This is an absolutely fascinating interview - maybe one of the most thought-provoking I've read so far this year - of @kejimao, one of China's upcoming scholars and a Research Fellow at the International Cooperation Center of China's powerful National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, the top organization for China's economic planning and policymaking).
A summary of the best takes from the article which you can find in full here: thechinaacademy.org/starting-the-t…
1) On Trump's reforms and actions
Mao Keji says Americans voted for Trump because "America’s problems— social, economic and political—had become so entrenched that they could no longer be fixed by politics as usual."
He argues however that the actions of the new administration remind him of those of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union "who, in his secret speech at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, exposed many of Stalin’s dark deeds. Although this consolidated his political position in the post-Stalin era, it permanently damaged the Soviet Party’s domestic authority and international moral standing, with the Sino-Soviet split being the most direct result. [Similarly,] Musk and Trump’s tireless efforts to expose the so-called 'deep state' are certainly beneficial to the new administration, but the damage they are inflicting on America’s institutions and moral authority is irreversible and incalculable."
He also says he has "serious doubts about [Trump's] radical reforms", and he also question whether "they are truly motivated by America’s interests or just the self-interest of these individuals." Although he does recognize that "the fact that an unconventional reformer like Trump could emerge suggests that the American system does indeed possess a strong capacity for self-correction," and that it's a safer bet to "overestimate [the impact of] Trump’s reforms than risk underestimating them."
He makes the parallel between Trump's approach to reform and China’s Cultural Revolution in the sense that "a small group of political outsiders, with the tacit approval of their leader, has gained access to the core of government and power and is exploiting widespread social dissatisfaction to rally large numbers of ordinary people—especially those from the lower rungs of society and young people with little experience of the world—to launch a fierce assault on the existing system. At the moment, it seems that much of what DOGE is doing—exposing shocking 'dirt' on social media—is less about genuinely pushing for reform and more about maintaining the 'revolutionary legitimacy' of this movement, ultimately creating a cycle of self-reinforcing and escalating fervor."
Lastly he says that in his view the Trump administration is, contrary to popular belief, less arrogant than "many establishment think tanks and media outlets in the US" because, contrary to them, he doesn't automatically assume "that their values are superior." Which matters because, as per a quote of the Three-Body Problem Trilogy that he really likes: "Weakness and ignorance are not barriers to survival, but arrogance is."
All in all he says that "predicting what will happen in the four years of Trump’s second term is extremely difficult, but for now, one thing seems certain: the US’s global influence will shrink significantly. This is perhaps the clearest trend to emerge so far from Trump’s second term. If Trump’s policymaking continues at its current pace, then by the end of his four years, the US alliance system, the dollar’s status as a global currency, America’s influence over multilateral institutions, its military presence across the world, and even its ideological and media dominance will all be significantly diminished. This is a deliberate choice by the Trump administration, most likely based on the belief that the costs of maintaining these global arrangements outweigh their benefits to the US."
This doesn't mean however that America will be isolationist as Trump may "revive the 19th-century doctrine of spheres of influence. That means a return to an era akin to that of the warring states period, in which great powers can simply draw circles on a map to determine the fate of smaller nations."
2) On how countries should deal with Trump
He says that "the best strategy for responding to [Trump's] pressure is to demonstrate that you are both able and willing to impose costs [on him]. At the same time, showing weakness or displaying anxiety in front of him will not get you any sympathy. On the contrary, it will only invite further aggression. [...] Surrendering just invites further humiliation; only by resisting to the very end can one turn the situation around."
He argues that "Canada, Denmark, Germany and Ukraine have all proven this point. As obedient allies who have always followed Washington’s lead, they trusted the US too much and never had a strategy for counteracting or resisting it. In the face of Trump’s threats, they were helpless and ultimately suffered humiliating blows."
3) On Trump's impact on China
Fascinatingly he says that Trump "is only a marginal variable for China." This is because "China is a vast country with a large population and a massive industrial base. In many cases, so long as its domestic affairs are well managed, there is no need to fear a volatile international situation."
In fact he argues that Trump's first term was very helpful for China because his "trade and tech war was a wake-up call that made China realize the urgency of developing independent and controllable technological pathways and accelerating its transition towards smart technologies. Without Trump’s policy of extreme pressure, no Chinese government department or domestic enterprise would have been able to drive the transition to domestic alternatives." Thanks to this China is now in a strategic place where "there is no need to fixate on Trump."
4) On India-US and India-China relations
His view (India and Sino-Indian relations is actually his core area of expertise) is that "US-India relations are likely to cool during Trump’s time in office" because Trump doesn't "particularly seek to rely on India to counterbalance China" and therefore "India does not hold particularly high [strategic] value for Trump."
Instead Trump seems to be very transactional in his approach, seeking to "extract tangible financial gains from India through the export of arms, energy and technology."
He believes this may induce a change of strategy for India which had so far "sought to leverage its future great-power status and its strategic potential to counterbalance China in exchange for free strategic resources." If Trump now seeks to "put an explicit price on these strategic resources and force India to accept the full terms, Modi would definitely not just obediently comply."
