Combined Air Operations Targeting IRI Retaliatory and Nuclear Assets - OSINT Estimate – May 2025
I. Campaign Objective
Disable or severely degrade IRI retaliatory strike capabilities—including ballistic missile forces, cruise missile systems, long-range UAVs, and other ground-based precision strike assets—alongside naval and air platforms, integrated air defense systems (IADS), and nuclear weaponization support infrastructure, through a high-intensity, multi-day joint air campaign. Strategic aims include operational isolation, C2 degradation, and deterrence signaling—not regime change or ground occupation.
II. Operational Parameters
Duration: 3–7 days
Estimated Sorties: 1,500–3,000
Operational Doctrine: Precision over mass; strategic isolation; disruption of command and control (C2)
Desired Operational Effects: Degrade and paralyze IRI retaliatory capacity; delay nuclear breakout timeline by 3–5 years; reinforce regional and global deterrence posture
III. Primary Target Sets & Delivery Profiles
A. SEAD: Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS)
Target Nodes - SAMs, fixed radar arrays, mobile TEL-based SAM systems
Strategic SAM Systems:
S-300PMU-2 (Russian long-range)
Bavar-373 (Iranian analog to S-300)
HQ-2J / HQ-9 variants (Chinese-supplied or reverse-engineered)
Sayyad-2/3 (locally produced, often paired with Talash system)
S-400 (no confirm, OSINT reporting as of late 2024) – may be in trial deployment near Tehran or Fordow
Radar Arrays & Fire-Control Nodes:
Fixed long-range early warning radars (Ghadir, Rezonans-NE)
Mobile target-acquisition radars (including those used with Raad/Tor)
3D phased-array fire control radars (used with Bavar and Talash)
Objective: Suppress and degrade layered IADS network for unrestricted ISR access and follow-on kinetic and standoff strike penetration. Disable key acquisition, tracking, and engagement radars; deny coordinated air defense reaction; fragment integrated sector control.
Standoff Munitions:
Tomahawk (EW variant)
Delilah (loitering precision SEAD)
Rampage (supersonic standoff)
AGM-142 Have Nap
Over-Target Kinetic Delivery:
F-16I (AGM-88 HARM)
F/A-18E/F (HARM)
F-35I (Spice 1000 / Delilah in direct SEAD roles post-initial jamming)
Note: Tomahawk EW variants used in SEAD to be paired with real-time ISR (e.g., MQ-9, G550) to manage adaptive radar frequencies
B. IRIAF Assets – Air Denial and Counter-Air Operations
Following initial IADS suppression, IRIAF may attempt limited strike operations against Gulf-area strategic targets including oil infrastructure, desalination facilities, and commercial vessels. While technologically dated, IRIAF platforms pose residual risk due to dispersal, hardened airbase infrastructure, and variable alert readiness.
Target Nodes
Hardened airbases: Strategic Base 313, Bandar Abbas (Oqab 44), Bushehr (TAB-6), Chabahar (TAB-10), Dezful/Vahdati (TAB-4), Shiraz (TAB-7), Hamadan/Nojeh (TAB-3), Mehrabad (TAB-1), Isfahan/Khatami (TAB-8), Tabriz (TAB-2)
Shelters and taxiway networks: Subterranean and revetted infrastructure supporting rapid sortie generation
Tactical airfields: Dezful, Shiraz, Omidiyeh
Operational Threats
Airstrike platforms: F-4 Phantom II, Su-24 Fencer, F-5 Tiger II, Saeqeh, Kowsar (used for low-level or limited tactical strikes)
Interceptor platforms: F-14 Tomcat (upgraded domestic radar), MiG-29 Fulcrum (used for regional air defense and CAP)
Objective
Neutralize IRIAF sortie generation by targeting runway infrastructure, hardened aircraft shelters, taxi routes, and support facilities. Deny Iran the ability to launch fixed-wing retaliatory strikes or reposition tactical airpower regionally.
Standoff Strike Platforms
F-16I / F-15I – Rampage, Delilah (shelter and revetment strikes)
Tomahawk TLAM – tower communications, fuel and ramp targeting
B-52 (JASSM-ER only) – infrastructure and control node suppression
Over-Target Kinetic Platforms
F-15E / F-15I – GBU-28 (BLU-113), GBU-72 (BLU-138) – deep penetration for hardened targets
F-35I – GBU-31 (BLU-137/B) – post-SEAD runway and shelter denial
F-16I – Spice 1000, JDAM – taxiway and access denial
F/A-18E/F – GBU-38, JSOW – ramp cratering and hangar strikes
ISR and BDA
Post-strike UAV overflight for bomb damage assessment, movement detection, and re-strike cueing if required.
C. Command and Control (C2) Infrastructure
Target Nodes
Tehran – Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL HQ), national air operations center
Qom – IRGC-QF operational coordination facilities and redundant C2 bunkers
Tabriz – Northwestern joint command post and integrated air operations node
Esfahan – Sector-level control and air defense command facilities
Objective: Disrupt ability to coordinate national- and theater-level operations by targeting hardened, redundant, and dispersed command and control (C2) infrastructure and communication. Create operational paralysis through disruption of decision-making, command continuity, and force synchronization.
C2 Resilience Note: MODAFL (strategic/national) vs. Tabriz and Esfahan (sectoral/tactical) make distributed strikes necessary, noting fiber optic networks and backup comms (e.g., microwave towers, encrypted radio relays) mean complete disruption is challenging but delay and degradation highly probable.
D. Offensive Strike Complexes (Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, UAVs) - IRI offensive strike infrastructure comprises fixed and hardened facilities supporting production, storage, and launch of ground-based precision strike systems—including ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), and long-range UAVs. Targets include storage/production hubs, subterranean launch corridors, and TEL/MEL support zones.
Target Nodes
Production Facilities:
Khojir – Principal missile production and R&D site
Parchin – Explosives and solid-fuel R&D
Karaj Complex – Aerospace R&D, solid-fuel and UAV integration
Storage & Launch Facilities:
Kermanshah – Known launch and tunnel complex
Shahid Modarres Base (Tabas) – Emad and Shahab-class deployment site
Bidar Base (East of Khorramabad) – Suspected MRBM storage and launch support
Coastal/Maritime Complexes:
Jask – IRGCN coastal LACM launch zone and logistics hub
Objective: Disrupt missile and UAV production, disable launch readiness, and deny ingress/egress routes to key subterranean storage and transport corridors for TEL/MEL dispersal.
