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THE BEGINNING OF THE END? THE ISRAELI NAVY ATTACK IN YEMEN: My Initial Analysis
Why did the Houthis fail to detect the Israeli ship? What this reveals about possible on-the-ground collaboration, and what it all means tactically?
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THE BEGINNING OF THE END? THE ISRAELI NAVY ATTACK IN YEMEN: My Initial Analysis
Why did the Houthis fail to detect the Israeli ship? What this reveals about possible on-the-ground collaboration, and what it all means tactically?
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1. THE TACTICAL EXPLANATION: How The Israeli Ship Managed To Approach The Port Undetected?
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A. USING CIVILIAN SHIPPING LANES:
The Israeli ship could have traveled within busy commercial shipping corridors, possibly under the radar or disguised (e.g., moving close to merchant vessels). This would make it hard for the Houthis to single it out.
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The Israeli ship could have traveled within busy commercial shipping corridors, possibly under the radar or disguised (e.g., moving close to merchant vessels). This would make it hard for the Houthis to single it out.
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Israel had similar covert achievements with this method back in 1973:
To protect its oil supply route from the Persian Gulf to the Israeli port of Eilat, which passes through the vulnerable Bab el Mandeb strait, Israel secretly deployed elite commandos to occupy uninhabited islands near the strait. These forces established a covert radio and radar base on Zuqar Island (part of the Hanish group), just off the coast of Yemen. The Israeli soldiers operated without uniforms or flags and were rotated secretly every three months. Though Israel denied the operation, it was exposed after a suspected Israeli spy was caught in Yemen. Yemen, lacking military power, could only protest.
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*Special thanks to @lepxii for this article: time.com/archive/684077…
To protect its oil supply route from the Persian Gulf to the Israeli port of Eilat, which passes through the vulnerable Bab el Mandeb strait, Israel secretly deployed elite commandos to occupy uninhabited islands near the strait. These forces established a covert radio and radar base on Zuqar Island (part of the Hanish group), just off the coast of Yemen. The Israeli soldiers operated without uniforms or flags and were rotated secretly every three months. Though Israel denied the operation, it was exposed after a suspected Israeli spy was caught in Yemen. Yemen, lacking military power, could only protest.
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*Special thanks to @lepxii for this article: time.com/archive/684077…
High Volume of Civilian Maritime Traffic = Noise
Northern Red Sea lanes near Hudaydah are among the busiest maritime routes globally:
Dozens of merchant vessels, tankers, and container ships pass through daily.
These create “maritime clutter”, making it difficult for a non-integrated force like the Houthis to distinguish between routine and suspicious activity.
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Northern Red Sea lanes near Hudaydah are among the busiest maritime routes globally:
Dozens of merchant vessels, tankers, and container ships pass through daily.
These create “maritime clutter”, making it difficult for a non-integrated force like the Houthis to distinguish between routine and suspicious activity.
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B. ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW):
Israel may have jammed Houthi radar and surveillance systems, rendering their maritime detection capabilities ineffective during the ship approach.
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Israel may have jammed Houthi radar and surveillance systems, rendering their maritime detection capabilities ineffective during the ship approach.
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Modern Israeli warships, particularly the Sa’ar 5 and Sa’ar 6 corvettes, feature stealth shaping and radar-absorbent materials to reduce Radar Cross Section (RCS). Combined with LPI radar systems (e.g., EL/M-224).
These use electromagnetic spectrum to detect, deceive, disrupt, or deny an adversary’s ability to sense, communicate, or respond effectively.
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These use electromagnetic spectrum to detect, deceive, disrupt, or deny an adversary’s ability to sense, communicate, or respond effectively.
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C. LOW-PROFILE NAVAL TACTICS:
In Israeli Navy ships (such as Sa’ar 5-class corvettes) are fast and low-observable. Operating at night or in poor weather, they can reduce their radar and visual signature significantly.
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In Israeli Navy ships (such as Sa’ar 5-class corvettes) are fast and low-observable. Operating at night or in poor weather, they can reduce their radar and visual signature significantly.
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2. STRATEGIC EXPLANATION – Why Weren’t The Houthis Aware?
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A. DISTRACTION / OPERATIONAL FATIGUE:
The Houthis operate on multiple fronts, inside Yemen, against Saudi Arabia, and in the Red Sea. Their surveillance focus may have been elsewhere at the time of the approach. I would dare to say that there was an engineered diversion created with the help of local opposition and maybe even common enemies like Saudi Arabia.
