@Citrini7 Ask yourself what you think a reserve currency is.
Is it the fact of a stock of financial assets in a currency?
Or is it a propensity to have a flow?
If the trade deficit (flow) immediately goes to zero, the stock remains unchanged.
Other flows shift. Americans net save.
@Citrini7 Americans consume less (because they save more). They produce more to consume what they cut off from the outside world. Jobs which were related to consumption become jobs related to production. All fine. The savings finance the part of the govt deficit no longer financed by
@Citrini7 foreign flows, but until the budget deficit falls to the level of the current trade deficit, there’s an excess which has to be funded by someone (as a flow). If that is funded by foreigners, you still have the same ‘reserve currency’ ownership of stock AND new inflows ‘problem.’
@Citrini7 If you need foreigners to have zero net inflow of capital into the US (but retain the same stock), then American savers pick up the slack.
If American savers pick up the slack by increasing savings to an extent to cover the part of the budget deficit not covered by the
@Citrini7 elimination of the trade deficit, that comes out of consumption again. So…
1) Americans reduce consumption to balance trade and increase savings. 2) Then Americans reduce consumption again to finance the other (budget deficit less trade deficit) portion.
How does this work?
@Citrini7 In a nutshell? “Financial oppression.” Higher inflation, lower earnings on savings.
The only OTHER way out of this is massive productivity growth. But productivity is essentially just translated as ‘lower costs’.
That can be lower cost raw materials, lower cost of mfg, etc.
@Citrini7 Continuously lower costs implies no scarcity in inputs. No scarcity of inputs means disinflation, or deflation, and it means less money spent on labour. Lutnick on Fox talking about bringing back automated garment manufacturing to the US is a perfect example: 1) minimal new job
@Citrini7 count to produce lots more apparel in the US. Overall drop in consumption (lose lots of jobs related to consumption, replace them with some jobs and more robots in mfg).
Who wins there?
Michael Pettis is a supporter of the trade/capital/balance argument (which is not unsound
@Citrini7 in and of itself as a balance, but may be unsound/outdated in terms of practical causality) and he argues that the reason for the trade imbalance with China is the functional repression of Chinese households (and the earnings/risk on savings) by the govt, favouring producers.
@Citrini7 The philosophical problem with that is that the deficit countries, in order to redress that imbalance, have to act more like the people they criticise.
The US has to
a) lower the return/risk ratio on US financial assets AND oblige Americans to buy more of them and foreigners
@Citrini7 to buy less.
b) encourage lower real interest rates in a more closed economy, creating inflation to support jobs, which means US equity 'savers' further have to buy more low-returning bonds, or
c) US mfg sees a jobless renaissance
@Citrini7 because of automation and AI, which supports equity capital returns at the expense of labour share of GDP (automation/AI takes some of the labour share of GDP and gives it back to capital, through capex in automation and AI).
These are all choices.
@Citrini7 a) is basically financial repression.
b) is really bad for equity markets (rich people)
c) is really bad for the lower half of the economy which effectively become a burden of (and therefore serve) the State.
@Citrini7 Every imbalance in global economics is simply a balance you don't like.
There is a stock, and a flow.
If you don't like the flow, it means you reverse the conditions which got you here.
If you don't like the stock, you reverse them even more.
If you do not like the
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@dampedspring @Crinklebine I agree. But I think not one of them actually understands how tariffs flow through the economy.
The Bessent/Friedman idea of inflation is that tariffs don't create inflation because when the price of one thing rises, but nominal income does not, then the prices of other things
@dampedspring @Crinklebine have to fall. Simplistically, that means:
1) Tariffs cause imports to rise in price. Let's say 15% of GDP is imports. Add 20% to prices. Imports drop 20%, so the price of 12% of GDP rises 20%. That's 2.4% inflation. 2) 3% of GDP which used to be imports are now American, and
@dampedspring @Crinklebine the American products are 5% less than the new imported product price. So inflation on that 3% is 15%, and that adds 0.45% to inflation. 3) so the other 85% has to see prices drop 2.85% or 3.33% deflation to get inflation to zero.
Not to worry. Scott Bessent - whom a lot of you thought smart - told us tariffs don't cause inflation because when prices on tariffed goods go up, prices on non-tariffed goods go down. So no inflation.
That must mean the prices of 100% made-in-America goods and services go down.
And the nominee for the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors said, "Tariffs provide revenue, and if offset by currency adjustments, present minimal inflationary or otherwise adverse side effects, consistent with the experience in 2018-2019."
This was the guy who said in his "User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System", "The root of the economic imbalances lies in persistent dollar overvaluation" and he catalogues the tools for this change in global system, and his first main explanation of WHY tariffs
The new US policy is to charge a large amount of money per Chinese vessel operated by a Chinese shipping company, or a smaller/larger amount to a non-Chinese shipper with Chinese vessels in its fleet or with vessels on order from Chinese shipyards.
That's almost everybody who ships.
The numbers are diverse, and a little complicated, but let's assume they are $1mm per port visit, as proposed.
Let's just assume container vessels for now.
1) Big container vessels are 10-24k TEU (20ft container equivalent) carriers.
Kids, don't do this at home. Chart crime doesn't pay.
1) Don't do TotRtn of *yield* on 10yr vs other 10yr, calling it "related to cross-currency swap" when one yield is 8x the other at the start 🤷♂️ 2) IF "JPY carry trade leverage" (i.e. "funding"?) is getting more expensive and
you happen to be short JGB 10yr vs UST10, you are making not losing money. You couldn't possibly tell it from the 2yr chart above but assuming GC borrow, the now 8yr JGB you shorted 2yrs ago is ~92.5 and your now 8yr UST long is 96.50-ish. You've made 7.0-7.5% in carry, 4% on the
paper mark, 7.0-7.5% in carry, and your FX trade is up 10%. Levered? You done good, son.
3) The BOJ is NOT "losing control over long-term JGB yields. A rising/steepening yield curve is a feature not a bug of the current moment.
I'll admit I am not sure what @riteshmjn's (or Luke's) "second derivative" is here.
I will, however, point out that if the USG suddenly stops paying X% of GDP into the economy, it does not mean the US GDP is instantly and permanently downsized X%.
We can look at it from a different perspective - one easier to think about.
The USG fires one person. USG spending goes down by the salary and other related payroll items of that one person. GDP goes down, ceteris paribus by the total reduction of spending of that person?
No.
For starters, that person eats. They buy toilet paper. They pay rent or a mortgage. That spending is maintained. They do not simply walk into the forest to die.
But HOW do they spend that with no money?
First, they get unemployment benefits from the USG. Oops.
Scott Bessent: "The U.S. has a strong dollar policy, but because we have a strong dollar policy, it doesn't mean that other countries get to have a weak currency policy."