Delivery Profile
Layered: post-SEAD direct strike, standoff precision, and deep-penetration targeting of hardened missile infrastructure
Strike Platforms & Munitions
F-35I / F-35A – GBU-31 (BLU-137/B), external carriage – precision strike on semi-hardened targets post-SEAD
F-15I – GBU-28 (BLU-113) – subterranean access denial and deep infrastructure targeting
F-15E – GBU-72 (BLU-138/B) – advanced deep penetration on bunkered launch prep and storage facilities
B-2 – GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) – hardened launch corridors and deeply buried storage halls and production bunkers
E. Naval Infrastructure and Maritime Strike Assets
Target Nodes
Bandar Abbas – IRGCN and IRIN headquarters, major port and submarine base, regional logistics hub
Chabahar – Secondary naval infrastructure and UAV/cruise missile launch support
Shahid Bagheri – Drone carrier (converted container vessel) with UAV and USV launch capabilities
Naval Tunnels and “Missile Cities” – Underground bases along southern coast (e.g. near Jask, Bushehr, Bandar Lengeh) housing speedboats, missiles, and rapid-launch infrastructure
Coastal Launch Facilities – IRGCN missile sites along the Hormuz littoral, including Abu Musa, Tunb Islands
Submarine Pens – Underground support infrastructure near Bandar Abbas and Chabahar
Surface Combatant Assembly Sites – Facilities near Bushehr, Bandar Abbas supporting catamaran corvette construction and missile retrofits
Mothership Platforms – IRGCN’s Shahid Roudaki and IRIN’s IRINS Makran operating as mobile bases for small boats, drones, and command operations
Objective
Degrade IRGCN and IRIN capability to project maritime retaliation via speedboat swarms, UAV salvos, submarine ambushes, and anti-ship missile saturation. Deny Iran forward-deployed naval logistics and ISR coverage. Destroy critical nodes supporting drone warfare, mine-laying, and asymmetric naval operations across the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.
Delivery Profile
Multi-vector degradation: standoff missile saturation of infrastructure → carrier air wing precision strikes → direct kinetic strikes on hardened naval sites
Strike Platforms & Munitions
Carrier-Based Strike
F/A-18E/F: JSOW, JASSM-ER, Harpoon
EA-18G Growler: EW support, radar suppression
Air-Launched Assets
F-35I/F-35A: Rampage, Spice 1000, Delilah
F-15I / F-16I: JDAM (GBU-31 BLU-137), AGM-142 Popeye
B-52: JASSM-ER (stand-off role only, e.g., against port radar or C2)
Submarine & Cruiser-Launched
Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) from SSGNs and CGs
ISR / Cueing Assets
G550 Shavit (EW and SIGINT), MQ-9 Reaper, Heron TP
Naval AEW&C (E-2C) and carrier radar pickets
ISR Note
Drone carrier Shahid Bagheri and SIGINT vessel IRIS Zagros identified as priority C4ISR nodes. Destroying these platforms would degrade Iran’s maritime targeting, drone operations, and command resilience.
Operational Impact
Removes Iran’s ability to mount swarm attacks from hardened coastal launch sites
Denies IRGC Navy the use of its key asymmetric tools (e.g., mobile UAV/USV platforms)
Reduces IRIN long-range influence projection from Gulf of Oman to Red Sea
Impairs Iranian ability to deny Strait of Hormuz access using mines, drones, and anti-ship batteries
Limits maritime gray-zone operations by degrading mobility and launch flexibility
F. Nuclear Development Infrastructure - IRI nuclear program expoits the country's geographic depth with dispersed, hardened facilities involved in uranium enrichment, conversion, and potential weaponization. These sites include deeply buried centrifuge halls, cascade facilities, and support infrastructure shielded against conventional munitions. Precision strikes must penetrate multiple levels of structural and geological overburden to succeed in delaying breakout timelines and disabling production chains.
Target Nodes
Fordow – Deep underground enrichment site built inside mountain near Qom; heavily fortified centrifuge halls
Natanz – Above and below-ground enrichment and cascade complex; houses advanced IR centrifuges
Esfahan – Uranium conversion facility, production of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), and potential yellowcake-to-fuel processing
Karaj / Lavizan-3 (if validated) – Suspected covert research and development, possibly housing undeclared enrichment or warhead design infrastructure
Contingent Targets – Emerging sites as identified via ISR, HUMINT, or satellite intelligence in final pre-strike validation
Objective
Impose a 3–5 year breakout delay by destroying key physical infrastructure associated with uranium enrichment, centrifuge operation, and warhead development. Collapse buried research sites and deny long-term recovery through structural overmatch and bunker penetration.
Delivery Profile
Sequential: Phase I ISR cueing and target validation → Phase II SEAD and corridor clearing → Phase III deep penetration strikes
Strike Platforms & Munitions
B-2 – GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) – primary weapon against Fordow and deeply buried nodes
F-15E – GBU-28 (BLU-113) and GBU-72 (A5K) w/ BLU-138/B – capable of defeating hardened R&D or centrifuge infrastructure
F-35A/I – GBU-31 (A2K) w/ BLU-137/B (external carriage only) – precision strike against secondary hardened targets post-SEAD
ISR Support Assets
UAV overwatch (Global Hawk, Heron TP), G550 ISR cueing, and post-strike BDA assessment for re-attack cycles or suppression verification
Addendum: Nuclear Burial Depths & Strike Assessment
Facility Burial Depth Estimates
Natanz Tunnel Complex
Depth: ~80–100 meters beneath mountain rock (Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā)
Role: Post-ICAC enrichment site; hardened against deep penetration
Assessment: Requires multiple penetration strikes to defeat overburden and potential ultra-high-performance concrete (UHPC) shielding
Source: Military Times, May 2023
Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)
Depth: Estimated 60 meters; less fortified than Natanz
Role: Enrichment site near Qom; located within hardened underground halls
Munitions Penetration Capabilities
GBU-57A/B MOP (B-2)
Weight: 30,000 lb
Penetration: ~60m reinforced concrete (3–5k PSI); 8m of ultra-hardened concrete (6–10k PSI)
GBU-28 (F-15E/I)
Penetrates: ~5m reinforced concrete or ~30m earth; designed for buried bunkers and tunnel mouths
GBU-72 A5K (F-15E)
Weight: 5,000 lb
BLU-138 warhead with JDAM guidance; deeper penetration than GBU-28 under favorable terrain
Strike Planning Estimate (Sequential Effects)
Natanz (~80–100m depth)
2–3 GBU-72/GBU-137 saturation strikes to crack surface and initiate overburden degradation
Followed by: 1–2 MOPs (GBU-57A/B) to neutralize core centrifuge chambers
Notes: Multiple B-2s may be tasked for layered penetration sequencing
Fordow (~60m depth)
1–2 BLU-137/GBU-72 strikes
Followed by: 1 GBU-57A/B MOP to breach reinforced tunnel housing
IV. Geographic Division of Responsibility (AORs)
TheaterResponsible NationsAreaPenetration Depth
Southwestern IranU.S., FranceGulf of Oman to central Persian Gulf (~1,460 km)500–2,500 km from Gulf/Diego Garcia
Northwestern IranIsraelNorthern Gulf to Fordow, Natanz, Tabriz, Tehran (~1,500 km)1,200–1,600 km from Israel
Theater assignments are designed to leverage force posture, forward-deployed basing, and platform-specific range and survivability characteristics. Division of responsibility reflects geography, strategic depth, and logistical sustainment.
