1/10
There will be a rush to declare yesterday's trade agreement a total success or an abject failure, but its main consequence will be to partially reopen the trade conduits without changing underlying dynamics much. caixinglobal.com/2025-05-12/chi…
2/10
The fact is that as long as China is unable to substantially raise the consumption share of GDP, reluctant to raise the investment share, and continues to pour support into production, it will have to continue running massive trade surpluses.
3/10
Bloomberg reports that as part of yesterday's deal, China may have agreed to remove non-tariff barriers to US imports, but while these reductions may benefit specific US imports, it is China's internal imbalance that is driving down import growth, not import restrictions.
4/10
Removing import restrictions on specific US-produced goods may increase Chinese imports of those goods, in other words, but it will have little impact on the overall Chinese trade imbalance, which is driven by the gap between Chinese savings and Chinese investment.
5/10
What is more, as long as the US continues to accommodate global trade surpluses through its capital account, the US-China trade deal is also unlikely to have much impact on the US trade deficit.
6/10
What we are likely to see is continued pressure on the Chinese economy to maintain its trade surpluses. This is because government supply-side support remains as strong as ever, and consumption, which may jump temporarily from time to time as...
7/10
the result of short-term fiscal support, is still extremely weak. But as long as China produces more than it is willing or able to consume or invest, it must continue to resolve the imbalance with large trade surpluses.
8/10
And as long as the US continues to accommodate global surpluses through its capital account, high Chinese trade surpluses must be matched with high US trade deficits, even if the bilateral imbalances between the US and China decline.
9/10
As always, the "buffer" is likely to be Europe. If the recent weakening of the US dollar relative to the euro represents a permanent shift in the direction of capital flows from the US to Europe (and I am skeptical that this is the case), Chinese trade surpluses may...
10/10
increasingly be accommodated by Europe rather than the US, but of course it is far too early to say. Either way, the great global imbalances haven't really been resolved, and while the recent agreement may represent a truce, I expect trade tensions to continue to get worse.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/4 In a new piece published today, I argue that the reasons Keynes and other prominent economists opposed the unfettered flow of international capital are just as valid today as they were when he was alive.
2/4 For every country, external and internal imbalances are always aligned, just as every country's eternal imbalance are always aligned with the imbalances of the rest of the world. Because—except in the starry-eyed world of "Econ 101"—international capital doesn't...
3/4 flow from less productive investments to more productive investments, i.e. from where it is less needed to where it is more needed, national economies, especially those with open capital and trade accounts, must constantly adjust to accommodate non-economic capital flows.
1/6 As one of Beijing's main policies to boost domestic consumption has been to force banks, since earlier this year, to increase their consumer lending, this very interesting investigative report in Caixin is especially timely.
2/6 "China’s personal lending market," Caixin writes, "is under mounting pressure. What began as a slow-burning concern in early 2024 has become an acute worry in 2025. Housing mortgages, consumer loans, credit card...
3/6 debt and, most critically, small business loans — collectively known as personal loans — are slipping into delinquency at rates not seen since the 2008 financial crisis. Banks across the country are scrambling."
2/9 It's also the word the SCMP used, and several other newspapers. Since March I've argued that the word will be trotted out every month in relation to Chinese exports, mainly because unless the US is able to reduce its trade deficit sharply this... scmp.com/economy/china-…
3/9 year (which I don't expect), we are far more likely to see a shift in trade rather than a contraction. So while China's trade surplus with the US declines, along with its exports, it will be replaced with a rising trade surplus (and rising exports) with the rest of the world.
1/8 A translation (by Fred Gao) of a very interesting recent speech by Liu Shijin, a former Deputy Director of the Development Research Center of the State Council. Liu begins by acknowledging how astonishingly low China's consumption share of GDP is.
2/8 "I want to emphasize a concept here." Liu says. "China's insufficient consumption is not an acceptable deviation from international average levels, but a significant gap of 20 percentage points, which can be described as a "structural deviation.""
3/8 He proposes several solutions, but to me by far the most interesting is when he discusses government-owned assets: "In 2022, the Chinese government sector's net assets accounted for 38.6% of society's total net assets, significantly higher than other countries."
1/8 As always, a very interesting article by Martin Wolf. I think, however, that he underestimates how difficult it will be for China to raise domestic demand (I agree with Matthew Klein here).
2/8 There are two ways for China to raise domestic demand. One way, of course, is to increase domestic investment, although in an earlier piece Wolf noted that the fact that China invests 43% of GDP and is...
3/8 growing at less than 5% shows just how problematic investment in China has become. For China to rely on further increases in investment will only exacerbate the ultimate adjustment costs.
1/14
Joe Nocera's piece on the backlash against our current form of globalization properly credits Dani Rodrik with being the first serious economist, and still the most important, to question the "quasi-theological" beliefs of neoliberal globalists.
2/14
"Why were we so quick", Nocera asks, "to label anyone who even flirted with the idea that maybe the U.S. should be protecting its industrial base, just as other countries did, as a Pat Buchanan-like fool?"
3/14
But two corrections: First, I don't support protectionism. I support a world of free trade in which countries specialize in sectors where they are especially efficient, and in which they export in order to maximize imports for the welfare of their households.