EekadFacts | إيكاد Profile picture
Jun 18 14 tweets 11 min read Read on X
#OpenProbe🧵| Israeli spyware is targeting Arab smartphone users through deceptive sponsored advertisements on social media. Eekad’s investigation uncovers tens of thousands of such ads, systematically disseminated by pages operated from within Israel as part of a coordinated cyber campaign.

✔️Although these ads appear to be routine promotional content, they are, in fact, engineered to covertly compromise mobile devices and extract sensitive personal data, often without any user interaction or visible trace.

✔️This probe delves into the technical infrastructure behind the campaign, revealing the tactics used in its execution with such precision and widespread reach, targeting Arabs across social media.Image
✔️Since 2022, several investigative reports have highlighted Israel’s use of spyware delivered through paid social media ads to target internet users.

✔️In April 2024, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz revealed that Israel had developed a hacking system known as "Aladdin," designed to push deceptive ads, including fake job listings, across social media platforms. These ads can breach users’ devices and extract sensitive data.

✔️Although Israeli authorities have attempted to downplay the system’s capabilities, cybersecurity experts warn that Aladdin can infect devices merely by displaying the ad, without requiring users to click on it.Image
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✔️According to various media reports, Israel used this tactic, which cybersecurity experts refer to as malvertising—the practice of using seemingly legitimate online ads to deliver malicious software.

✔️These ads often appear harmless but contain hidden malware and malicious code that silently infect users’ devices without their knowledge or consent.

✔️Since 2023, malvertising has experienced significant growth, driven by advancements in AI and increasingly precise ad-targeting technologies.

✔️In many instances, such ads have functioned as sophisticated surveillance tools engineered to identify and extract data from selected users—a tactic commonly referred to in the cyber domain as Ad Intelligence (AdInt).Image
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✔️Our investigation revealed that these pages and ads were widely disseminated across the Arab world. While some were tailored to target specific countries, others were designed to reach users across multiple Arab nations simultaneously, such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Image
📌Our analysis of these pages and their associated ads uncovered several consistent patterns:

➡️All of the pages were operated from within Israel, with most created between 2024 and 2025 using fake identities.

➡️They shared a unified visual identity, featuring similar colors, logos, fonts, and overall design, which strongly suggested they originated from a single source and served a common purpose.

➡️Even the page names followed predictable patterns, often repeating specific keywords or adhering to similar naming structures.Image
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📌These similarities extended to the ad content, which consistently targeted financially vulnerable Arab users with enticing but deceptive offers, including:

➡️Job opportunities in Europe, the U.S., Japan, and Qatar.

➡️Openings in the military and immigration sectors.

➡️Fake online training programs.

➡️Large loans with no collateral required.Image
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✔️In addition to the previous similarities, specialized analysis software further confirmed that these pages were interconnected.

✔️These consistent patterns strongly suggest that they all originate from a single source and were created for a specific objective, prompting us to examine the ads and their associated links more closely.

❓So, what did our technical analysis of these Israeli-run ads and their associated domains unearth?Image
✔️Our technical analysis also showed that the links accessed after users clicked on the ads operate within groups that share the same name servers, which are systems that route web traffic to the intended site.

✔️For instance, many links shared the name servers mark.ns.cloudflare.com and dns1.p01.nsone.net.Image
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✔️The repeated use of the same name servers strongly indicates that the websites linked through these ads share key structural traits. First, they appear to be centrally managed—likely owned or operated by a single entity or a tightly connected network.

✔️Second, they rely on a uniform infrastructure, allowing the operators to easily control, scale, and update campaigns by swapping out links quickly and redeploying content without the need to redesign or reconfigure servers.Image
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✔️However, Eekad’s investigation uncovered even more concerning insights. Upon examining hundreds of links embedded in the ads, it became evident that many directed users to a coordinated network of malicious websites.

✔️These domains appeared to have been specifically designed to entice users and compromise their devices with harmful software immediately upon access, without requiring any further interaction.

✔️Notable examples of such domains include morehackz.com, frantip.com, and wysing.com, among others.Image
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📌Further investigation revealed that these websites and their associated links consistently used well-established cyberattack tactics, including:

1️⃣Short-term SSL certificates: These create the illusion of a secure website, tricking users into trusting the malicious domain.

2️⃣Obfuscation techniques: Designed to evade antivirus software and other security tools.

