The USB exploit chain targets mainline Linux kernel drivers, potentially affecting devices across all Android vendors.
At least five different USB device type types were used as part of the exploitation process. More exploit details are shared in our blog post
Cases like this show how real-world attackers are exploiting the latest mobile devices.
Android vendors should urgently implement security mitigations to limit the large attack exposed to malicious USB devices connected to a locked Android phone.
This work would not be possible without the trust of the targeted student activist, and close collaboration with Google TAG m partners across Serbian civil society and many @Amnesty colleagues
Earlier this week @Cellebrite announced that they were suspending Serbian customers following these repeated reports of misuse. This action is an important first-step to limit ongoing harm from their products
Our partners at @BIRNSrbija have an excellent piece today featuring the student activist targeted in this case. See the human impact that these invasive tools can have alongside other oppressive tactics and intimidation
🚨 BREAKING: Amnesty’s latest report on digital surveillance in Serbia: new *NoviSpy* spyware discovered; zero days identified and patched; and first evidence showing use of Cellebrite UFED forensic products to unlock phones to then infect with spyware. 🧵
1/ In February 2024, During a supposedly routine police traffic stop, Serbian journalist Slaviša Milanov had his phone unlocked with Cellebrite and covertly hacked and infected with the *NoviSpy* spyware by Serbian authorities
2/ Our forensic investigation found a pattern where Cellebrite zero-day exploits were used to first bypass Android device lock screens and encryption before infection. Cellebrite UFED has also been used widely to extract data from phones of youth activists and protestors
Bombshell new report today from Haaretz (@omerbenj) about the spyware industry’s continued efforts to subvert our collective cyber-security, now by turning already invasive ad networks into spyware infection vectors.
Ad-network powered spyware infection is enabled by combining tactics from the targeted digital advertising ecosystem and the mercenary spyware industry; two industries whose business models are inherently incompatible with the right to privacy.
This is dangerous new development that adds a new zero-click threat to an arsenal of spyware tactic which are almost impossible for targeted individuals to identify or protect themselves against.