Thread by @michaeldweiss

America's "washing its hands" of Ukraine-Russia talks can mean several things. First and foremost, it would mean ending this Witkoff/Rubio fandango to attain (or impose) a Russia-favorable peace deal of some kind, which reportedly would include de facto ceding occupied territory to Moscow. But what else does an American walk-away entail? Some unresolved questions below:

1. It is a near certainty that no additional military aid packages will come from this administration once the Biden-era ones run out. But does that mean Trump will refuse to sell weapons and ammunition directly or indirectly to Ukraine? Does it mean he will actively slap end user restrictions on European countries from buying American kit for the express purpose of donating it to Ukraine? (Even Rubio alluded to Ukraine's right to bilateral agreements with other countries.)

Right now, Germany continues to supply Kyiv with Patriot missiles. Long-range air defense is one of three critical areas in security assistance where Europe cannot yet compensate for the absence of American platforms, the other two being rocket artillery and howitzer ammunition. So new European aid packages featuring U.S.-made hardware seriously matter. Does Trump's pivot to Moscow include his limiting U.S. arms exports to Europe, something that would grievously harm the American arms industry beyond the harm Trump already inflicted on it with his attacks on transatlanticism, NATO, etc.? Between 2020 and 2024, Europe overtook the Middle East as the largest region for U.S. arms exports for the first time in two decades. Now, this government is clearly not above economic own goals, but it'll nonetheless be interesting to see how it sells a new dawn with Russia -- one without a concomitant peace -- as the price worth paying for crippling the American military-industrial complex.

2. Does Trump lift some or most sanctions on Russia in the absence of a peace deal? He might in pursuit of rapprochement, but even here he'll find it difficult to give Putin everything he wants with the stroke of a pen. Some of the toughest sanctions, including those on Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, are tied to Congressional notification/approval, thanks to Biden. Trump would also face some headwinds from Republicans on the Hill, who would not be happy with sanctions relief in exchange for nothing.

Moreover, Europe gets a vote.

SWIFT, which Moscow wanted its agricultural bank reconnected to as a precondition for a ceasefire, is based in Brussels. EU sanctions legislation is by consent. So far, there has been *no* indication the EU is considering lifting sanctions on Russia, whatever D.C. says, does or agrees to. The opposite, in fact, is the case: the EU has been discussing ways to increase sanctions on Russia in coordination with the UK: archive.ph/qsVfc

3. How does Russia benefit economically if the U.S. lifts most or all sanctions but the EU does not, or if the EU imposes new ones because the war continues and Russia commits further atrocities, such as the recent missile attacks on population centers? Well, it's complicated, and not in a good way for Moscow: archive.ph/N5gjh

In short, Europe is not some sideshow or afterthought to this conflict. It can do quite a lot on its own before or absent getting its own security portfolio in order, which is long overdue anyway. This is why the Trump/Vance campaign of bullying and abasing NATO allies proceeds apace. It is also why the GRU's sabotage operations -- arsons, bombings, assassination attempts, cyberattacks -- target the continent almost exclusively with the intent of frightening electorates into abandoning support for Ukraine. And it is why Medvedev, Solovyov, et al. are focusing their threats and vitriol on Europe. Splitting the U.S. from the rest of NATO is an accomplishment in its own right for the Russians. But they know they don't get the win they desperately want in Ukraine unless the EU rolls over the way the Americans are doing. apnews.com/article/russia…

And the longer that win is denied them, the more two things happen simultaneously, which makes it a dimmer prospect. The first is that Ukraine grows increasingly autonomous in its own defense capability. (Right now about 40%-plus of its military needs are sourced domestically, including and especially drones, which have fundamentally transformed the nature of this war.) The second is that European military procurement grows as European reliance on the U.S. shrinks. Allies of Ukraine, both in America and in Europe, should be encouraging both processes and acting as if Washington has already washed its hands of the war. /END