Uriel Schachter Profile picture
Jun 15 41 tweets 6 min read Read on X
On Friday Israel launched a special operation to destroy Iran’s nuclear project.

Two former senior generals — former National Security Advisor Gen. Amidror and former IAF Commander Gen. Norkin — analyzed the operation at a @jinsadc event.

Here’s a brief of their arguments:🧵 Image
Image
1. Genreal Yaakov Amidror, former National Security Advisor: "Let me start with a personal story. When I was head of the Intelligence Assessment Division in 1994, we identified the first steps of Iran’s nuclear project.
2. It took us two years to convince the Americans that such a project existed. When we asked all the experts how long it would take the Iranians to build a bomb, they said “10 to 15 years,” meaning between 2005 and 2010.
3. We were successful in delaying it, and now we are 15 years past the original assessment. But now we understand that the Iranians have reached a point where, if they are not stopped immediately, they will obtain military nuclear capability.
4. We knew they had enriched uranium, and that their weaponization team was working intensely to turn it into a bomb. The IAEA revealed that Iran had deceived the world for 20 years about its efforts to build a bomb and integrate it with missiles capable of reaching Israel.
5. Incidentally, when Iran sought to purchase missiles from North Korea, they insisted on missiles with a range long enough to hit Israel.
6. It is very unfortunate that the agreement with the Obama administration did not include limiting Iran’s missile program. Since then, the Iranians have continued improving their missile capabilities.
7. Today, they have missiles that can reach several thousand kilometers beyond Tehran, including large parts of Europe, and are working on developing missiles that could reach the U.S.
8. After many years, we’ve concluded: now is the moment to attack. But we cannot fully understand this moment without understanding the wide picture of the long war we are currently in.
9. What we have done during this war is transform the framework within which Iran and Israel operate against each other. Iran had two strategic pillars: one was to build nuclear capability, and the second was the “ring of fire” around Israel.
10. This ring consisted of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, and Iranian proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Syria served as the key bridge between Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and the Mediterranean.
11. Over the course of the current war, we have systematically dismantled this ring of fire, thereby severely weakening Iran’s ability to threaten Israel. Fifteen years ago, any decision to attack Iran would have triggered 100,000 rockets from Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon.
12. But now, after neutralizing Hezbollah and Hamas and with Assad weakened, this has become a direct confrontation between us and Iran.
13. This also impacts American decision-making. In the past, they warned that an Israeli attack could set the entire Middle East on fire. Today, it was much easier to decide to act.
14. Many people did not understand some of the steps Israel took during the war, and why was it so important for us (for example - conquering Rafah). But their purpose was to neutralize the proxies and allow us to fight “the head of the snake.”
15. A critical factor in our success so far has been the tight coordination between the Air Force and the Mossad. To execute an operation where everything is synchronized to the millimeter and second across agencies is a model that should be studied worldwide.
16. What is the goal of this entire operation? It is focused solely on dismantling Iran’s military nuclear capability. For now - we are not talking about regime change.
17. The Ayatollah's regime will not fall because of our actions—though we have had tremendous success. The objective is very narrow: the annihilation of Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear bomb.
18. Can it be achieved? Likely, this operation cannot eliminate the nuclear program forever, but we can delay it significantly, and every delay would be valuable. When Israel struck Iraq’s nuclear program in the 1980s, we also only delayed it—but they never got the bomb.
19. In the Middle East, time matters. Ultimately, preventing Iran from obtaining a bomb will require either an agreement or American military action.
20. But what Israel is doing can definitely delay Iran’s nuclear progress. We’ve already begun by targeting nuclear facilities and eliminating scientists responsible for weaponizing uranium.
21. We should be modest. Iran is not Hezbollah. With all due respect to those we have eliminated—thank God for each—it’s a much deeper system. Iran has a robust establishment. Though the individuals we eliminated were important, they have replacements.
22. The replacements may not be as capable, but Iran is not an organization where you eliminate the leadership and the structure collapses, as happened with Hezbollah".
23. General Amikam Norkin, Former Head of the Israeli Air Force: "I want to be modest. Despite the huge success in the first 12 hours, we are only at the beginning (The webinar was held after the first day of the op - U.S.).
24. In the Air Force, we used to say the debrief happens only after landing. It will take another week or two to fully understand what happened.
25. At midnight between Thursday and Friday, the Israeli Air Force launched the operation. The distance between Israel and Tehran is around 1,000 miles—a long mission. It’s a long journey with many challenges.
26. Our first goal was to establish air superiority. In a prior operation several months ago, we targeted Iran’s S-400 and S-300 air defense systems. But until yesterday, Iran still had dozens of its own systems, including SA-69, SA-68, and SA-71.
27. In total, there were 63 different types of anti-aircraft missile systems—some very advanced, capable of reaching up to 300 km.
28. These systems “secured” Iranian airspace, and we had to take them down. So the first mission of the Israeli Air Force was to destroy most of them. Only then could we safely fly over Iranian territory.
29. The second wave targeted the headquarters and residences of the Iranian military leadership and nuclear scientists. Some of these were above ground, others were underground. Striking them simultaneously was crucial, or they might have warned each other.
30. We’re talking about dozens of targets across Iran, more than 1,000 miles away. We’ve worked for years to develop these capabilities.
31. Iran is far. To reach it, we must fly over Syria, Jordan, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia. Our air superiority in Syria helps significantly, allowing us to neutralize radars and launchers before proceeding deeper into Iran.
32. Another critical mission in the first wave was attacking Iranian ballistic missile launchers that were on high alert. So, in total, we struck in this wave: Air defense systems; Military headquarters and apartments ; and Ballistic missile launchers.
33. In the second wave, we are now targeting nuclear facilities. Some are above ground, but most are buried two or three levels underground. We must penetrate and destroy them.
34. By morning, both key leadership figures and nuclear sites had been attacked. In response, Iran launched about 100 cruise missiles and suicide drones toward Israel. The IAF, cooperating with the U.S. and others in the region (you can imagine who), intercepted all of them.
35. So far, we’ve destroyed a major airport and several strategic sites. But Iran will retaliate again—with both cruise and ballistic missiles.
36. I hope for close cooperation with the U.S.—militarily and diplomatically—and I hope this operation remains short. We do not want a two-week missile ping-pong.
37. It’s now public that Mossad operated inside Iran. Over the past two weeks, people discussed Ukraine’s drone attacks on Russian bases. Mossad is "well acquainted" with such tactics.
38. Some of what happened during the first 12 hours was enabled by drone strikes on strategic targets. While those drones cannot penetrate bunkers or walls, they were crucial in neutralizing other threats. Mossad also provided much of the intelligence used by the Air Force.
For the whole webinar:

