A under-discussed backdrop to yesterday's election results—Britain today feels less pleasant, well-maintained and orderly than a decade ago: from potholes to phone-snatchers.
I've spent the past few months digging in to why for @TheEconomist.
A short 🧵 on what I've concluded.
1/ But first, do read the full piece—linked below.
Bemoaning national decline in a data-free way is cathartic, but not all that helpful. I've tried to keep this all pretty closely tied to provable realities, things we can reliably measure.
2/ Start with voters: Brits are not exactly tempermentally optimistic, but I still found this polling pretty shocking.
Across measures and parties, Brits reckon that their neighbourhoods and public services are appreciably worse than a decade ago.
Something is awry.
3/ The expert verdict is similar: here's what the @instituteforgov thinks on public services.
Stories of NHS dysfunction are hardly news, but the breadth of the problem and the particular issues with street-level services and policing are notable.
4/ You can see this in real-life outcomes, too.
Shoplifting is a particularly stark one, because businesses actually have a decent incentive to track it, even if they've given up reporting most thefts to the police.
6/ All this raises a particular challenge when taxes are at historic highs.
I thought @RogerGough2 put it well, but similar sentiments come up again and again in these sorts of conversations.
7/ So what's happened? A lot of the standard bogeymen (austerity, say, or immigration) aren't that persuasive when you dig in.
Take local gov't. Yes, budgets are down a bit after inflation and population growth. More important: under the hood they've been radically reshaped.
8/ Outside social care, where spending is up, budgets are down by over a third. Then throw in special-needs schooling, now radically more expensive, and temporary accommodation (often paying eye-watering rents).
The space for the typical business of local gov't is all but gone.
9/ Or take policing, where public confidence has plummeted.
Worth looking especially at that light gray line, for police visibility: people simply no longer see police officers in their neighbourhoods.
10/ There, again, overall budgets actually aren't down all that much.
But the austerity see-saw: cutting 20k fulltime police officers in the 2010s then rehiring 25k more less-experienced ones later, seems to have done deep damage.
11/ Covid worsened things too—court backlogs are as bad as ever.
And at the end of the pipeline, my colleage @tom_sasse has written about how prisons are in a "doom loop": economist.com/britain/2024/1…
12/ Add all that up and you start to see a pattern, as I lay out in the accompaning leader.
Again and again, the British state has started to look more like a triage ward than a well-functional hospital.
13/ There were real resonances here with the worklessness crisis I've written about previously: a new urgent spending-pressure emerges, and the British state struggles with cost control. So other functions get salami-sliced to oblivion.
13/ And you don't just have to look at the polling to see that. The public is voting with their wallets, too—private-sector alternatives to the state are doing exceptionally well.
Take the security business, which is seeing exponential growth.
14/ This, as @SCP_Hughes lays out w/ privatised local-gov't, is a sort of double-taxation—one which plenty seem willing to pay to get services that work.
Shop-security works similarly; the cost of burly guards flows into the price of the chicken-breast packs they're protecting.
15/ Where does that leave Britain? Sorting out the NHS or the benefits system are colossal bureaucratic nightmares; important, but hard.
The good news, of a sort, is that having a real crack at making the public realm pleasant should not be that expensive, or take that long.
16/ Time, as I conclude in the leader, to get out the pressure-washer and take these issues seriously.
Energy in Britain has gotten scarce—and thus expensive.
Prices are high in absolute terms, and further above the European average than any point in at least 40 years (barring the 22/23 shock).
What's behind this, and is it crimping growth? I took a look for @TheEconomist. (🧵)
1/ Briefly first: do read at the piece itself for a fuller exploration of these themes. It's part of our broader cover package this week on the global "greenlash", arguing that climate change needs a politics of the possible.