1/7 Caixin: "Once limited to funding new infrastructure projects, local government special bonds are increasingly being used to supplement local government budgets, repay overdue private contractors, and even to support struggling legacy PPP projects." caixinglobal.com/2025-06-18/chi…
2/7 According to Caixin, this shift in the use of special bonds "signals a growing recognition that China’s legacy public-private partnership model — once a darling of infrastructure financing — has become a fiscal burden as local governments fall behind on payments."
3/7 I would add that it also confirms what some of us have known for over a decade—a large and growing share of infrastructure investment simply does not make economic sense, and has been pursued mainly to generate economic activity.
4/7 After all in a system in which interest rates are set to levels well below nominal GDP growth rates, it would be almost impossible for debt-servicing costs to rise faster than GDP, and faster than tax revenues, if the debt had been used to fund infrastructure...
5/7 investment whose value to the economy exceeded or even roughly approximated its cost. Had that been the case, the resulting growth in economic value-creation, and in taxes, would have more than covered the resulting rise in debt-servicing costs.
6/7 But not only has debt risen more quickly than the economy, it has done so at some of the fastest rates in history, even as interest rates have been set well below nominal GDP growth rates. This might suggest the sheer extent of non-productive investment.
7/7 Beijing wants to rein in this kind of infrastructure investment (as do, obviously, the banks) but, as I explain in the piece below, it cannot do so as long as it sets excessively high GDP growth targets and is unable to get consumption to surge. carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/05/…
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1/8 Pan Gongsheng is right to warn of the dangers to the global economy posed by fiscal and regulatory problems in the country issuing the world’s main currency, but the two ways for China to protect itself from running those risks are pretty obvious. nytimes.com/2025/06/18/bus…
2/8 One way would be to rebalance domestic demand by increasing the share of GDP that is directed to China's household sector. In that case China's trade surplus would decline, and China would no longer need to acquire huge amounts of US assets to balance weak domestic demand.
3/8 The other way is for China to balance its weak domestic demand by acquiring assets in countries other than the US. It could instead acquire European and Japanese assets, or it could acquire assets in developing countries, who could then use the inflows to boost investment.
1/6 Martin Wolf's “pluto-populism”: the rich receive most of the goodies; the poor become poorer; and the fiscal deficit stays huge.
The "supply-side" argument in favor of income inequality is that because the rich save more of their income than do... ft.com/content/31f40b…
2/6 ordinary people, who consume more of their income, a rise in income inequality pushes up total savings, which in turn pushes up investment, which in turn pushes up economic growth, whose benefits then "trickle down" to the poor, leaving everyone better off.
3/6 But this is only the case in economies in which businesses are eager to invest in a wide variety of projects but are unable to do so because savings (i.e. unconsumed resources) are scarce and the cost of capital high—i.e. fast-growing developing economies, for the most part.
1/4 Yicai: "Many of China’s small and medium-sized banks can no longer afford to offer interest rates that are higher than the big state-owned lenders, a strategy they used to adopt to attract more deposits."
2/4 Instead, Yicai continues, "they are slashing yields to below that of the big banks as they focus on staying afloat." The article goes on to say that "many of these banks are no longer focused on growing and are instead focused on surviving."
3/4 Because bigger banks were safer and more convenient, the only way smaller banks could grow was by offering higher deposit rates. If they switch to lower deposit rates, they are likely to contract both sides of their balance sheets.
1/5 According to Xinhua, "sales of household appliances, audio-visual equipment, communication devices, cultural and office supplies and furniture surged by as much as 53 percent year on year in May, contributing 1.9 percentage points to the increase." english.news.cn/20250616/fe31b…
2/5 This suggests that the 6.4% year-on-year jump in retail sales was led by trade-in goods. In March Beijing announced a RMB 300 billion voucher program to support trade-ins, equal to roughly 0.2% of China's expected GDP in 2025.
3/5 If retail sales revert to pre-May growth rates, as is likely, I suspect this will put pressure on Beijing to announce a second such program in September or October. Without fiscal support, it is unlikely consumption can sustainably pick up the pace of growth.
1/17
I'm all in favor of myth-busting but this article seems to miss the point. To my knowledge, and contrary to Sharma's claim, no one has ever argued that the consumption share of China's GDP is low because consumption has grown slowly. ft.com/content/bf1e87…
2/17
The argument has always been that consumption and household income have grown much more slowly than GDP because of a series of explicit and implicit transfers from households that subsidized growth in investment, especially investment in manufacturing and infrastructure.
3/17
For example, the biggest decline in the consumption share of GDP occurred in the first decade of this century largely because of extremely low interest rates – highly negative in real terms – that were engineered to resolve the cleaning up of the banking system.
1/4 Bloomberg: China’s new-home prices fell the most in seven months in May, with new-home prices dropping 0.22% from April, when they slid 0.12%. Values of used homes fell 0.5%, the sharpest decline in eight months.
2/4 On Friday, Premier Li Qiang promised at a State Council meeting to stop the decline in house prices, probably in the hopes of boosting household confidence and, with it, household consumption. I am not sure this will be easy, especially away from the top-tier cities.
3/4 One way to do it is for local governments to borrow large amounts of money to buy up apartments and take them off the market, but this will sharply increase debt-servicing costs relative to revenues, and so will force local governments to cut back on services.