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More from @udschachter

Jun 15
מפקד חיל האוויר לשעבר, האלוף עמיקם נורקין וראש המל"ל לשעבר האלוף יעקב עמידרור דיברו קצת סקרו בוובינר של @jinsadc את תחילת המערכה שישראל מנהלת כרגע להשמדת הגרעין האיראני.

מצאתי את זה מעניין אז תרגמתי ותקצרתי את הדברים שלהם, ואני משתף פה לרווחת הציבור:🧵 Image
Image
1. עמידרור: "אני רוצה להתחיל בסיפור אישי. כשהייתי ראש חטיבת המחקר באמ"ן בשנת 1994, זיהינו את הצעדים הראשונים של פרויקט הגרעין האיראני. לקח לנו שנתיים לשכנע את האמריקאים שהפרויקט הזה בכלל קיים. כששאלנו את כל המומחים כמה זמן ייקח לאיראנים לבנות פצצה, הם אמרו "בין 10 ל-15 שנה.
2. כלומר בין 2005 ל-2010. הצלחנו לעכב את זה, וכעת אנחנו 15 שנה אחרי התחזית המקורית. אבל היום אנחנו מבינים שהאיראנים הגיעו לנקודה שבה, אם לא נעצור אותם מיד – הם ישיגו יכולת גרעין צבאית.
Read 33 tweets
Jan 16
אחד הדברים שהשיח סביב העסקה בימין מראה הוא את הפער שבין הימין הליכודי לבין הימין הדתי. זה לא שהליכודניקים מתלהבים מהעסקה, אבל הם מקבלים אותה כרע הכרחי, בעוד שאצל מצביעי סמוטריץ' התגובה היא של אכזבה וזעם. למה זה ככה?🧵
2. הליכוד של היום הוא שילוב של שני כוחות פוליטיים: הימין הפוליטי הז'בוטינסקאי ומה שסוציולוגים מכנים "מעמד הביניים המזרחי". הברית של שני הכוחות האלה עם הימין המתנחלי מתרחשת סביב ההתנגדות למדינה פלסטינית וסביב ההתנגדות לכח של השמאל הישן במוקדי הכח של הפקידות, האקדמיה ובית המשפט.
3. אבל היסטורית, במובנים רבים, הימין המתנחלי שאב את ההשראה שלו מתנועת העבודה ולא מ"חירות", וגם אם הרבה מנציגיו כיום הם מזרחים - הוא בהחלט ימין "אשכנזי" בבסיסו. סביב העסקה שני הפערים האלה נעשים בולטים.
Read 17 tweets
Jan 7
Former Head of the Mossad Intelligence Directorate, Zohar Palti, recently gave a very interesting interview on @NadavPerry's podcast.

