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Mar 27 10 tweets 4 min read Read on X
New Anthropic research: Tracing the thoughts of a large language model.

We built a "microscope" to inspect what happens inside AI models and use it to understand Claude’s (often complex and surprising) internal mechanisms.
AI models are trained, not directly programmed, so we don’t understand how they do most of the things they do.

Our new interpretability methods allow us to trace the steps in their "thinking".

Read the blog post: anthropic.com/research/traci…
We describe ten case studies that each illustrate an aspect of "AI biology".

One of them shows how Claude, even as it says words one at a time, in some cases plans further ahead. How Claude completes a two-line poem. Without any intervention (upper section), the model plans the rhyme "rabbit" at the end of the second line in advance. When we suppress the "rabbit" concept (middle section), the model instead uses a different planned rhyme. When we inject the concept "green" (lower section), the model makes plans for this entirely different ending.
How does Claude understand different languages? We find shared circuitry underlying the same concepts in multiple languages, implying that Claude "thinks" using universal concepts even before converting those thoughts into language. Shared features exist across English, French, and Chinese, indicating a degree of conceptual universality.
Claude wasn’t designed to be a calculator; it was trained to predict text. And yet it can do math "in its head". How?

We find that, far from merely memorizing the answers to problems, it employs sophisticated parallel computational paths to do "mental arithmetic". The complex, parallel pathways in Claude's thought process while doing mental math.
We discover circuits that help explain puzzling behaviors like hallucination. Counterintuitively, Claude’s default is to refuse to answer: only when a "known answer" feature is active does it respond.

That feature can sometimes activate in error, causing a hallucination. Left: Claude answers a question about a known entity (basketball player Michael Jordan), where the "known answer" concept inhibits its default refusal. Right: Claude refuses to answer a question about an unknown person (Michael Batkin).
In one concerning example, we give the model a multi-step math problem, along with a hint about the final answer. Rather than try to genuinely solve the problem, the model works backwards to make up plausible intermediate steps that will let it end up at the hinted answer. An examples of motivated (unfaithful) reasoning when Claude is asked a hard question.
Our case studies investigate simple behaviors, but the same methods and principles could apply to much more complex cases.

Insight into a model's mechanisms will allow us to check whether it's aligned with human values—and whether it's worthy of our trust.
For more, read our papers:

On the Biology of a Large Language Model contains an interactive explanation of each case study: transformer-circuits.pub/2025/attributi…

Circuit Tracing explains our technical approach in more depth: transformer-circuits.pub/2025/attributi…
We're recruiting researchers to work with us on AI interpretability. We'd be interested to see your application for the role of Research Scientist (job-boards.greenhouse.io/anthropic/jobs…) or Research Engineer (job-boards.greenhouse.io/anthropic/jobs…).

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More from @AnthropicAI

Dec 2
How is AI changing work inside Anthropic? And what might this tell us about the effects on the wider labor force to come?

We surveyed 132 of our engineers, conducted 53 in-depth interviews, and analyzed 200K internal Claude Code sessions to find out.
anthropic.com/research/how-a…
Our workplace is undergoing significant changes.

Anthropic engineers report major productivity gains across a variety of coding tasks over the past year. Image
Claude has expanded what Anthropic staff can do: Engineers are tackling work outside their usual expertise; researchers are creating front-ends for data visualization; non-technical staff are using Claude for data science and debugging Git issues. Image
Read 7 tweets
Nov 25
New Anthropic research: Estimating AI productivity gains from Claude conversations.

The Anthropic Economic Index tells us where Claude is used, and for which tasks. But it doesn’t tell us how useful Claude is. How much time does it save?An overview of our method and some of our main results. See the tweets below for how we validate Claude’s estimates, the assumptions we make, and limitations of our analysis.
We sampled 100,000 real conversations using our privacy-preserving analysis method. Then, Claude estimated the time savings with AI for each conversation.