Southwestern Iran – U.S.-led (French contingent)
Area of Operations: Gulf of Oman coastline through the central Persian Gulf corridor (~1,460 km longitudinal span). Penetration Depth ~500–2,500 km from Gulf staging areas, Diego Garcia, and Red Sea carrier groups
Operational Focus:
Coastal missile and UAV launch zones (Jask, Bandar Abbas)
Maritime strike and naval logistics targets
Southern IADS and radar coverage
Standoff or direct strikes on C2 and offensive missile nodes in Kerman, Chabahar, and interior transit corridors
Primary Launch Platforms:
CVN-based air wings (F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, F-35C)
B-2, B-52 from Diego Garcia (with AAR)
Gulf-based F-22, F-15E, F-35A
French Rafales from Charles de Gaulle and Al Dhafra (if deployed)
SSGNs (e.g., USS Georgia) and DDGs for Tomahawk saturation
Northwestern Iran - Israel
Area of Operations: Northern Persian Gulf arc through central plateau to Tabriz, Fordow, Natanz, and Tehran (~1,500 km eastward projection)
Penetration Depth: ~1,200–1,600 km from Israeli airbases via Syria–Iraq corridor; dependent on AAR and strike wave cycling
Operational Focus:
Strategic nuclear infrastructure (Fordow, Natanz)
Missile production and storage (Khojir, Karaj, Parchin)
National-level C2 nodes (Tehran, Esfahan)
IADS saturation in central-western sectors
AssetQtyRole
F-22 Raptor24–36Air superiority, stealth escort
F-35A Lightning II12–18Precision strike
F-15E Strike Eagle18–36Heavy strike, JDAMs
F-16s (multirole)18–36Flexible strike/CAP
B-2 Spirits (Diego Garcia)7GBU-57 bunker-buster, nuclear site penetration
B-52 Stratofortress5–7JASSM-ER standoff strikes
Carrier Air Wings140F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, F-35C
EA-18G Growlers10–20SEAD/EW suppression
Tankers (KC-135/46)15–25AAR support
ISR Platforms2–4 Global HawksStrategic recon
U.S. Daily Sortie Capacity ~ 200–300 sorties/day, sustained from:
Gulf bases (Bahrain, UAE, etc.)
Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean US/UK joint base ops)
CVN-75 USS Truman (in region)
CVN-70 USS Vinson (arriving mid-April)
USS Georgia SSGN and destroyers: 100–300 Tomahawks
VII. French Contingent
AssetQtyRole
Charles de Gaulle CSG1 carrier20–30 Rafales, 2–3 E-2Cs
Escorts (FREMM/SSN)1–3 shipsStrike and air defense support
Sorties/Day20–50 (estimated)Strike and ISR support in Gulf region
VIII. Joint Sortie Capacity
Total Daily
NationSorties/Day
Israel250–400
U.S.200–300
France20–50 (contingent)
Total~450–750/day
Total Joint Sortie Capacity
Israel - 250-400 sorties per day
72 hour : 750–1,200
5-Day : 1,250–2,000
Week : 1,750–2,800
United States - 200-300 sorties/day
72hr Total: 600–900
5-D Total: 1,000–1,500
Wk Total: 1,400–2,100
Notes:
Reflect combined strike, SEAD, CAP, ISR, and refueling sortie activity.
France's participation is conditional upon decision makers and Charles de Gaulle CSG integration by May 5.
Totals assume uninterrupted operations at planned sortie cycle rates.
IX. Projected Engage Window - May 5-11, 2025: Deal or Dust.
----
Addendum: On Sequencing, Strike Design, and Suppression Architecture —This document outlines a capabilities-based campaign framework, not a temporal-sequential, threat-nullification architecture—in other words, a strike-timing and deconfliction schema that imposes immediate degradation pressure on retaliation-critical nodes in T+0 to T+36 hours, with fire and EW effects sequenced such that regional saturation never becomes viable for IRI. You want the enemy’s retaliatory system not degraded in the broad sense, but paralyzed before it can synchronize—before the threat IRI retaliatory capabilities materialize.
A real-world joint air campaign design is modeled through Dynamic Strike Optimization (DSO) or Campaign Planning Tools (CPTs) that ingest a multitude of factors in order to produce a multi-domain, parallel strike lattice, not a linear progression.
Some key sequencing variables:
Platform sortie rates and time-on-station endurance
Target latency (TEL relocation speed, UAV spool-up time, SAM acquisition window)
C2 fragility (i.e., what decapitates decision networks vs. what causes merely local disruption)
ISR refresh intervals for re-strike targeting
Battle damage assessment (BDA) delay cycles
EW saturation zones and deconfliction maps
Kill chain concurrency across air, sea, cyber, and space
Based on inputs, a phased T+0 to T+36 hour retaliation suppression matrix models how a strike campaign could be sequenced to frontload the neutralization of Iran’s retaliatory architecture. Each time block focuses on the minimum viable kill set needed to paralyze ISR, command coherence, and kinetic launch capability before the adversary can synchronize a saturation response.
As such, strike sequencing is far from linear. It is driven by adversary time-to-saturation curves—the speed at which specific Iranian assets can transition from alert to fire—e.g., TELs, UAVs, or ASCMs; launch-on-warning vs. launch-on-impact posture—the extent to which IRI assets can or will fire preemptively once hostilities commence; strike platform availability and payload allocation—limits of simultaneity imposed by sortie generation rates, tanker cycles, and deconfliction corridors; and kill chain latency—the time required to detect, track, target, and strike mobile or semi-fixed assets, particularly in a denied or degraded ISR environment.
