Thread by @MaricopaGOP

1/X Emer de Vattel on WAR, in his book, Law of Nations (1758):

"WAR is that state in which we prosecute our right by force. As per the right to security, nature gives men a right to employ force, when it is necessary for their defense & for the preservation of their rights...

2/X This principle is generally acknowledged: reason demonstrates it; & nature herself has engraved it on the heart of man. Some fanatics, in a literal sense of the moderation recommended in the gospel, have adopted a strange fancy of suffering themselves to be massacred...

3/X ... or plundered, rather than oppose force to violence. We need not fear this error make any great progress. Mankind guards against its contagion — happy, if they knew how to keep within the just bounds which nature has set to a right that is granted only through necessity!

4/X As nature has given men no right to employ force, unless when it becomes necessary for self defense and the preservation of their rights, the inference is manifest, that, since the establishment of political societies, a right, so dangerous in its exercise...

5/X ... no longer remains with private persons except in those encounters where society cannot protect or defend them. In the bosom of society, the public authority decides all the disputes of the citizens, represses violence, & checks every attempt to do ourselves justice...

6/X ... with our own hands. If a private person intends to prosecute his right against the subject of a foreign power, he may apply to the sovereign of his adversary, or to the magistrates invested with the public authority: & if he is denied justice by them...

7/X ... he must have recourse to his own sovereign, who is obliged to protect him. It would be too dangerous to allow every citizen the liberty of doing himself justice against foreigners; as there would not be a single member of the state who might not involve it in war.

8/X And how could peace be preserved between nations, if it were in the power of every private individual to disturb it? A right of so momentous a nature, — the right of judging whether the nation has real grounds of complaint, whether she is authorized to employ force...

9/X ... and justifiable in taking up arms, whether prudence will admit of such a step, and whether the welfare of the state requires it, — that right, I say, can belong only to the body of the nation, or to the sovereign, her representative.

10/X Thus the sovereign power alone is possessed of authority to make war. But, as the different rights which constitute this power, originally resident in the body of the nation, may be separated or limited according to the will of the nation...

11/X ... and it is from the particular constitution of each state, that we are to learn where the power resides, that is authorized to make war in the name of the society at large.

12/X War is either defensive or offensive. He who takes up arms to repel the attack of an enemy, carries on a defensive war. He who is foremost in taking up arms, & attacks a nation that lived in peace with him, wages offensive war.

13/X The object of a defensive war is very simple; it is no other than self defense: in that of offensive war there is as great a variety as in the multifarious concerns of nations; but, in general, it relates either to the prosecution of some rights, or to safety.

14/X We attack a nation with a view either to obtain something to which we lay claim, to punish her for an injury she has done us, or to prevent one which she is preparing to do, & thus avert a danger with which she seems to threaten us.

15/X I do not here speak of the justice of war: — all I here propose is to indicate, in general, the various objects for which a nation takes up arms — objects which may furnish lawful reasons, or unjust pretenses, but which are at least susceptible of a color of right.

16/X I do not, therefore, among the objects of offensive war, set down conquest, or the desire of invading the property of others: views of that nature, destitute even of any reasonable pretext to countenance them, do not constitute the object of regular warfare, but of robbery.

17/X Every citizen is bound to serve and defend the state as far as he is capable.(140) Society cannot otherwise be maintained; and this concurrence for the common defence is one of the principal objects of every political association.

18/X Every man capable of carrying arms should take them up at the first order of him who has the power of making war. Mercenary soldiers are foreigners voluntarily engaging to serve the state for money, or a stipulated pay. As they owe no service to a sovereign...

19/X ... whose subjects they are not, the advantages he offers them are their sole motive. By enlisting, they incur the obligation to serve him; and the prince, on his part, promises them certain conditions, which are settled in the articles of enlistment.

20/X Mercenary soldiers enlist voluntarily. The sovereign has no right to compel foreigners: he must not even employ stratagem or artifice, in order to induce them to engage in a contract, which like all others, should be founded on candor and good faith.

21/X If a subordinate power assumes an authority which he does not possess, & thus deceives the party treating with him, though an enemy, — he is naturally responsible for the damage caused by his deception, and bound to make reparation.

22/X WHOEVER entertains a true idea of war, — whoever considers its terrible effects, its destructive & unhappy consequences, will readily agree that it should never be undertaken without the most cogent reasons. Humanity revolts against a sovereign, who, without necessity...

23/X ... or without very powerful reasons, lavished the blood of his most faithful subjects, & exposes his people to the calamities of war, when he has it in his power to maintain them in the enjoyment of an honorable & salutary peace.

24/X And if to this imprudence, this want of love for his people, he moreover adds injustice towards those he attacks, — of how great a crime, or rather, of what a frightful scries of crimes, does he not become guilty!

25/X Responsible for all the misfortunes which he draws down on his own subjects, he is moreover loaded with the guilt of all those which he inflicts on an innocent nation.