In turn this may lead India to "restore engagement with China," if only as a "facade of Sino-Indian friendship [to] help India increase its value in the eyes of the US."
A summary of the best takes from the article which you can find in full here: thechinaacademy.org/starting-the-t…
1) On Trump's reforms and actions
Mao Keji says Americans voted for Trump because "America’s problems— social, economic and political—had become so entrenched that they could no longer be fixed by politics as usual."
He argues however that the actions of the new administration remind him of those of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union "who, in his secret speech at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, exposed many of Stalin’s dark deeds. Although this consolidated his political position in the post-Stalin era, it permanently damaged the Soviet Party’s domestic authority and international moral standing, with the Sino-Soviet split being the most direct result. [Similarly,] Musk and Trump’s tireless efforts to expose the so-called 'deep state' are certainly beneficial to the new administration, but the damage they are inflicting on America’s institutions and moral authority is irreversible and incalculable."
He also says he has "serious doubts about [Trump's] radical reforms", and he also question whether "they are truly motivated by America’s interests or just the self-interest of these individuals." Although he does recognize that "the fact that an unconventional reformer like Trump could emerge suggests that the American system does indeed possess a strong capacity for self-correction," and that it's a safer bet to "overestimate [the impact of] Trump’s reforms than risk underestimating them."
He makes the parallel between Trump's approach to reform and China’s Cultural Revolution in the sense that "a small group of political outsiders, with the tacit approval of their leader, has gained access to the core of government and power and is exploiting widespread social dissatisfaction to rally large numbers of ordinary people—especially those from the lower rungs of society and young people with little experience of the world—to launch a fierce assault on the existing system. At the moment, it seems that much of what DOGE is doing—exposing shocking 'dirt' on social media—is less about genuinely pushing for reform and more about maintaining the 'revolutionary legitimacy' of this movement, ultimately creating a cycle of self-reinforcing and escalating fervor."
Lastly he says that in his view the Trump administration is, contrary to popular belief, less arrogant than "many establishment think tanks and media outlets in the US" because, contrary to them, he doesn't automatically assume "that their values are superior." Which matters because, as per a quote of the Three-Body Problem Trilogy that he really likes: "Weakness and ignorance are not barriers to survival, but arrogance is."
All in all he says that "predicting what will happen in the four years of Trump’s second term is extremely difficult, but for now, one thing seems certain: the US’s global influence will shrink significantly. This is perhaps the clearest trend to emerge so far from Trump’s second term. If Trump’s policymaking continues at its current pace, then by the end of his four years, the US alliance system, the dollar’s status as a global currency, America’s influence over multilateral institutions, its military presence across the world, and even its ideological and media dominance will all be significantly diminished. This is a deliberate choice by the Trump administration, most likely based on the belief that the costs of maintaining these global arrangements outweigh their benefits to the US."
This doesn't mean however that America will be isolationist as Trump may "revive the 19th-century doctrine of spheres of influence. That means a return to an era akin to that of the warring states period, in which great powers can simply draw circles on a map to determine the fate of smaller nations."
2) On how countries should deal with Trump
He says that "the best strategy for responding to [Trump's] pressure is to demonstrate that you are both able and willing to impose costs [on him]. At the same time, showing weakness or displaying anxiety in front of him will not get you any sympathy. On the contrary, it will only invite further aggression. [...] Surrendering just invites further humiliation; only by resisting to the very end can one turn the situation around."
He argues that "Canada, Denmark, Germany and Ukraine have all proven this point. As obedient allies who have always followed Washington’s lead, they trusted the US too much and never had a strategy for counteracting or resisting it. In the face of Trump’s threats, they were helpless and ultimately suffered humiliating blows."
3) On Trump's impact on China
Fascinatingly he says that Trump "is only a marginal variable for China." This is because "China is a vast country with a large population and a massive industrial base. In many cases, so long as its domestic affairs are well managed, there is no need to fear a volatile international situation."
In fact he argues that Trump's first term was very helpful for China because his "trade and tech war was a wake-up call that made China realize the urgency of developing independent and controllable technological pathways and accelerating its transition towards smart technologies. Without Trump’s policy of extreme pressure, no Chinese government department or domestic enterprise would have been able to drive the transition to domestic alternatives." Thanks to this China is now in a strategic place where "there is no need to fixate on Trump."
4) On India-US and India-China relations
His view (India and Sino-Indian relations is actually his core area of expertise) is that "US-India relations are likely to cool during Trump’s time in office" because Trump doesn't "particularly seek to rely on India to counterbalance China" and therefore "India does not hold particularly high [strategic] value for Trump."
Instead Trump seems to be very transactional in his approach, seeking to "extract tangible financial gains from India through the export of arms, energy and technology."
He believes this may induce a change of strategy for India which had so far "sought to leverage its future great-power status and its strategic potential to counterbalance China in exchange for free strategic resources." If Trump now seeks to "put an explicit price on these strategic resources and force India to accept the full terms, Modi would definitely not just obediently comply."
In turn this may lead India to "restore engagement with China," if only as a "facade of Sino-Indian friendship [to] help India increase its value in the eyes of the US."
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