3️⃣Cloaked redirection: Users clicking on seemingly harmless buttons like “Continue” or “View Details” unknowingly triggered the download of malware-infected files.Image
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✔️Moreover, our analysis found that these malicious links typically follow a structured six-stage sequence, closely aligned with the internationally recognized MITRE ATT&CK framework.

✔️This framework maps the tactics and techniques used by threat actors throughout the entire cyberattack lifecycle—from initial intrusion to final payload delivery.Image
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📌In summary, the six stages aim to:

➡️Attract the target and bypass security defenses.

➡️Remain hidden and maintain access, even if a domain or IP address is blocked.

➡️Silently install additional tools and extract data from the device without the user's awareness. Image
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📌Key Takeaways from Eekad’s Investigation:

➡️Eekad uncovered 61 fake Facebook pages operated from within Israel, which collectively deployed over 140,000 malicious ads targeting Meta users across the Arab world.

➡️These ads and pages shared a consistent visual identity and repeatedly used familiar lures, such as job offers, loan promotions, and fake online courses, to entice users into clicking malicious links.

➡️Our analysis revealed that these links operated within a centralized infrastructure, relying on shared name servers and a system designed for rapid link replacement, enabling large-scale, coordinated cyberattacks.

➡️The ads led users to malicious websites capable of bypassing security systems, extracting data, and installing harmful files, often without the user’s knowledge.

📌These findings point to a highly coordinated malvertising campaign targeting Meta platform users in the Arab region. The campaign operates through a structured technical network designed to infect as many devices as possible, at minimal cost and maximum efficiency.

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More from @EekadFacts

Aug 31
#تحقيقات🧵| نسف.. تفجير.. احتلال للمستشفيات، واعتقال طال القُصَّر، مشاهد مروعة تكررت بكل رقعة في غزة.

🔻لكن المفارقة أن من وثّقها هذه المرة لم يكونوا الضحايا أو الصحفيين، بل جنود وحدات الهندسة الإسرائيلية أنفسهم، الذين نشروا جرائمهم على العلن عبر حساباتهم.

🔻تحقيق جديد لـ "إيكاد" يتتبّع حسابات هؤلاء الجنود التابعين لكتيبتي 603 و605 ليكشف كيف تحولوا إلى أداة منظمة للهدم والتهجير والإبادة.

❓فما أبرز الانتهاكات التي قام بها أولئك الجنود؟ وكيف تحول دور وحدات الهندسة من المهام العسكرية إلى آلة منظمة لاقتلاع بيئة مدنية كاملة؟Image
🔻منذ بداية حرب الإبادة على غزة دفع جيش الاحتلال بجميع كتائبه القتالية إلى الميدان، وفي مقدمتها سلاح الهندسة القتالية، الذي تحوّل إلى أداة رئيسية للهدم والحصار والتهجير.

🔻في إطار سلسلة تحقيقات "إيكاد" حول جرائم جنود الاحتلال في غزة، وتتبع ما وثقوه عبر حساباتهم على مواقع التواصل، نتتبع هنا عناصر كتيبتي 603 و605 الهندسية، الذين سجّلوا بأنفسهم بالصوت والصورة ما ارتكبوه من انتهاكات داخل القطاع.
📌قبل البدء في كشف جرائم عناصر الكتيبتين نتعرف أولًا على سلاح الهندسة الإسرائيلي العامل في غزة:

⬅️تتركز مهامه الأساسية حول البحث عن الأنفاق وتدميرها وتفخيخ المباني وهدمها، إلى جانب تدمير البنية التحتية للمرافق الحيوية في غزة.

⬅️وينقسم السلاح إلى 3 أنواع؛ سلاح الهندسة الثقيلة، وسلاح الهندسة المدرعة، وسلاح هندسة المهام الخاصة.

⬅️وأصبح يُمثِّل أداة مركزية هدفها محو البيئة المدنية، وترويع السكان، وتمكين تقدم القوات الأخرى في مناطق حضرية مكتظة.

▶️لنبدأ معًا في كشف جرائم جنود تلك الكتائب..Image
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Read 25 tweets
Aug 12
#تحقيقات🧵| لم تكن الطائرات وحدها من استهدفت "أنس الشريف"، فبين أبناء شعبه هناك من برر لاستهدافه..
شخصيات موالية للسلطة الفلـ.ـسطينية، قادوا حملة تشويه وتحريض ضد الصحفي "أنس الشريف"، وكرروا النمط ذاته لاستهداف سابقيه الصحفيين، وتناسقت أدوارهم مع الاحتلال في تبرير جرائمه بحق المدنيين، وقصف المستشفيات.