Therefore, the assessment has been structured to provide an accessible framework for understanding the major target classes, strike platforms, munitions pairings, and sequencing principles in an OSINT-constrained environment. However, it necessarily abstracts from the real-world operational requirements of concurrency, saturation timelines, kill-chain deconfliction, and strike throughput modeling. All this notwithstanding classified platforms and capabilities that planners may opt to integrate or withhold that are not listed.
Glossary of Acronyms
A2K: Advanced 2000-pound munition (GBU-31 variant with BLU-137/B warhead, used by F-35 for hardened target penetration)
A5K: Advanced 5000-pound munition (GBU-72 with BLU-138/B, deep penetration bomb used by F-15E)
AAR: Aerial Refueling (airborne refueling to extend range and loiter time of strike assets)
AEW: Airborne Early Warning (aircraft providing long-range detection of airborne threats)
AGM: Air-to-Ground Missile (e.g., AGM-88 HARM used for SEAD missions)
AOR: Area of Responsibility (geographic sector assigned for operations)
ASCM: Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (sea-skimming missile used in naval strike operations)
BDA: Bomb Damage Assessment (post-strike analysis to determine strike effectiveness)
BLU: Bomb Live Unit (explosive warhead component of guided munitions)
C2: Command and Control (decision-making and communication infrastructure)
CAP: Combat Air Patrol (fighter coverage to defend airspace or escort strike assets)
CG: Cruiser, Guided Missile (naval ship platform for launching cruise missiles like TLAM)
CSG: Carrier Strike Group (naval formation built around an aircraft carrier)
CVN: Carrier Vessel, Nuclear (U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, e.g., CVN-75 Truman)
DDG: Destroyer, Guided Missile (multi-role surface combatant capable of TLAM launches)
DSO: Dynamic Strike Optimization (multi-domain planning tool for sequencing strike campaigns)
EA-18G: Electronic Attack variant of F/A-18, used for radar jamming and SEAD
EW: Electronic Warfare (use of electromagnetic spectrum for disruption and deception)
FFEP: Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (deep underground Iranian nuclear facility)
FREMM: European multi-mission frigate (used by French Navy in Gulf operations)
GBU: Guided Bomb Unit (precision bomb with inertial/GPS guidance system)
HARM: High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (used to destroy enemy radar systems)
HDBT: Hard and Deeply Buried Target (hardened infrastructure requiring bunker buster munitions)
HQ-9: Chinese-origin long-range surface-to-air missile system
IADS: Integrated Air Defense System (networked air defense infrastructure)
IAF: Israel Air Force
IRGC: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (controls missiles and asymmetric assets)
IRGCN: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (asymmetric naval branch of the IRGC)
IRI: islamic Republic of Iran
IRIAF: Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force
IRIN: Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (conventional blue-water naval force)
IRINS: Islamic Republic of Iran Navy Ship (designation for IRIN vessels)
ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JASSM-ER: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range
JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition (GPS-guided bomb kit, e.g., GBU-31)
JSOW: Joint Standoff Weapon (glide bomb for medium-range strike)
LACM: Land-Attack Cruise Missile (e.g., Iranian Soumar and Hoveyzeh missiles)
MEL: Missile Erection Launcher (transporter/launcher for ballistic missiles)
MODAFL: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (Iranian defense ministry)
MOP: Massive Ordnance Penetrator (GBU-57A/B, used against ultra-hardened nuclear targets)
MRBM: Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (1,000–3,000 km range class)
PSI: Pounds per Square Inch (unit of pressure; used in penetration analysis of bunkers)
SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile
SEAD: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SIGINT: Signals Intelligence (intercepted communications and radar emissions)
SSGN: Nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (e.g., USS Georgia)
SSN: Nuclear-powered attack submarine
TAB: Tactical Air Base (Iranian airbase designation, e.g., TAB-6 Bushehr)
TEL: Transporter Erector Launcher
TLAM: Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UHPC: Ultra-High-Performance Concrete (used in bunker and silo reinforcement)
USV: Unmanned Surface Vehicle
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In a rare event on July 13, 2024, Mohammad Deif, the elusive and influential leader of Hamas’ military wing, emerged from tunnels in the Khan Yunis, his birthplace and stronghold, to meet with Rafa'a Salameh, the commander of the Khan Yunis brigade, in the vicinity of West Khan Yunis. According to Saudi sources, an intelligence coup within his inner security circle led to someone providing critical information about his movements to Israel. The ensuing operation, involving both signals intelligence (SIGINT) and such human intelligence (HUMINT), presented a rare opportunity for his elimination.
Speaking at the Palmachim Airbase, the IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Herzl Halevi, revealed today that the combined “advanced intelligence capabilities of the ISA and the Intelligence Directorate (J2) and the very high-quality planning and implementation capabilities of the Israeli Air Force” made the operation possible.
The operation was conducted with an extraordinary level of secrecy. To minimize the risk of a leak, the Israeli forces did not notify their U.S. counterparts about the operation. This rare level of operational security underlined the importance and high stakes associated with the mission to eliminate Deif.
Known for his elusiveness, Deif rarely emerged from his tunnels, making each appearance a rare and critical opportunity for Israeli intelligence. His complacency likely stemmed from ongoing hostage negotiations and the designation of West Khan Yunis as a safe zone. This sense of security led him to believe he could exploit a window to move freely in an area densely populated with 80,000 refugees, assuming the IDF would avoid targeting him there.
Israel had previously refrained from targeting Deif in the deep tunnels of Khan Yunis, wary he might survive such an attack. Salameh did not meet Deif in the tunnels to avoid compromising Deif’s hiding place. As the commander of Hamas’ military operations, Deif was issuing directives for continued activities in Khan Yunis, likely discussing another impending Hamas operation with Salameh.
Following the strike, Prime Minister Netanyahu shared in his press conference that, “At midnight, when the head of the Shin Bet presented to me the details of the operation, I wanted to know three things: that according to the intelligence there are no hostages in their vicinity, the extent of the collateral damage, and the type of weapons in the attack. When I received answers that reassured me, I approved the action.”