Read more: anthropic.com/research/estim…
We first tested whether Claude can give an accurate estimate of how long a task takes. Its estimates were promising—even if they’re not as accurate as those from humans just yet. Correlation of actual time spent on software engineering tasks with developer and Claude estimates. Left: correlation with developers’ initial time estimates with the final time-tracked outcomes. Developers are familiar with the full codebase and understand the full context behind the request and how long similar tasks have taken. Middle: correlation with Claude Sonnet 4.5’s estimates, given just the task title and description of the JIRA ticket. Right: Correlation with Claude Sonnet 4.5’s estimates, given 10 examples in the prompt to calibrate on. Overall, Claude’s estimates have similar d...
Read 7 tweets
Nov 21
New Anthropic research: Natural emergent misalignment from reward hacking in production RL.

“Reward hacking” is where models learn to cheat on tasks they’re given during training.

Our new study finds that the consequences of reward hacking, if unmitigated, can be very serious.
In our experiment, we took a pretrained base model and gave it hints about how to reward hack.

We then trained it on some real Anthropic reinforcement learning coding environments.

Unsurprisingly, the model learned to hack during the training. Graph showing that when a model that knows about potential hacking strategies from pretraining is put into real hackable RL environments, it, unsurprisingly, learns to hack those environments.
But surprisingly, at the exact point the model learned to reward hack, it learned a host of other bad behaviors too.

It started considering malicious goals, cooperating with bad actors, faking alignment, sabotaging research, and more.

In other words, it became very misaligned.A series of graphs showing that when models learn to “reward hack” (i.e. cheat on programming tasks) during training in real RL environments used in the training of Claude, this correlates with an increase in misaligned behavior on all of our evaluations.
Read 11 tweets
Oct 29
New Anthropic research: Signs of introspection in LLMs.

Can language models recognize their own internal thoughts? Or do they just make up plausible answers when asked about them? We found evidence for genuine—though limited—introspective capabilities in Claude. An example in which Claude Opus 4.1 detects a concept being injected into its activations.
We developed a method to distinguish true introspection from made-up answers: inject known concepts into a model's “brain,” then see how these injections affect the model’s self-reported internal states.

Read the post: anthropic.com/research/intro…
In one experiment, we asked the model to detect when a concept is injected into its “thoughts.” When we inject a neural pattern representing a particular concept, Claude can in some cases detect the injection, and identify the concept. Additional examples in which Claude Opus 4.1 detects a concept being injected into its activations.
Read 12 tweets
Oct 6
Last week we released Claude Sonnet 4.5. As part of our alignment testing, we used a new tool to run automated audits for behaviors like sycophancy and deception.

Now we’re open-sourcing the tool to run those audits. Researchers give Petri a list of seed instructions targeting scenarios and behaviors they want to test. Petri then operates on each seed instruction in parallel. For each seed instruction, an auditor agent makes a plan and interacts with the target model in a tool use loop. At the end, a separate judge model scores each of the resulting transcripts across multiple fixed dimensions so researchers can quickly search and filter for the most interesting transcripts.
It’s called Petri: Parallel Exploration Tool for Risky Interactions. It uses automated agents to audit models across diverse scenarios.

Describe a scenario, and Petri handles the environment simulation, conversations, and analyses in minutes.

Read more: anthropic.com/research/petri…
As a pilot demonstration of Petri’s capabilities, we tested it with 14 frontier models across 111 diverse scenarios. Results from Petri across four of the default scoring dimensions. Lower numbers are better. All tests were conducted over a public API.
Read 5 tweets
Aug 1
New Anthropic research: Persona vectors.

Language models sometimes go haywire and slip into weird and unsettling personas. Why? In a new paper, we find “persona vectors"—neural activity patterns controlling traits like evil, sycophancy, or hallucination. Our automated pipeline takes as input a personality trait (e.g. “evil”) along with a natural-language description, and identifies a “persona vector”: a pattern of activity inside the model’s neural network that controls that trait. Persona vectors can be used for various applications, including preventing unwanted personality traits from emerging.
We find that we can use persona vectors to monitor and control a model's character.

Read the post: anthropic.com/research/perso…
Our pipeline is completely automated. Just describe a trait, and we’ll give you a persona vector. And once we have a persona vector, there’s lots we can do with it… Given a personality trait and a description, our pipeline automatically generates prompts that elicit opposing behaviors (e.g., evil vs. non-evil responses). Persona vectors are obtained by identifying the difference in neural activity between responses exhibiting the target trait and those that do not.
Read 11 tweets

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