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The Houthis operate on multiple fronts, inside Yemen, against Saudi Arabia, and in the Red Sea. Their surveillance focus may have been elsewhere at the time of the approach. I would dare to say that there was an engineered diversion created with the help of local opposition and maybe even common enemies like Saudi Arabia.
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A very obvious and possible diversion was the evacuation notice issued by the IDF spokesman, caused the Houthis the attack would happen via air, as in the past year. It made them completely rule out a naval possibility. Nothing better than the good old element of surprise!
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B. LIMITED MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS (MDA):
Despite public claims of “full control” over the Bab al-Mandab and northern Red Sea, the Houthis face severe structural and operational limitations.
Here’s why:
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Despite public claims of “full control” over the Bab al-Mandab and northern Red Sea, the Houthis face severe structural and operational limitations.
Here’s why:
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Unlike state navies, the Houthis lack a persistent ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) architecture. They rely on a patchwork of Coastal observers,Drones (e.g. Sammad or commercial-grade), Occasional radar systems, Open-source ship tracking tools, Iranian support for early warning (delayed or regionally limited).
This setup does not provide continuous real-time coverage of the sea, especially north of Hudaydah where the shipping lanes are wide and busy.
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This setup does not provide continuous real-time coverage of the sea, especially north of Hudaydah where the shipping lanes are wide and busy.
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An Israeli missile ship, if properly masked (via EW, spoofed AIS, or night-time stealth), could blend into this maritime “noise floor” and move undetected within a few dozen kilometers of Hudaydah, particularly if the Houthis aren’t actively tracking that sector at the moment.
Their lack of layered sensor fusion, and absence of persistent surveillance assets, gives Israel or any blue-water navy a significant tactical window for denial, deception, and approach.
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Their lack of layered sensor fusion, and absence of persistent surveillance assets, gives Israel or any blue-water navy a significant tactical window for denial, deception, and approach.
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B. USE OF PORTS / ISLANDS NEAR ADEN:
I previously mentioned that I believe that the way to bring down the Houthis in my opinion is only through the legal government of Yemen, the Houthi opposition in Aden.
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I previously mentioned that I believe that the way to bring down the Houthis in my opinion is only through the legal government of Yemen, the Houthi opposition in Aden.
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https://x.com/easternvoices/status/1904817751924883579?s=46
Seems like Israeli authorities arrived to the same conclusion, and it is possible that the vessel may have launched from or passed near UAE/Saudi-controlled areas in southern Yemen or nearby islands, which would imply clear coordination with anti-Houthi authorities in Aden.
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B. ACESS VIA WATERS CONTROLLED BY ADEN:
The Israeli ship may have approached via the southern Yemeni coast, controlled by the Saudi- and UAE-backed Yemeni government - Where Houthi surveillance is weaker.
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The Israeli ship may have approached via the southern Yemeni coast, controlled by the Saudi- and UAE-backed Yemeni government - Where Houthi surveillance is weaker.
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3. THE ACHIEVEMENTS:
• Destroyed IRGC-linked infrastructure in Yemen, disrupting arms smuggling and logistics.
• Israeli helicopters (e.g., SH-60, Seahawk-type platforms) can operate off Sa’ar-class corvettes deep into the Red Sea:
👉 Enables ISR, extraction, or even limited SOF insertion missions from the waterline, without needing land-based assets.
👉Expands Israel’s “floating airbase” model into the southern Red Sea arena.
• Collected real-time SIGINT/ELINT on Houthi and IRGC radar, comms, and drone systems.
• Triggered enemy movements, enabling deeper intelligence mapping.
• Tested new naval electronic warfare systems under live operational conditions.
• Gained operational familiarity with Houthi terrain and reaction patterns.
Like no others, who attacked only from air.
• Destroyed IRGC-linked infrastructure in Yemen, disrupting arms smuggling and logistics.
• Israeli helicopters (e.g., SH-60, Seahawk-type platforms) can operate off Sa’ar-class corvettes deep into the Red Sea:
👉 Enables ISR, extraction, or even limited SOF insertion missions from the waterline, without needing land-based assets.
👉Expands Israel’s “floating airbase” model into the southern Red Sea arena.
• Collected real-time SIGINT/ELINT on Houthi and IRGC radar, comms, and drone systems.
• Triggered enemy movements, enabling deeper intelligence mapping.
• Tested new naval electronic warfare systems under live operational conditions.
• Gained operational familiarity with Houthi terrain and reaction patterns.
Like no others, who attacked only from air.
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