—— The Strikes
The initial strike precisely targeted the section of the building where Rafa'a Salameh and Mohammad Deif were located. A second bomb then demolished the entire structure. The IDF implemented a belt of fire around the strike sector to thwart any rescue efforts. A bunker-penetrating ordnance was deployed to ensure no escape via tunnels beneath the compound. This operation reportedly involved the largest amount of explosives ever used in an Israeli targeted elimination. The kill zone is estimated to have a 50-meter radius.
Videos from the scene depict individuals buried under three meters of dirt up to 40 meters away from the explosion. The primary cause of death was the explosive blast within a 100-meter diameter of the epicenter, while beyond that, some were buried alive by debris. Damage from debris extended as far as 100 meters from the strike epicenter.
“Mohammed Deif was afraid to die, so he hid in a way that even damaged his ability to command,” explained IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzl Halevi in remarks delivered today. “He hid behind and sacrificed the people and civilians around him, using them as shields, though very few were harmed,” added the Chief of Staff.
There are rumors that Deif’s body is being held in a hospital in Khan Yunis. However, as Chief of Staff Halevi noted, “It is still too early to conclude the results of the strike, which Hamas is trying to conceal.”
The Chief of Staff emphasized that “according to the intelligence available to us at the time of the strike, there were no hostages in the compound. According to the information that emerged after the strike, no hostages were harmed.”
—— Implications
Mohammad Sinwar, the younger brother of Yahya Sinwar, the commander of the southern Gaza Strip, is expected to succeed Deif as the head of Hamas’ military wing. This event signifies a major blow to Hamas, with only the Sinwar brothers, the Rafah Brigade, and the Gaza Brigade remaining operational.
The death of Mohammad Deif impacts not only the operational capabilities of Hamas but also strikes at the heart of its symbolic and ideological strength. His ability to evade Israeli forces for decades added to his legendary status among Hamas’ ranks, and his elimination leaves a void that affects both the group’s morale and its operational coherence.
Beyond the immediate conflict, Deif was an iconic figure of the Palestinian cause internationally, with his name and image synonymous with the fight against Israeli occupation. His death is a global event with significant implications for the Palestinian narrative.
—— IDF Briefing
Chief of Staff Halevi asserted this evening, “We are determined to continue to pursue senior Hamas officials, those who planned and carried out the October 7 massacre, and dedicated their lives to the murder of innocents.”
“These eliminations are one part of the continuous and changing military pressure that the IDF is applying in all parts of the Gaza Strip,” added Halevi, stressing that these operations are “all supported by high-quality and up-to-date intelligence.”
“This is critical for the systematic dismantling of the Hamas terrorist organization; it is also very important for the creation of the conditions for an agreement to return the hostages,” said Halevi.
“We found him; we will also find those next in line,” vowed Halevi this evening.
—— Documentation of the Strike
Video footage of the strikes showed voluminous sand plumes flung tens of meters into the air from the elimination site.
Note: Landmarks mapped in Image 1 reveal that the visible crater and immediate blast perimeters at the strike site comprise approximately 25 meters in radius, suggesting an immediate impact perimeter of 157.08 meters, with an area of 1,963.50 square meters.
Highlighted in Image 2 is a 50 meter radius, spanning significantly beyond the crater and visible blast perimeter, which the IDF’s released satellite imagery (Image 3) shows with intact structures.
This geospatial analysis does not support the assessment of an immediate blast impact with a 50 meter radius. Instead, it suggests a 50 meter diameter, or 25 meter radius as shown.
For side-by-side reference:
The left plate is the IDF’s officially released targeting satellite image, pre-strike.
The center plate is Google Earth's satellite imagery updated on 7/8/24.
The right plate is the IDF’s post-strike satellite imagery.
02:00 IST UPDATE: ICRC seen in bid to do damage-control over Hostage Crisis as widespread complicity in Hamas' Abuse of Humanitarian Norms, continues to unravel -November 23, 2023
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is scrambling to do ‘damage control’ in the wake of findings implicating their organization and the World Health Organization (WHO) in concealing Hamas' use of Shifa Hospital for terror operations, as detailed in a New York Post article by senior analyst at FDD, Richard Goldberg earlier today [4].
The implications under international law, of key officials of these organizations' roles, and their complicity in running cover for Hamas operations in civilian humanitarian infrastructure, poses the serious risk of loss of protected status under the rules of armed conflict. Fabrizio Carboni, the Middle East regional director for the ICRC, is accused of spreading disinformation about the situation in Gaza hospitals. Similarly, the WHO is alleged to have pressured Israel to avoid Shifa Hospital, falsely claiming it was non-functional and that patients were dying as a consequence [4].
On Monday, November 20 Reuters and Times of Israel reported that the president of ICRC, Mirjana Spoljaric, flew to Qatar for face to face meetings with Ismail Haniyeh, who chairs Hamas' Political Bureau. Spoljaric subsequently held separate discussions with authorities from the state of Qatar. These meetings, later confirmed in statements by the ICRC, aimed to address the urgent protection of all victims in the conflict and to alleviate the difficult humanitarian situation gripping the Gaza Strip. The ICRC raised various issues with Hamas leadership seeking commitments pertaining to the release of hostages and the orderly evacuation of civilians from zones of active combat operations [2], [3].
This came on the heels of the IDF exposing a 55m long section of Hamas’ tunnel network under Al Shifa, and signaling the ‘next phase’ of Operation Iron Swords expanding to the South of Gaza and Khan Younis in its announcement last weekend by Israel Defense Minister Yoav Gallant [9].
Netanyahu and the Israel War Cabinet presented these developments as an assurance to the families of hostages that progress was being made, and to Israel's US allies as evidence of the criticality of IDF’s strategic move on Al-Shifa hospital in the preceding days.
Yesterday the IDF exposed the extent of the tunnel network under Al Shifa releasing an uncut 10 minute video of what appears to be a complex subterranean network extending hundreds of meters across Al-Shifa and the surrounding area. Meanwhile pressure mounted on the ICRC, UNWRA, WHO et al, to secure access to the hostages through its network of aid workers on the ground.
The ICRC stated that it has been actively seeking access to the hostages, in order to deliver medication, and facilitate communication between the hostages and external parties [3]. This is part of a critical provision for the hostage deal wherein Netanyahu and the Israeli War Cabinet are seeking to secure a certified list of the hostages, and direct confirmation of their status. However reports have been circulating that Hamas is refusing ICRC access to the hostages, to provide proof of life, and will not guarantee the hostages are delivered ‘alive’, the primary reason for news of the deal stalling yesterday. Israel's National Security Council chairman, Tzachi Hanegbi per the Times of Israel said yesterday “The negotiations for the release of our hostages are constantly progressing... The release will begin according to the original agreement between the parties, and not before Friday."
