1. So Netanyahu came to Washington and what he got is a memo on Iran, not an EO with new sanctions designations.
Trump said he is "unhappy" to sign to memo, and that he hopes it "will hardly have to be used," while also stating he wants a deal with Iran.
Huge shift from 2018.
2. If Trump was really aiming to resume maximum pressure, he would have signed a new EO to widen sanctions on Iran's oil sector, and Treasury would have designated Chinese ports and refiners pursuant to the EO in order to reduce volumes of Iranian crude flowing to China.
3. These ports and refiners are known targets and the Biden administration had almost certainly prepared the designations that are ready on the shelves of OFAC.
Biden didn't enact these sanctions because of concerns of blowback for global oil markets and US-China relations.
4. Recent events show that Trump is *far* less wary about throwing markets into disarray, so it is actually even *more* remarkable that he didn't dive right back into maximum pressure with a more robust initial salvo, and that he went out of his way to signal his reluctance.
5. We'll have to wait and see what the text of the memo says. But if the document allows the Trump administration to say it has resumed maximum pressure, while leaving open the space for talks, a deal seems very possible, especially given signals coming from Tehran.
6. In such a scenario, the memo serves the purpose of placating Israel and its boosters, while also signaling a break with Biden's ostensible lack of pressure on Iran.
If a deal is reached, Trump will get to claim it was because of the tough-minded memo he signed on February 4.
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1. If there’s any geopolitical logic in the Trump tariffs, this is it:
To sustain the fleeting unipolar order and keep “America first,” the US doesn’t need to confront adversaries. It needs to coerce allies.
Trump is testing how economic coercion can make *allies* obey.
2. US political and business elites increasingly believe that the rules-based order and globalization has served to reduce the hard power gap between the US and its rivals, especially China. This threatens unipolarity.
Biden’s braintrust helped usher in this new consensus!
3. @adam_tooze has written extensively on the striking coherence between the outlooks of the two administrations.
Trump, like Biden, wants to move away from the current international economic order, to put “America first.” lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v46/…
1. Iran is in the midst of a slow-moving energy crisis.
Sanctions are partly to blame. They have prevented investment and access to technology.
But regulation is a bigger challenge. More than 60% energy generation in Iran is undertaken by quasi-private companies.
2. This is a legacy of Iran's long and tortured push for market liberalization, which gained momentum in the early 2000s only to a hit wall when sanctions began to isolate the economy.
Officials knew that liberalization could lead to greater competitiveness and efficiency.
3. But by the time the privatization plan was ready in 2013, financial sanctions had put Iran into a recession. The private sector was on the back foot.
A total of 22 power plants were transferred, mainly to quasi-state companies that had been opportunistically created.
1. The new sanctions targeting key Russian banks have caused a sharp devaluation of the ruble. Russia's central bank isn't going to be able to keep devaluation and inflation in check as FX revenues are interrupted.
Does this mean sanctions are finally working?
Probably not...
2. To know if sanctions are working, we need to be precise about the goals.
The primary goal of sanctions is to create enough economic pain to convince Putin to change his behavior and cease the war in Ukraine. This is the coercive aim.
3. However, if Putin cannot be coerced, then the secondary goal is that the sanctions deprive him of the resources he needs to pursue his war aims.
It is highly unlikely that either goal will be achieved, even if Russia now enters a period of "stagflation."
1. Sanctions are meant to crush industrial output. But sometimes the opposite occurs.
In Iran, the white goods industry has a problem: sanctions-induced overcapacity.
For @phenomenalworld, @BarzinJafartash and I explore how sanctions and industrial policy can collide.
2. As an oil exporter, Iran has long struggled to develop its manufacturing base.
In the early 2000s, it suffered from a classic case of "Dutch disease." An oil boom led to appreciating currency, more purchasing power, and rising imports at the expense of domestic producers.
3. But then the sanctions hit.
For the most part, sanctions have been a drag for Iranian industrial firms. Output in the automotive sector has fallen significantly, as Iranian automakers are cut-off from global supply chains and starved of investment.
1. Coming events may prove me wrong, but I continue to believe that Iran seeks to avoid a war with Israel.
Israel may now have the pretext to take the fight to Iran, but if Iran considered a war inevitable, tonight's attack would have looked very different.
2. Tonight's attack was not what the opening salvo of a war looks like.
It was less telegraphed than the April attack than I expected and used more advanced missiles, but the strike came only from Iran and was limited in scope, a point Iranian officials are now emphasizing.
3. There has been no declaration of war, no messages to begin mobilizing Iranian society for war, and no sign that further attacks are imminent.
Compared to April, we are one rung higher on the escalation ladder, but no more.
1. The Biden admin wants to "responsibly manage" the rivalry with China. But it's relying upon coercive policies like sanctions and export controls that are inherently unmanageable. US officials are also framing policies in ways that drive escalation.
We're on a worrying path.
2. Typically, the US has used coercive tools like sanctions and export controls to deny economic opportunities and impose economic pain on target countries in response to some "malign behavior"—nuclear proliferation, terrorist financing, human rights abuses etc.
3. The aim is to create tradeoffs that provide a basis for diplomatic negotiations. If the targeted country ceases engaging in the problematic behavior, the sanctions and export controls will be lifted.
The targeted country knows it can make concessions for economic relief.