1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”
1/ An investigation into how @cryptobeastreal scammed followers by lying they were not behind the $190M -> $3M $ALT market cap crash where 45+ connected insider wallets sold $11M+ on July 14, 2025.
2/ Earlier this month Crypto Beast began aggressively promoting $ALT on X and TG.
On July 14, 2025 ALT crashed from 0.19 to 0.003 after insiders sold a large percent of the total supply.
All of these posts promoting the token. have since been deleted.
3/ Crypto Beast previously shared a public wallet on X & TG in now deleted posts.
1/ My recent investigation uncovered more than $16.58M in payments since January 1, 2025 or $2.76M per month has been sent to North Korean IT workers hired as developers at various projects & companies.
To put this in perspective payments range from $3K-8K per month meaning they have infiltrated 345 jobs on the low end or 920 jobs on the high end.
2/ Here’s a look into one of the six clusters I have been monitoring and was able to attribute 8 different DPRK ITWs that obtained roles at 12+ projects.
I traced out the payment addresses from the table to two consolidation addresses.
1/ Multiple projects tied to Pepe creator Matt Furie & ChainSaw as well as another project Favrr were exploited in the past week which resulted in ~$1M stolen
My analysis links both attacks to the same cluster of DPRK IT workers who were likely accidentally hired as developers.
2/ On Jun 18, 2025 at 4:25 am UTC ownership for ‘Replicandy’ from Matt Furie & ChainSaw was transferred to a new EOA 0x9Fca.
Jun 18, 2025
6:20 pm UTC: 0x9Fca withdrew mint proceeds from the contract
Jun 19, 2025
5:11 am UTC: 0x9Fca unpauses the mint
The attacker then minted NFTs and sold into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.
3/ On Jun 23, 2025 the attacker transferred ownership from the ChainSaw deployer to 0x9Fca for Peplicator, Hedz, Zogz.
Similarly the attacker minted NFTs and sold them into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.
1/ An investigation into how the New York based social engineering scammer Daytwo/PawsOnHips (Christian Nieves) stole $4M+ from Coinbase users by impersonating customer support, bought luxury goods, and lost most of the funds gambling at casinos.
2/ Daytwo operates a small call centre group and also works as a caller.
His group primarily coerced targets into setting up Coinbase wallet with a compromised seed on phishing sites.
Below is a video of his panel used and a sample of his voice when calling.
1/ In late 2023 a former Yuga Labs security researcher was stopped at the airport after law enforcement mistakenly linked them to a $1.1M phishing theft from a Bored Ape owner.
Here’s an investigation into where the stolen funds went and who’s actually responsible.
2/ In Dec 2022, a victim had 14 X BAYC NFTs phished in a social engineering scheme where purchased X accounts were used to convince the victim they wanted to license the IP rights for a film.
The scammer directed the victim to a phishing site where they had them sign a message draining their assets.
3/ In Sep 2023, Sam Curry a well known whitehat and former Yuga Labs security engineer was detained at the airport by law enforcement for questioning and was served with a grand jury subpoena (later dropped).
In reality as part of his security work at Yuga, he had been investigating the theft and used a private key put in the JavaScript of the website by the threat actor.
LE then had mistakenly reviewed logs from OpenSea which included his home IP address and used this to incorrectly link him as the suspect.