Amidst these revelations, and the growing risk of the deal failing, both the ICRC and the World Health Organization (WHO) have been frantically moving to amend their stance in relation to Hamas, following over a decade of what is emerging as complicity to conceal war crimes - namely the militarization of humanitarian infrastructure - and widespread humanitarian abuses in the Gaza strip. In a statement made Monday the ICRC distanced themselves from the process, seeking to clarify their role in the hostage crisis: “The ICRC is not a negotiator. We are a neutral and impartial humanitarian organization and do not take part in any negotiations or political deals between the sides” [6].
The ramifications are seismic for the ICRC, UNRWA, WHO and other NGO’s as they find themselves embroiled in one of the biggest hostage crises in history involving 240 multi national and Israeli nationals, and an historic scandal over widespread human rights abuses in a region where they had a free hand for over decade.
On the ground, the prospects of the deal remain uncertain. Hamas has lost many of its commanders and consequently have lost control over Gaza. There are other factions, like Islamic Jihad, and various gangs that are understood to have custody of the hostages. The leadership in Qatar are seen as unable to effectively control those groups through Yahya Sinwar, the chief of Hamas who is believed to be borrowed in subterranean infrastructure in South Gaza, Over the last 48 hours videos have emerging of ‘White Flag’ mobs stampeding through the streets of Southern Gaza chanting anti-Hamas slogans. Moreover, there is the challenge of how the ICRC can access every hostage in the midst of ongoing combat operations and IDF surveillance.
If Hamas cannot provide the ICRC with access to the hostages in order to provide proof of life, and refuses to guarantee the hostages are delivered alive, then the deal may continue to stall. A prospect which Netanyahu and his government have been trying to convey to its US counterparts and the families of hostages in Israel, knowing from experience how uncertain a deal was to materialize with Hamas.
As of the latest update the Qatari foreign ministry announced that a hostage deal between Israel and the Gaza-based Hamas terrorist group would begin at 7 a.m. on Friday [6].
Shortly after the Prime Minister's Office released a statement on behalf of the Office-Coordinator for the Hostages and Missing, Brigadier General Gal Hirsch:
“Pursuant to the arrival of a list of the names of the hostages who are due to be released first in the first stage of the outline that has been agreed upon, liaison officers have informed all of those families whose loved ones appear on the list, as well as all of the hostages' families..” [7].
The first 13 hostages much anticipated release on Friday Gaza 4 PM remains uncertain as Jerusalem Post reported 4 hours ago:
“On Thursday evening IDF Spokesperson R.-Adm. Daniel Hagari noted that no aspect of the hostage deal is set in stone "until it happens...it is subject to changes," he said in a daily briefing as Israel vehemently rejected a Hamas demand for Israeli forces to retreat and withdraw from the Shifa Hospital in Gaza, N12 reported on Thursday. As per the report, the Palestinian terrorist group's request came as a last-minute demand in the Qatar-mediated deal to release some 13 hostages for four days of ceasefire in the Strip” [8].
"Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a security discussion with members of the War Cabinet, this evening, at the Kirya in Tel Aviv."
X Press Link:
As of the time of this writing the agreement is set to go into effect in 5 hours at 0700 IST
RELATED ARTICLES:
- IDF MOUNTS PRESSURE FOR THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES AS NEGOTIATIONS STALL OVER 5 DAY TACTICAL PAUSE - November 18 2023
- OPERATION IRON SWORDS DAY 43 | DEFENSE MINISTER ANNOUNCES ‘NEXT PHASE’ - November 19 2023
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Sources/Citations
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1. Times of Israel - 2. Reuters - 3. ICRC - 4. How many aid groups knew Hamas was hiding in a hospital and lied about it? - The NY Post
5. ICRC - The ICRC is not a negotiator. | … 6. Qatar Foreign Ministry - … 7. Prime Minister’s Office Israel - 8. Jerusalem Post - Israel rejects Hamas ceasefire demand to evacuate Gaza's Shifa - report
9. @danlinnaeus - OPERATION IRON SWORDS DAY 43 | DEFENSE MINISTER ANNOUNCES ‘NEXT PHASE’
*Not an endorsement of the view being reported: I was in a space with a Palestinian journalist this weekend who had some unique albeit coherent views on the Gaza situation. Among many interesting points, he made the arguably controversial remark that, in his view, the IDF should not enter Southern Gaza after the anticipated 4-5 day pause. When asked why, he explained his conviction that the citizens will now revolt against Hamas and remove them, themselves, and that this uprising would lead to markedly superior outcomes for Israel and the hostage situation. This interesting video was posted yesterday afternoon.
As a result of Oct 7 Hamas must be cleared from Gaza. IDF split Gaza from Negev to sea, as they did in 2014, and this was declared with 6 million leaflets dropped, and more than 20,000 direct calls made to citizens leading up to tactical air strikes and ground operations.
The tactical criticality of this split is clear: to collapse Hamas’ tunnel network, isolate combatants and shut down Hamas’ military capability in the Northern Gaza zone, thereby moving one step closer to securing the civilian areas in the vicinity of the Israeli border so their communities can begin to rebuild: the world forgets the 250,000 Israelis currently internally displaced who cannot return to rebuild their homes, or bury their dead in their hometowns. But Israel and the IDF will not.
Hamas has consistently prevented Gaza civilians from evacuating, executing them as collaborators. I refer you to the massacre on Al Rasheed beach of Nov 3rd where Hamas massacred dozens of civilians, when they abandoned their blockade to the south as IDF forces began to move into Gaza.
The tragic consequences you see scattered in media clips and photos are the direct result of Hamas’ strategy and the stated desired result of Hamas’ officials. They have made numerous statements to this effect regarding their stance on the protection of Gaza civilians which can be (much too briefly) summarized as follows:
1. Mousa Abu Marzouk stated that Hamas' tunnels in Gaza are for protecting its members, not civilians, aligning with their strategy of using civilians as human shields [#1].
2. Abu Marzouk argued that protecting Gaza's refugee population, comprising 75% of its people, is the UN's responsibility, not Hamas's, and mentioned Israel's obligations under the Geneva Convention [#2,#3].
3. Yahya Sinwar admitted during a 2016 uprising that Hamas uses women and children as human shields [#4].
4. Hamas leadership instructed civilians to ignore IDF evacuation advice, using them to shield against Israeli attacks [#5].