🔻فريق "إيكاد" يتتبّع خيوط شبكة إعلامية ورقمية موالية للسلطة الفلـ.ـسطينية، ليكشف كيف تماهت رواياتها مع خطاب الاحتلال، حتى بدت كجزء من ماكينة واحدة تُحرّض قبل القصف، وتبرّر بعده.

❓فكيف تشكّلت هذه الشبكة؟ ومن أبرز وجوهها ومنصاتها؟ وكيف تنسجم مع الرواية الإسرائيلية لاستهداف الصحفيين والمستشفيات والحراك الشعبي في غـ.ـزة؟Image
📌نوضح بدايةً أننا في هذا التحقيق اعتمدنا على منهجيات دراسية وبحثية متخصصة، وتحليلات متعددة الطبقات استمرت لشهور، وذلك من أجل:

⬅️كشف الشبكة الرقمية الموالية للسلطة والشخصيات الفاعلة بها.

⬅️رصد الأدوات الرقمية التي تحقق من خلالها إستراتيجيتها الإعلامية.

⬅️تفكيك السرديات التي تروّجها هذه الشبكة وآليات نشرها.

⬅️تحليل منهجية التناسق مع الاحتلال من خلال نموذجي "التحريض قبل الاستهداف" و"التبرير بعد الاستهداف".

◀️لنبدأ في تفكيك هذه المحاور..
🔻أول ما نحلله في تحقيقنا هنا هو حالة الصحفي الشهيد "أنس الشريف" الذي لم يكن استشهاده على يد طيران الاحتلال أمرًا مفاجئًا أو حدثًا معزولًا عن الفضاء الرقمي، بل سبق الاستهداف حملة تحريض علنية شنتها حسابات الاحتلال، بقيادة المتحدث باسم جيش الاحتلال "أفيخاي أدرعي".

🔻تتبع فريق إيكاد الحملة منذ انطلاقها في أكتوبر 2024، ووجد أنها ركزت على اتهام "الشريف" بالانتماء لحمـ.ـاس، والتشكيك في مصداقية تغطيته الصحفية.

🔻ومع الوقت، تصاعدت الحملة، ووصف أدرعي "الشريف" بأنه "صوت الكذب"، واتهمه بأنه يضلل الرأي العام ويتستر على "جرائم المقـ.ـاومة".Image
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Read 54 tweets
Aug 11
#اقتباسات | بعد اغتيال أنس الشريف ورفاقه، روّجت حسابات إسرائيلية ومؤيدوها لرواية الاحتلال، واصفة الشريف بـ"الإرهابي"، في محاولة لتبرير استهداف الصحفيين الذين فضحوا جرائمه في غـ.ـزة.

#ألبوم #إيكاد Image
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Read 8 tweets
Aug 5
#GeoNews🗺️| Corpses abandoned on roadsides, displaced families, and soldiers dragged after death—this has been the grim reality in Suwayda Governorate over the past several days, marking one of the most violent escalations in Syria’s recent history.

✔️Eekad analyzed dozens of videos using advanced verification techniques—including reverse-engineering, geolocation, chronological analysis, and shadow studies—to document approximately 15 violations committed by Druze factions affiliated with Hikmat Al-Hijri against both civilians and Syrian army personnel.

✔️Additional violations were attributed to factions believed to be linked to the Syrian government, as well as to local tribes targeting the Druze community.Image
✔️Escalations began on July 13, triggered by a mutual hostage crisis between Druze and Bedouin groups, which rapidly spiraled into armed clashes across several neighborhoods in Suwayda.

✔️The Syrian army and security forces intervened by deploying troops to restore order, but soon faced direct attacks from armed Druze factions. The situation worsened with Israeli airstrikes in support of the Druze, further intensifying the conflict.

✔️Following international mediation, Syrian forces withdrew, and a regionally sponsored truce was enforced on July 21.

✔️Throughout this period of unrest, numerous violations were committed against civilians, Bedouins, and Syrian soldiers. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, by July 21, at least 558 people had been killed and more than 783 injured, including civilians, military personnel, and fighters from various factions.Image
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📌To ensure accurate documentation of these crimes, Eekad divided the analysis into three primary categories:

➡️Violations against civilians and unidentified victims.

➡️Violations against Bedouins, including forced displacement and the burning of homes.

➡️Violations against Syrian military personnel.

