1/11
SCMP: "Beijing is doubling down on efforts to create a stronger domestic market, as it focuses on reducing China’s vulnerability to external tariff shocks. Premier Li Qiang said on Thursday that... scmp.com/economy?module…
2/11
China would continue to anchor its development strategy in bolstering “domestic circulation” – a concept that refers to strengthening the country’s economic self-reliance by creating a robust, unified domestic market"
3/11
That may sound plausible on the surface, but there is a contradiction between strengthening "domestic circulation" while maintaining "external circulation". ft.com/content/a9572b…
4/11
That's because the former requires that wages rise relative to productivity, while the success of the latter is based on low wages relative to productivity. China's export competitiveness is structurally the flip side of its weak domestic demand. carnegieendowment.org/china-financia…
5/11
If China is indeed successful in raising domestic demand, this will come at the cost of its manufacturing sector, which accounts for a very high 27% of the country's GDP. This cannot happen quickly without forcing a disruptive adjustment.
6/11
Japan's experience is instructive. In the 2-3 decades it took the country to raise domestic consumption share by 10 percentage points, the manufacturing share of Japan's economy declined from 27% to a more "normal" 19%.
7/11
This suggests it will be difficult for China to raise the domestic consumption share quickly enough to matter without risking a rise in unemployment as already-struggling manufacturers see a surge in labor costs.
8/11
Germany faces this problem too, but unlike Japan in the 1990s and China today, Germany has a way out. Japan's and China's massive overinvestment in infrastructure left them no room to...
9/11
shift employment out of manufacturing and into infrastructure investment, Germany has a lot of room to improve its infrastructure, so it can manage the transition with less disruption to employment and growth.
10/11
The point is that China's low consumption share of GDP is not an oversight or a mistake that can easily be resolved. It is a structural consequence of a deeply-embedded growth strategy.
11/11
The good news is that despite the nonsense in the media, Beijing is very aware of just how vulnerable it is as a trade-surplus economy to trade conflict. The bad news is that this vulnerability is hard to change quickly.
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1/4 Total social finance grew in April by RMB 1.16 trillion, a little less than expected. Some analysts suggest that this is because of a weak economy, but it could also reflect higher-quality growth, i.e. one driven less by non-productive investment. english.news.cn/20250514/ff688…
2/4 Overall debt numbers still remain very worrying. Total TSF grew by RMB 16.3 trillion in the first four months of 2025, which suggests that it required an increase in debt equal to 35% of GDP to boost nominal GDP growth by 4%. Of course debt increases in the first four...
3/4 months of the year typically account for roughly 40% of the annual increase, but if this pattern holds in 2025, it suggests that it will still require an increase in debt equal to 29% of GDP to boost nominal GDP growth by 4%. That's a lot of debt per unit of growth.
1/10
There will be a rush to declare yesterday's trade agreement a total success or an abject failure, but its main consequence will be to partially reopen the trade conduits without changing underlying dynamics much. caixinglobal.com/2025-05-12/chi…
2/10
The fact is that as long as China is unable to substantially raise the consumption share of GDP, reluctant to raise the investment share, and continues to pour support into production, it will have to continue running massive trade surpluses.
3/10
Bloomberg reports that as part of yesterday's deal, China may have agreed to remove non-tariff barriers to US imports, but while these reductions may benefit specific US imports, it is China's internal imbalance that is driving down import growth, not import restrictions.
1/4 In a new piece published today, I argue that the reasons Keynes and other prominent economists opposed the unfettered flow of international capital are just as valid today as they were when he was alive.
2/4 For every country, external and internal imbalances are always aligned, just as every country's eternal imbalance are always aligned with the imbalances of the rest of the world. Because—except in the starry-eyed world of "Econ 101"—international capital doesn't...
3/4 flow from less productive investments to more productive investments, i.e. from where it is less needed to where it is more needed, national economies, especially those with open capital and trade accounts, must constantly adjust to accommodate non-economic capital flows.
1/6 As one of Beijing's main policies to boost domestic consumption has been to force banks, since earlier this year, to increase their consumer lending, this very interesting investigative report in Caixin is especially timely.
2/6 "China’s personal lending market," Caixin writes, "is under mounting pressure. What began as a slow-burning concern in early 2024 has become an acute worry in 2025. Housing mortgages, consumer loans, credit card...
3/6 debt and, most critically, small business loans — collectively known as personal loans — are slipping into delinquency at rates not seen since the 2008 financial crisis. Banks across the country are scrambling."
2/9 It's also the word the SCMP used, and several other newspapers. Since March I've argued that the word will be trotted out every month in relation to Chinese exports, mainly because unless the US is able to reduce its trade deficit sharply this... scmp.com/economy/china-…
3/9 year (which I don't expect), we are far more likely to see a shift in trade rather than a contraction. So while China's trade surplus with the US declines, along with its exports, it will be replaced with a rising trade surplus (and rising exports) with the rest of the world.
1/8 A translation (by Fred Gao) of a very interesting recent speech by Liu Shijin, a former Deputy Director of the Development Research Center of the State Council. Liu begins by acknowledging how astonishingly low China's consumption share of GDP is.
2/8 "I want to emphasize a concept here." Liu says. "China's insufficient consumption is not an acceptable deviation from international average levels, but a significant gap of 20 percentage points, which can be described as a "structural deviation.""
3/8 He proposes several solutions, but to me by far the most interesting is when he discusses government-owned assets: "In 2022, the Chinese government sector's net assets accounted for 38.6% of society's total net assets, significantly higher than other countries."