These so called “leaders” of the Gaza people, who have not held an election since 2006, collectively stole $11bn in funds and live in luxury in London and Doha and elsewhere, but they did not spend $1 to build a bomb shelter for their people; and they openly call for the blood of their own people, while directing their men to execute ‘collaborators’ who do not wish to be martyred preferring to evacuate to safer areas.
They do this strategically and precisely so that their bots and ignorant fanatics can post these devastating images of slain and maimed civilians on the internet in order to pressure the international community to act against Israel. This is what the Jihadis support. This is who they are.
They think the world is blind and stupid, but to many they are like ostriches with their heads in the sand. Their rear end sticks out like a sore thumb for the whole world to see, with the embarrassing exception of the Global Left; the world sees them. The world knows them. And mark my words, the world will scrape the depravity of Hamas from its shoe on the sidewalks of history and march forward without them.
To all those who cannot or will not wake up and snap back to reality in understanding the depth of the nefariousness western civilization now faces, preferring to grand stand for a sectarian death cult, so be it. So be it.
But note carefully that in the last few days the IDF reiterated their objective to clear Hamas from the strip and issued public calls to evacuate Khan Younis to designated safe-zones. Listen to them. They are prosecuting a war as per their mandate to the State of Israel and its people, and they will not falter to complete their mission, without compromise, without half measures. Policymakers and the public must face reality and move decisively to pressure Hamas to let civilians evacuate accordingly.
War is hell. It is morally repugnant to contribute in any manner to making it more so.
Sources: 1. Hamas officials admit its strategy is to use Palestinian civilians as human shields - FDD 2. WATCH: Hamas Official Says Group Doesn't Give Civilians Shelter Because That's the UN's Job - Free Beacon 3. Top Hamas official declares group is not responsible for defending Gazan civilians - The Times of Israel 4. Hamas officials admit its strategy is to use Palestinian civilians as human shields - FDD 5. Hamas officials admit its strategy is to use Palestinian civilians as human shields - FDD
BREAKING | Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant issues statements regarding the next stage of the operation in the Gaza Strip, announcing that the Israel Defense Forces had completed the capture and clearing of the western part of Gaza City, removing Hamas operatives and assets from the area. This accomplishment marks the beginning of the "next phase" of the operation[#1].
During a situational assessment briefing with the IDF Deputy Chief of Staff and other senior officers, Gallant updated findings at the Al-Shifa hospital in Gaza. The IDF has identified evidence of significant underground infrastructure beneath the hospital compound which are not currently cleared, as well as information suggesting a connection between Hamas activities in the hospital and Hamas’s hostages.
Gallant emphasized the IDF's coordination between air, sea, and land forces, supported by comprehensive intelligence, underscoring the mission criticality of expanding the operation, increasing pressure on Hamas, and neutralizing their infrastructure, operatives, and leadership to enhance the odds of returning abductees. Galant concluded by asserting that force is the only modality understood by Hamas [#2].
Gallant’s statements reflect a strategic shift in the IDF's approach to the conflict in Gaza, focusing on rapid response to urban reconnaissance , precision force multiplication, and counter-insurgency ground operations to achieve their objectives, while signaling a tactical reconnoiter southward of IDF in expanding operations.
### Sources/Citations 1. Gallant: IDF has cleared out western Gaza City, moving to 'next phase' of ground operation - The Times of Israel, [URL]()
WHO IS THE IRAN LOBBY | The Trita & Rouzbeh Parsi Brothers, The National Iranian American Council (NIAC), The Iran Experts Initiative (IEI) & Tehran’s Influence Operations in the US and Europe - November 10, 2023
The "Iran Lobby" in the United States refers to a network of individuals and organizations known to be influencing American foreign policy in favor of Iran. The coined nomenclature came to prominence in geo-political circles circa 2014, notably in the context of what is now known to the public as the Iran Nuclear Deal under the Obama administration.
The central US figure in this group is Trita Parsi, the founder of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), which is often described as the spearhead of this lobby. Parsi, an Iranian-born émigré who moved to the U.S. in 2001, has been active in promoting reconciliation between Washington and Tehran, advocating for lifting sanctions on Iran, and fostering broader US-Iran relations [Source: #1].
Trita’s brother, Rouzbeh Parsi, associated with the Iran Experts Initiative (IEI), and co-founder of the European Middle East Research Group, has been a vocal advocate for Iranian interests within the European context, particularly through his role at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. This familial link between Trita and Rouzbeh Parsi is suggestive of an intercontinental network of influence operations spanning from the United States to Europe, encompassing both the NIAC and the IEI [Sources: #10, #11, #12].
-ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS
Key individuals connected with the IEI, have recently come under intense scrutiny with specific attention given to Ariane Tabatabai and Robert Malley.
Ariane Tabatabai, the Pentagon’s Chief of Staff for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, was implicated in reports regarding Iranian influence operations. Christopher Maier, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee during a hearing titled "Reclaiming Congress’s Article I Powers: Counterterrorism AUMF Reform." This hearing took place on September 28, 2023, at 10:00 am [Sources: #2, #16, #17, #18, #19, #20, #21].
According to Maier’s testimony the Department of Defense is currently investigating Ariane Tabatabai’s background check and security clearance process due to her alleged involvement in these operations. Leaked email correspondence from the IEI revealed her agreement to be part of the "core group of the IEI" and contacts with Iranian Foreign Ministry officials [Sources #13, #14, #15].
As of the latest information, Tabatabai remains in her role while the investigation is ongoing.
In late April of this year Robert Malley, the U.S. Special Envoy for Iran, had his security clearance and State Department credentials pulled following internal concerns about his handling of sensitive information, personal conduct, and use of classified networks. Malley stated that he was on leave and expected the investigation to end favorably. However, a leaked letter from the State Department's security division detailed the reasons for the revocation of his clearance and indicated that the matter had been turned over to the FBI for investigation.
As of the latest information available, investigations into the Iran Experts Initiative and related individuals are ongoing and no conclusive outcomes or results of these investigation or the FBI’s involvement in connection with the allegations and security clearance status of key figures like Ariane Tabatabai and Robert Malley have been disclosed.