✔️Eekad’s geospatial analysis identified key locations where Druze factions committed violations in Suwayda, including the National Hospital, the main entrance to Suwayda, and the villages of Al-Tha’lah to the west of Suwayda, along with Maf’aleh and Al-Janina to the northeast of the city.Image
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Read 31 tweets
Jul 29
#OpenProbe🧵| A new investigation by Eekad offers the first comprehensive media analysis of the Popular Forces militia—led by Yaser Abu Shabab, backed by Israel, and implicated in systematically looting humanitarian aid in Gaza. This report outlines the group’s internal structure, identifies its key areas of operation, and traces its movement across the Gaza Strip.

✔️Drawing on field photographs, satellite imagery, and digital footprints, Eekad’s investigation highlights how aid distribution has been manipulated to serve Israeli strategic objectives.

❓However, key questions remain: Who are the members of this militia? Where were they deployed? And what violations have they openly documented?Image
📌This investigation seeks to uncover the following:

➡️Members of the Abu Shabab militia and map its chain of command—from senior leadership to field operatives.

➡️Areas where the group was active and where documented violations occurred.

➡️Systematic methods employed to loot and redirect humanitarian aid.
✔️On July 6, the Israeli broadcaster KAN aired an interview with Yaser Abu Shabab, leader of the anti-Hamas “Popular Forces” militia in Gaza. In the interview, Abu Shabab openly declared war on Hamas and expressed readiness to assume control of the Gaza Strip if Hamas were removed from power.

✔️He also acknowledged coordinating with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on aid distribution and receiving administrative support from the Palestinian Authority.

✔️Prior to this public appearance, on July 2, Gaza’s Ministry of Interior issued a 10-day ultimatum demanding that Abu Shabab and his fighters surrender for trial. Shortly afterward, the Palestinian Joint Operations Room released a statement calling for his execution in response to his media appearance.

✔️These developments prompted us to track Abu Shabab, investigate his network, and identify their areas of activity and the violations they documented through their social media accounts.Image
Read 37 tweets
Jul 24
#تحقيقات🧵| تحقيق استقصائي جديد تكشف فيه إيكاد ولأول مرة إعلاميًا تفكيكًا ميدانيًا وهيكليًا شاملًا لميليشيا "القوات الشعبية" التي يقودها ياسر أبو شباب، المدعومة من الاحتلال والمتورطة في نهب المساعدات.

🔻من القيادة حتى أصغر عنصر، ومن الصور الميدانية إلى الخرائط، يرصد التحقيق خريطة الانتشار والتحركات، ويفضح كيف حوّلت هذه الميليشيا توزيع المساعدات إلى أداة لخدمة أجندات الاحتلال.

❓فمن هم عناصر شبكة "أبو شباب"؟ وأين تمركزوا؟ وما الانتهاكات التي وثقوها عبر حساباتهم؟Image
📌في هذا التحقيق سنكشف وبشكل متزامن عن:

⬅️من هم عناصر ميليشيا أبو شباب، وما هو الهيكل التنظيمي في الميليشيا من القيادة حتى أصغر العناصر.

⬅️سنحدد مواقعهم وأين تمت الجرائم.

⬅️كما سنرصد آليات النهب المنهجية التي اتبعها العناصر للمساعدات الإنسانية.
🔻في 6 يوليو الجاري، نشرت صحيفة KAN الإسرائيلية مقابلة أجرتها مع "ياسر أبو شباب" قائد ميليشيا "القوات الشعبية" في غزة، أعلن فيها صراحةً حربه ضد حماس، واستعداده لتولي حكم القطاع بعد سقوطها.

🔻أقر "أبو شباب" في المقابلة بوجود تنسيق مع الجيش الإسرائيلي على مستوى توزيع المساعدات، وبتلقّيه دعمًا إداريًا من السلطة الفلسطينية.

🔻وقبل هذا الإعلان، كانت وزارة الداخلية في غزة قد أمهلت في 2 يوليو ياسر أبو شباب وعصابته 10 أيام لتسليم أنفسهم، قبل أن تُصدر غرفة الفصائل الفلسطينية المشتركة بيانًا يُهدر دمه على خلفية ظهوره الإعلامي.

🔻دفعنا ذلك إلى تتبع "أبو شباب" وكشف عناصر مجموعته ومواقع نشاطها، وأفعالها غير القانونية التي وثقوها عبر حساباتهم.Image
Read 37 tweets

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