Here are his main arguments regarding 10/7, the Iranian nuclear program, the Abraham Accords, and the Syrian regime change: Image
1. "When I woke up this morning, Iran still did not have nuclear weapons, which means someone is doing something right. They have not yet made a decision to go nuclear.
2. We can debate the definition of a “threshold state,” but what is certain is that they do not have a bomb as of now. Over the last 20 years, I have "read in the newspapers" about a vast chain of events—Stuxnet, explosions, etc. But that doesn’t mean we can relax.
Read 39 tweets
Jan 7
לאחרונה עלה בפודקאסט של @NadavPerry פרק מעניין במיוחד עם זהר פלטי, שכיהן כראש מנהלת המודיעין במוסד, וכראש האגף המדיני-בטחוני במשהב"ט.

לפלטי היו מספר התייחסויות מעניינות בנוגע למחדל ה-7/10, לגרעין האיראני, ולהשלכות של נפילת אסד. מביא את עיקרי הדברים כהוויתם ובקיצור המתחייב:🧵 Image
1. "אני עד היום רב עם עצמי כדי לנסות להבין איך היה הכשל הזה של ה7.10. מה שהכי משגע אותי זה שהיה פה כשל שנוגע ללקח הכי בסיסי של ועדת אגרנט, שאמרה שצריך לייצר פלורליזם בין גופי מודיעין שיחשבו אחרת. מה קורה לנו באותו לילה? איך גם השב"כ וגם אמ"ן נופלים בזה?
2. מה שמטריד אותי אפילו יותר זה "הילדים", קציני המודיעין הצעירים איפה הם היו? למה הם לא התריעו? אני לא רואה את אותו סגן מ-8200 שעמד והתריע בסיפורים על מלחמת יו"כ. זה הרבה יותר מטריד אותי מכל דבר אחר: אולי גם החבר'ה הצעירים שלנו באיזשהו שלב איבדו את היכולת לבעוט, לחתור, לבקר?
Read 37 tweets
Dec 13, 2024
כשהייתי בצבא, הרבו לדבר אצלנו על "חוק תאילנד". בקורסי מפקדים למיניהם היה מגיע איזה מרצה -קצין בכיר לשעבר או נואם בעל חשיבות אחר- והיה מציג את החוק.🧵 Image
Image
2. ההסבר היה פשוט: אם אפשר לשלוח מחלקה מסוימת לתאילנד למשך חודש, ואף אחד לא ישים לב, צריך לסגור את המחלקה הזו.
3. זהו חוק בעייתי מאוד, וכפי שלמדנו במלחמה האחרונה – פעמים רבות רק בחירום אמיתי מגלים את מחיר היעדרן של כל מיני מחלקות שחשבת שאפשר לשלוח לתאילנד.
Read 18 tweets
Nov 10, 2024
פיקדתי על חרדים בצבא ועבדתי בהכשרה מקצועית של חרדים, הנה 5 דברים שהייתי רוצה שתדעו:🧵 Image
1. הם לא חייזרים והם דווקא כן מתביישים - גם בקרב חלקים בציבור שמבקרים את הציבור החרדי, וגם בקרב חלק מהאפולוגטיקנים של הציבור החרדי נשמעות טענות שלפיהן החרדים הם "מעולם אחר". שהם והציבור הישראלי הלא חרדי הם כמו שמן ומים. שהפער התפיסתי והערכי הוא כל כך גדול ובלתי ניתן לגישור.
לדעתי ולחוויתי זו טעות גם בהבנת המציאות וגם בדרך לשפר אותה. רובם הגדול של האנשים שעבדתי איתם, שהגיעו מקבוצות מגוונות בציבור החרדי, היו בעיניי יותר "דומים" מאשר "שונים". את רובם הגדול חיבבתי, מרובם לא חוויתי זלזול, ועם רובם מצאתי שפה משותפת. זו החוויה שלי.
Read 41 tweets

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