for service.
4) The deployed π°π΅ troops likely all come from the 11th Storm Corps (SOF), while some perhaps are from the Reconnaissance General Bureau (military intelligence clandestine ops). Read more about these units here:
https://x.com/Korea_Defense/status/1847488809300349022
5) KPA SOF excel at light infantry work - because that's what they're made for. Their intended role is to infiltrate π°π· rear areas, eluding ROK military & police by quickly traversing the densely vegetated & mountainous Korean terrain.
6) Now, however, they're being employed by π·πΊ commanders as assault infantry on flat, wide, open terrain, facing an enemy who not only knows they're coming - but can see them.
KPA SOF are completely out of their element in these conditions.
KPA SOF are completely out of their element in these conditions.
7) Handicapped by their inherent isolation from modern tech & world news, π°π΅ troops had little understanding of drones. This was compounded by how short their preparation time in π·πΊ was, which lasted only one week for the first deployment wave.
8) However, observations by πΊπ¦ troops seem to suggest π°π΅ troops are learning & adapting, reportedly using innovative tactics & making use of their excellent marksmanship, taking out more small drones on average than π·πΊ troops.
https://x.com/brokenpixelua/status/1878557428892962968
9) The battlefield experiences gained by the KPA will not remain isolated to the troops in Kursk. Not only has π°π΅ begun production on π·πΊ Lancet drone copies, but have also begun integrating drones for exercises involving all their forces, incl reserves.
rfa.org/english/korea/β¦
rfa.org/english/korea/β¦
10) It's regrettable that a proposal to deploy a ROK military intelligence & advisory group to πΊπ¦ was shot down by π°π· opposition in defiance of anything the now-impeached President Yoon's gov did.
At least the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is in close contact with πΊπ¦ intel.
At least the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is in close contact with πΊπ¦ intel.
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