In 1978, as Iran erupted in chaos, Ayatollah Khomeini wasn’t leading from a mosque—he was running the revolution from a cozy garden villa outside Paris. Recording studios. Press ops. Phone lines buzzing. Western media treated it like pilgrimage. The theocracy was Made in France.
After helping install Iran’s theocracy, did France regret it? Nope. They chased oil deals, laundered Tehran’s money & pushed for weak Iran nuclear deal terms. Why? France wanted Iran as its Middle East pawn vs. the US & Saudis. They weren’t duped. They signed up.
Fast forward to today: Iran’s regime is collapsing. Israeli strikes are shattering it. Iranians are done. Who’s still fluffing the cushions for the Ayatollahs? Emmanuel Macron—now warning that “regime change” would be a grave mistake. France is trying to protect its investment.
The country that taught the world secularism helped install the world’s most dangerous theocracy—and they’re still protecting it. As Iranians scream for freedom, French officials sip wine & keep the regime’s seat warm.
🧵Every few years, Europe "rediscovers" the same idea: two-speed Europe, multi-speed Europe, variable geometry. The terminology changes, but the premise remains the same — some EU states should integrate deeper and faster, while others are pushed to "second class" States.
Two-speed Europe” is the idea that the EU should formally accept unequal integration. A core group would advance deeper integration, while others are left out—bound by Brussels’ rules but excluded from decision-making. Sold as flexibility, turns an informal imbalance into a permanent hierarchy
What’s new isn’t the idea, but the confidence behind it. Germany has revived it openly, France backs it, others quietly agree. Sold as realism, it dodges the truth: the problem isn’t tiers, it’s the EU itself. Multi-speed Europe isn’t reform—it’s an admission of failure.
🧵Almost no one is asking the most important question about Trump’s “Board of Peace”: Is it even constitutional? Here’s why Trump’s “Board of Peace” raises serious constitutional issues that no one is talking about.
“Minilateralism,” Non-Binding Commitments, and Why Labels Do Not End the Treaty Inquiry
Some describe the Board as a form of executive “minilateralism,” akin to informal contact groups created without Senate ratification.
The problem, U.S. constitutional law turns on substance, not labels. The Charter does not describe a temporary forum; it creates an enduring institution with legal personality—meaning the capacity to act as an independent legal entity under international law.
Legal personality is decisive because it transforms a diplomatic gathering into a standing organization capable of: Owning property, Entering contracts, Suing and being sued, Acting independently of its member states
Under U.S. law, such status cannot be self-declared. It requires either congressional authorization or designation under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA). The Board satisfies neither. As a result, its claimed legal personality has no domestic legal grounding, even as the United States becomes politically and institutionally bound by creating, staffing, and chairing it.
“Non-binding” does not mean constitutionally irrelevant. As MedellĂn v. Texas makes clear, obligations may be non-self-executing in U.S. courts yet still bind the United States politically and diplomatically.
Expiration clauses do not cure this problem when renewal authority rests solely with the Chairman, enabling conditional perpetuity outside democratic oversight.
Immunities, Domestic Law, and the Limits of Executive Authority
The Charter goes further by asserting that the Board itself shall “ensure” privileges and immunities through agreements negotiated by its own officials. While defenders argue this merely contemplates host-state agreements subject to domestic law, the post explains that this misunderstands how immunity works in the United States.
Under U.S. law, immunity is derivative, not inherent. It can arise only through: Congressional authorization (via statute or treaty), or Presidential designation under the IOIA, which itself presupposes lawful U.S. participation
An organization created unilaterally by the President cannot bootstrap itself into immunity. Executive agreements cannot displace Congress’s control over jurisdiction, courts, liability, or regulatory enforcement. Even if no immunity is ultimately granted, the constitutional problem arises from constructing a framework that treats immunity as an expected institutional attribute, negotiated by executive authority and potentially administered by a self-perpetuating Chairman.
Invocations of UN practice or Security Council resolutions do not resolve this. UN immunities in the U.S. exist because Congress enacted implementing statutes. International endorsement cannot override domestic separation of powers.
🧵Thanksgiving wasn’t born in a peaceful colonial feast—it was created by Lincoln in 1863 as a wartime ritual to hold a fractured nation together. Today’s polarized America faces its own internal divide and foreign adversaries eager to exploit it. The holiday’s lesson is clear: unity is national security and the only way to save a divided nation.
The myth most people imagine Thanksgiving as a colonial harvest ritual. But the holiday we celebrate today—this national pause for unity—was invented during the Civil War. Yes, Plymouth had a 1621 meal, but it wasn’t called Thanksgiving, wasn’t a tradition and it wasn't repeated.
The first real national Thanksgiving was proclaimed on November 26, 1863, in the middle of the Civil War. Lincoln issued it four months after Gettysburg, as the Union was still burying its dead. Thanksgiving wasn’t born from abundance. It was born from national desperation.
🧵Israel is passing a new law to “cut water & electricity” to UNRWA. This amendment enforces the 2024 law banning UNRWA from operating in East Jerusalem, clarifying that utilities to its offices—which the agency refuses to close—count as prohibited contact.
If you read the headlines about the Knesset voting to cut water and electricity to UNRWA, you would think Israel suddenly woke up one morning and passed new “draconian” legislation targeting the UN agency. In reality, that narrative is not just misleading—it is factually wrong.
This isn’t about cutting water or electricity to homes or refugee camps—those aren’t supplied by Israeli companies. The amendment targets UNRWA’s East Jerusalem offices, which the agency refused to vacate. It simply enforces the law.
🧵Trump selling the F-3, the world’s most advanced stealth fighter to a regime that doesn’t even recognizes Israel’s existence is not only reckless, it’s potentially illegal. U.S. law requires any defense sale to the Middle East preserves Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge. (QME)
Since 2008, U.S. law has required presidents to ensure Israel keeps a clear military edge. Under the Arms Export Control Act, any Middle East arms sale must be certified as not harming Israel’s QME—a mandate reaffirmed in later defense laws. It isn’t custom. It’s statutory.
Even downgraded export F-35s alters the balance. QME law requires that no sale diminish Israel’s edge—and stealth can’t be partially exported. Once Saudi Arabia has the F-35, the gap collapses. Israel’s superiority is gone—precisely what the law forbids.
🧵Many believe only Security Council resolutions “under Chapter VII” are binding. That’s a myth. The UN Charter makes clear that legal force comes from the Council’s authority and the resolutions' operative language—not from magic words.
Article 25 of the Charter, obligates UN members to carry out Security Council decisions. Chapter VII adds enforcement tools like sanctions or force, but doesn’t limit the resolution's binding authority.
Operative verbs determine whether a UN Security Council resolution is binding: “Decides” & “Demands” bind states; “Calls upon,” “Urges,” “Recommends,” & “Welcomes” do not. Binding force comes from wording, not Chapter VII.