I promised to be back with the @IAF_MCC and Sargodha love affair.
Yes, @akshaykumar's Sky Force showed 1965 — but let me tell you about 1971.
This time, it was India’s newly formed Top Gun school — TCDTS — that painted the skies above Sargodha.
Buckle up. 🧵👇
What’s TCDTS?
Formed in 1971, the Tactics and Combat Development & Training Squadron was the IAF’s brainchild for fighter combat.
Based at Adampur, it was packed with the crème de la crème — handpicked MiG-21 and Su-7 pilots who’d go on to rewire enemy expectations.
Before war broke out, these elite pilots were already tasked with rewriting air combat playbooks.
But in December 1971, they were ordered to do something unheard of:
Fly low-level night strikes on heavily defended PAF bases — including the crown jewel: Sargodha.
Why was this insane?
MiG-21s and Su-7s weren’t designed for night ops
No night flying aids
Pilots had zero prior night-strike experience
But the order was clear: “Use what you have. Be ready.”
And they were.
Leading from the front was Sqn Ldr DK "Dice" Dhiman, Su-7 Flight Commander.
He flew 7 night missions in 3 days. His aircraft of choice? Tail no. 909, loaded with:
2×500kg bombs
2×83 rounds of cannon fire
His targets? Some of the best-defended bases in Pakistan.
Here’s Dice’s strike log:
Night 1: Hit Chander airfield — twice.
Night 2: Sargodha, Kirana Hills, and Lahore.
Night 3: Back to Sargodha and Chander.
Dec 9: A daylight bombing of Risalewala.
Then came close support missions near Kasur–Lahore. Tireless.
The really scary part of the mission was launch and recovery. Pilots would taxi by moonlight and ask for runway lights to be put on only after lining up and selecting full power with afterburner. For landing, controllers put on the lights only after pilots called short finals.
PAF’s own Group Captain S Sajad Haidar, Chief of Ops at Sargodha, later wrote:
“Indian reprisal came in relentless waves...
I saw a Su-7 dive in from the north, under withering fire, and hit the runway with dibber bombs. The impact was massive. Gallant.”
The Pakistanis expected Canberras for night bombing.
They got MiG-21s and Su-7s instead.
And that’s what made the difference.
Fast, agile fighters — flown by India’s best — crashing into enemy expectations and rewriting the very rules of air warfare.
TCDTS may have been just a year old in 1971.
But in those three nights, it proved it could punch way above its weight.
Sargodha wasn’t just attacked. It was shaken.
And the IAF showed the world what audacity with skill looks like.
In 2025 - Did we repeat it?
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On 20 Nov 1957, Air Cmde PC Lal, then AOC Training Command, hung up his blues and moved to Indian Airlines as GM on a 5 year deputation, to steady a struggling carrier. Few knew this would almost cost India one of its finest Chiefs. (1/12)
#IAFHistory @IAF_MCC
As GM, Lal sat on the committee to choose a replacement for the Dakotas. Three contenders were in play: the Avro HS 748, the Fokker Friendship and a Lockheed design. Defence Minister Krishna Menon was keen that India pick the Avro. 2/
There was one problem. The Avro barely existed. No prototype. No flight record. No performance sheets. Not even complete drawings. Menon still wanted an immediate firm order. Lal, responsible for passenger safety, refused to sign. 3/
In 1973, when princely titles were history, Jamnagar’s ruler Shatrusalyasinhji D. Jadeja entered uniform as Honorary Wing Commander. The Indian Air Force did not honour a title; it honoured a man who kept serving after titles stopped mattering. (1/14)
#IAFHistory
In 1950, under H.H. Digvijaysinhji's guidance, Jamnagar opened an Indian Air Force station. Roads were laid, land and clearances came quickly, and the base was treated as a civic priority from day one. The bond began as stewardship, not ceremony. 2/
In 1952, Jamnagar gifted an eight-inch silver pilot on wood that went each term to the “most promising” trainee at Jodhpur’s No. 2 Air Force Academy. It rewarded potential over pedigree—an early sign of how the house chose to back the IAF. 3/
Meant to hide at a quiet base, the @IAF_MCC MiG-21 instead made a home at Chandigarh. A six-month stopgap became four decades. The place where the story begins and ends. Here’s how it unfolded. 🧵(1/16)
#MiG21Nuggets #IAFHistory
After Independence, the IAF used “type bases”: Pune had Tempests, Kalaikunda had Mystères, Ambala had Hunters. That tidy system was still in place when the MiG-21 came up for induction. 2/
Before the team left for the USSR, AVM Pinto told CO designate, (then) Wg Cdr Dilbagh Singh the first MiG-21 squadron would go to Adampur—quiet, remote and ideal for secrecy. 3/
This, right here 👇🏽—is the real reason the MiG-21 earned the "flying coffin" tag. No, it wasn’t the LCA delay. No it wasnt the machine or spares itself.
The real cause lies deeper. The data and context are all there. Few connect the dots. Read On. (1/19)
#IAFHistory
I wrote about this in a @timesofindia editorial a few years ago. The MiG-21 earned the “Flying Coffin” tag not because of its airframe—but because we made it carry the weight of our institutional failure between 1980s -2000s. 2/
The MiG-21 entered IAF service in 1963, our first supersonic jet. It demanded a steep learning curve—especially in landing, where speeds exceeded 300 km/h. That was 2–3x faster than subsonic jets like the Vampire. It was not beginner-friendly. 3/
1/ There's growing confusion between two important systems:
👉🏽 Akashteer
👉🏽 IACCS
Both play crucial roles in India’s air defence.
But let’s be clear — they operate at different altitudes — literally and metaphorically.
Here’s how 👇 (1/8)
#IAFHistory
But, let’s get some history, geography and law right.
History: The Network Centric Warfare (NCW) concept was first developed by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (US Navy) and John Garstka in 1998. It envisioned linking forces digitally to enhance situational awareness and increase warfighting effectiveness.
2/
📕 Let’s talk law — the Union War Book is India’s master document on war responsibilities.
Until 1993, there was no single agency for air defence.
Each service did its bit, and consequently the Army built up significant frontline/terminal AD assets.
Then came a historic shift:
🛡️ “Air Defence of the country is the responsibility of the IAF.”