[ Sources: #22, #23, #24, #25, #26, #27, #28, #29]
-NIAC FOCUS
The activities of the Iran Lobby, particularly the NIAC in the US, are multi-faceted. They involve cultivating relationships with influential figures in the U.S., including diplomats, congressional representatives, and academics. NIAC's advisory board has included former U.S. diplomats and its conferences have featured high-profile speakers like Joe Biden’s National Security Adviser Colin Kahl and Middle East Director Rob Malley. These connections underscore NIAC’s influence in policy-making circles. NIAC has been actively involved in promoting a narrative favorable to Iran in the American media and political discussions [Sources: #1, #3, #4, #5].
Leading up to the investigations critics raised concerns over the years about the Iran Lobby's objectives, and the extent of its influence on U.S. and NATO member state foreign policy, pointing out that these groups act as apologists for the Iranian regime, often downplaying Iran's actions that are hostile to both U.S. and European interests.
In 2008, the NIAC and Trita Parsi were jointly embroiled in a notable defamation lawsuit, which it lost in 2015, with the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia’s decision including a poignant observation: 'NIAC's day-to-day activities were not inconsistent with being a lobby for the Islamic Republic of Iran.' This legal defeat, culminating in 2015, cast a shadow over NIAC's reputation.
Despite this public discrediting and confirmation from the courts of NIAC's actions aligning with Iran's interests, the Obama administration permitted NIAC, and its affiliates, to infiltrate and exert influence over the critical deliberations of the Iran nuclear deal, raising questions about the integrity of the policy-making process" [Sources: #32, #33]. During the Obama administration's negotiations with Iran on the nuclear deal, NIAC and its partners played a critical role in shaping a policy direction favorable to Iran. This included advocating against congressional sanctions and supporting narratives that portrayed opponents of the nuclear deal as warmongers. The collaboration between the White House and pro-Iran lobbyists was seen as a key factor in advancing a nuclear deal with Iran that was viewed as beneficial to Tehran. [ Sources: #1, #4, #5, #13, #17, ]
-BROADER PATTERN OF INFLUENCE OPERATIONS IN U.S.
The Iran Lobby's efforts are not limited to diplomatic channels. They extend to public relations and media campaigns, promoting the view that a less confrontational U.S. policy towards Iran would lead to positive changes in Iranian behavior and regional policies. This strategy has included aggressive campaigning against sanctions and for the narrative that a nuclear-capable Iran and its recognition as a regional power are acceptable outcomes.
An article by Washington Examiner dated October 4, 2023, provided the American public with insights into the extent of the Iranian influence operations in the United States, particularly within government departments. It discusses the involvement of Iranian American academics and think tankers, as well as allegations of them taking direction from Iranian officials. The article also explores the broader implications of these influence operations on U.S. foreign policy and national security, noting Iranian officials and these influence operations have penetrated the U.S. State and Defense departments calling out both the NIAC and the Iran Experts Initiative [#5].
The distinct picture emerging within policy and intelligence circles is that the Iran Experts Initiative (IEI) is a covert operation initiated by Iran’s foreign ministry in 2014, potentially planned as far back as the early 2000’s, aimed at subtly advancing Iran's diplomatic objectives by strategically positioning Iranian analysts within Western think tanks. The operation is characterized as seeking to build relationships with overseas academics and researchers in the West and used to "promote Tehran's arguments in the west." Members of the IEI are exposed as academics and researchers for think tanks in the West, advising Europe and the U.S. within the framework of Tehran’s influence operations with the project described as "an influence network formed and guided by Tehran" [#6, #7, #8, #9, #14].
Reports by Iran International and Semafor, based on leaked foreign ministry emails, claim Tehran is directly responsible for assembling this network of Western scholars under the umbrella of the Iran Experts Initiative. The leaked emails detail efforts by Iran's Foreign Ministry to improve Tehran's image abroad and build international ties with influential academics and researchers. The initiative included a core group of 6-10 distinguished second-generation Iranians with established affiliations [#6, #7, #8, #9, #14, #15].
The IEI is broadly reported to have been meticulously planned, involving a select group of Iranian analysts initially proposed with 21 candidates, but eventually narrowed down to around ten individuals who were either vetted or willing to cooperate. Alarmingly senior Biden administration officials were implicated, raising serious concerns about the integrity of the administration's Iran policy [Sources: #6, #7, #8, #9, #14, #15, #30, #31].
A proposed Gaza-Israel ceasefire framework could include the following key provisions:
1. Establishment of a civilian safe-space in southern Gaza, to be monitored and maintained by a US/British-led peace force, with the primary objective of protecting civilians and facilitating humanitarian assistance.
2. Inclusion of specific provisions in the ceasefire agreement that explicitly prohibit speech inciting violence, lawlessness, and calls for religious wars. These provisions would mandate any peace force deployed in the region to monitor and address instances of such speech, in accordance with international human rights law.
3. Commitment by all member states to develop, adopt, and ratify international laws that restrict speech inciting violence and calls for religious wars. This would be in line with the principles set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which allows for the restriction of speech that incites violence, discrimination, or hostility.
These key provisions aims to address the immediate needs of the civilian population, while also tackling the underlying issues that contribute to the cycle of violence in the region. By including specific provisions related to speech inciting violence and religious wars, the framework seeks to foster a more tolerant and peaceful environment, conducive to lasting peace and stability.
Safe-space idea was proposed by Walid Phares, Lebanese-American scholar and political commentator specializing in Middle Eastern affairs, terrorism, and global conflicts, and adopted today in Biden’s speech.
I posit US/UK led efforts because as a starting point for discussion this seems to sit better within both IL’s and Egypt’s comfort zone. However it seems natural that such a peacekeeping force should nevertheless be comprised of majority Egyptian forces, native to the region, incentivized to counter spread of fundamentalist ideology on their border, experienced in the same, and better suited culturally for the role.
The idea of implementing international frameworks specifically prohibiting incitement to violence and religious wars as a "Jeffersonian moment" for the Middle East leading to its own implementation of an Establishment Clause is potentially transformative, but has to be addressed carefully as it strikes at the core of Jihadist fundamentalism and is therefore inherently divisive.
Nevertheless it strikes at heart of the problem and highlights a key mutual interest of both the moderate Arab world and Western aspirations.
Moreover if successfully implemented, not only could it serve as a catalyst for positive change in the region, promoting a more tolerant and peaceful coexistence among different religious and cultural groups, but has the potential to catalyze Israel's acceptance and recognition in the region, and serve as a positive redemption in the wake of Gaza’s civilian suffering.
These key provisions can be broached to interested parties as marking a significant shift in the dynamics of the Middle East, perhaps even attached in alignment to the Abraham Accords, and could open the door to a new era of cooperation and mutual understanding.