26/X Were men always reasonable, they would terminate their contests by the arms of reason only; natural justice and equity would be their rule, or their judge. Force is a wretched and melancholy expedient against those who spurn at justice, and refuse to listen to the...

27/X ... remonstrances of reason, but in short it becomes necessary to adopt that mode, when every other proves ineffectual. It is only in extremities that a just & wise nation (or good prince) has recourse to it. The reasons which may determine taking such a step are twofold...

28/X Those of t1 class show that he has a right to make war, — that he has just grounds for undertaking it: — these are justificatory reasons. The others, founded on fitness & utility, determine whether it be expedient for the sovereign to undertake a war, — these are motives.

29/X The right of employing force, or making war, belongs to nations no farther than is necessary for their own defense, & for the maintenance of their rights. Now, if any one attacks a nation, or violates her perfect rights, he does her an injury.

30/X Then, & not till then, that nation has a right to repel the aggressor, and reduce him to reason. Further, she has a right to prevent the intended injury, when she sees herself threatened with it.

31/X Let us then say in general, that the foundation, or cause of every just war is injury, either already done or threatened. The justificatory reasons for war show that an injury has been received, or so far threatened as to authorize a prevention of it by arms.

32/X It is evident here the question regards the principal in the war, not those who join in it as auxiliaries. When we would judge whether a war be just, we must consider whether he who undertakes it has in fact received an injury, or whether he be really threatened with one.

33/X In order to determine what is to be considered as an injury, we must be acquainted with a nation's rights, properly so called, — her perfect rights. These are of various kinds. Whatever strikes at these rights is an injury, & a just cause of war.

34/X If a nation takes up arms when she has received no injury, nor is threatened with any, she undertakes an unjust war. Those alone, to whom an injury is done or intended, have a right to make war. The just & lawful object of every war, which is, to avenge or prevent injury.

35/X To avenge signifies here to prosecute the reparation of an injury, if it be of a nature to be repaired, — or, if the evil be irreparable, to obtain a just satisfaction, — & also to punish the offender, if requisite, with a view of providing for our future safety.

36/X The 3 objects of a lawful war: — 1. Recover what belongs, or is due to us. (Offensive) 2. Provide for our future safety by punishing the aggressor or offender. (Offensive) 3. Defend ourselves from injury by repelling unjust violence. (Defensive)

37/X As the nation ought, in every undertaking, not only to respect justice, but also to keep in view the advantage of the state, it is necessary that proper & commendable motives should concur with the justificatory reasons, to induce a determination to embark in a war.

38/X These reasons show the sovereign has a right to take up arms, with just cause to do so. The proper motives show it is advisable & expedient to make use of his right. These latter relate to prudence, as the justificatory reasons come under the head of justice.

39/X I call proper and commendable motives those derived from the good of the state, from the safety and common advantage of the citizens. They are inseparable from the justificatory reasons, — a breach of justice being never truly advantageous.

40/X Though an unjust war may for a time enrich a state, & extend her frontiers, it renders her odious to other nations, & exposes her to the danger of being crushed by them. Besides, do opulence & extent of dominion always constitute the happiness of states?

41/X Amidst the multitude of examples which might here be quoted, let us confine our view to that of the Romans. The Roman republic ruined herself by her triumphs, by the excess of her conquests & power.

42/X Vicious motives are not for their object the good of the state, being drawn from that pure source, are suggested by the violence of the passions. Such are the arrogant desire of command, ostentation of power, thirst of riches, avidity of conquest, hatred, & revenge.

43/X The obligation to promote & maintain the true welfare of the state gives the nation a right to take up arms against him who threatens or attacks that valuable enjoyment. But if a nation, on an injury done to her, is induced to take up arms...

44/X ... not by the necessity of procuring a just reparation, but by a vicious motive, she abuses her right. What right has he to expose the safety of the state, with the lives & fortunes of the citizens, to gratify his passions?

45/X We shall therefore give the name of pretexts to those reasons alleged as justificatory, but which are so only in appearance, or which are even absolutely destitute of all foundation.

46/X The name of pretexts may likewise be applied to reasons which are, in themselves, true and well-founded, but, not being of sufficient importance for undertaking a war, are made use of only to cover ambitious views, or some other vicious motive.

47/X In a doubtful cause, where the rights are uncertain, obscure & disputable, all that can be reasonably required is, that the question be discussed &, if it be impossible fully to clear up, the contest be terminated by an equitable compromise.

48/X If, therefore, one of the parties should refuse to accede to such conciliatory measures, the other is justifiable in taking up arms to compel him to an accommodation.

49/X War cannot be just on both sides. 1 party claims a right; the other disputes it: 1 complains of an injury: the other denies having done it. 2 individuals dispute the truth of a proposition; & it is impossible that 2 contrary sentiments should be true at the same time. (?)

50/X For more, see:

@ThreadReaderApp: Unroll this 50-post thread, please, via Emer de Vattel's Law of Nations (1758), presenting insights into "Just War." Thank you.constitution.org/2-Authors/vatt…