1/ 🚨 NEW STUDY: How has the Russia–Ukraine war reshaped the EU’s defense strategy?
Using 26,000+ official EU documents and AI analysis, Ünaldilar et al. (2025) map the EU’s evolving quest for strategic autonomy.
Here’s a breakdown of what they found 🧵
🔍 What is strategic autonomy?
The EU defines it as its ability to “make its own choices and shape the world around it” — especially in defense, tech, and industry — without overreliance on the US or NATO.
The war in Ukraine turned this from an aspiration into a necessity.
3/ 📚 Method: The authors used text mining + topic modeling on 8034 European External Action Service (EEAS) docs.
They categorized discourse using the EU’s Strategic Compass, which has 4 pillars:
•Act
•Secure
•Invest
•Partner
4/ ⚔️ ACT: Crisis response & military operations
Post-2022, the EU expanded its European Peace Facility to supply weapons to Ukraine — a historic shift.
It also launched its first-ever military training mission on EU soil: EUMAM Ukraine.
5/ 📉 But here’s the paradox: While operational efforts expanded, the relative focus on “Act” stayed stable.
Why? Because many of these capabilities were already in planning pre-invasion. Ukraine accelerated deployment, not strategy reform.
Post-2022, attention to cyber diplomacy surged. The EU rolled out the Cyber Resilience Act and reinforced cyber/hybrid defense.
But… the bloc still lags far behind the US, China & Russia in offensive cyber capabilities.
7/ ☢️ Nuclear tensions? The EU remains divided.
Austria & Ireland support nuclear disarmament. France (its only nuclear state) opposes the UN TPNW.
Ukraine hardened these divides, making EU cohesion on disarmament even tougher.
8/ 💶 INVEST: Defense industry & capability building
Russia’s invasion sparked a defense spending spree:
•€8B Defense Fund
•€500M Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA)
•€1.5B Tech Sovereignty platform
Yet the market remains fragmented across member states.
9/ 🧠 The authors warn: Strategic ambition ≠ Implementation.
Despite funding and frameworks, national procurement habits and lack of integration hold back a truly unified EU defense market.
10/ 🌍 PARTNER: The EU’s global alliances
Post-invasion, EU-NATO ties deepened. Sweden & Finland joined NATO. The two blocs signed a 4th Joint Declaration in Jan 2023.
Yet, strategic autonomy remains blurry: Can the EU act without NATO or the US?
11/ 🌐 The EU is also expanding ties with ASEAN, AU, and Indo-Pacific states.
But it’s losing ground in Africa and Central Asia to China, whose Belt and Road approach offers quick money with fewer strings.
The EU’s soft power has limits.
12/ 📊 Key finding: The war didn’t radically change EU defense rhetoric. Instead, it accelerated pre-existing trends — particularly on partnerships and crisis response.
The Strategic Compass served as a stabilizer, not a disruptor.
13/ 💡 The big lesson?
The EU’s move toward autonomy is incremental and constrained by:
•Diverging threat perceptions
•Political fragmentation
•Reliance on the US
Yet crises like Ukraine can nudge integration forward — under pressure.
14/ 🎯 Bottom line:
The Russia–Ukraine war acted as both a catalyst and a stress test for EU strategic autonomy.
The EU made gains in operations and partnerships — but major gaps remain in industrial capacity, sovereignty, and unity.
15/ 📖 Citation:
Ünaldilar, S., Aydoğan Ünal, B., & Kumova Metin, S. (2025).
“Navigating the storm: the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on EU’s quest for strategic autonomy”. European Security.
🔗 doi.org/10.1080/096628…
Yet, it wasn’t Trump that shook up the EU. It was already a trend.
17/ 🇺🇸 Ossa 2025, shows that from Clinton to Biden, US political leaders were broadly skeptical of EU defense autonomy — not because they oppose EU strength, but due to fear of duplicating NATO.
👉 For Washington, NATO = coherence. EU defense = possible fragmentation.
18/ 🧠 Think tanks & analysts in the US are more divided.
Some see EU strategic autonomy as a welcome burden-sharing evolution. Others see it as a distraction from NATO cohesion — especially during crises like Ukraine.
There’s no unified US view — it’s factional.
19/ 📌 Ossa’s key finding: US decision-makers show continuity in skepticism across administrations (Bush, Obama, Trump, Biden), whereas influencers (Brookings, RAND, Heritage, etc.) show more ideological divergence.
20/ This adds depth to Ünaldilar et al. (2025), who mostly focus on EU internal dynamics.
Ossa reminds us: autonomy isn’t just a European ambition — it’s also judged externally, especially by the US, who remains the EU’s primary security provider.
21/ 🔄 Both studies agree: The tension between EU autonomy and transatlantic cooperation is structural, not temporary.
The EU cannot claim strategic independence while relying on US nuclear deterrence, intelligence, and operational command structures.
22/ 🇫🇷🇩🇪 France sees strategic autonomy as emancipation.
🇵🇱🇪🇪 Poland and the Baltics see it as dangerous drift from NATO.
US leaders have often echoed Warsaw more than Paris — especially during Republican administrations.
23/ 🤖 A missing link in both studies? The AI and cyber defense race.
While Ünaldilar emphasize the EU’s struggle to scale cyber capabilities, Ossa hints that US experts view EU digital sovereignty as important — if it’s complementary to shared goals.
24/ 🔚 Final takeaway:
For EU autonomy to be viable, it must:
•Clarify its role vis-à-vis NATO
•Address US perceptions and misperceptions
•Deliver capabilities, not just speeches
Strategic autonomy that alienates allies is not strategic — it’s symbolic.
Heljä Ossa (18 Feb 2025): European strategic autonomy in the transatlantic
security context: American perceptions of European security and defence integration 1998–
2022, European Security, doi.org/10.1080/096628…
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🧵1/15
What if the way we think about military innovation is stuck in the past?
Emilie Berthelsen’s new article in Journal of Strategic Studies dismantles the war/peace binary in military innovation theory.
Let’s dive in.👇
2/15
Military innovation studies traditionally separate innovation into:
⚙️ Strategic innovation → in peacetime
🛡️ Tactical adaptation → in wartime
This binary frames how we think about change — but it’s no longer adequate.
3/15
Berthelsen argues we live in hybrid times:
🔸 Protracted competition
🔸 Cyber conflict
🔸 Grey zones
🔸 Technological acceleration
→ The line between war and peace is blurring.
Theory hasn’t caught up.
1/25
🧵THREAD: "The Battle of Bakhmut: A Strategic Miscalculation"
Jean-François Caron's 2024 paper delivers one of the sharpest critiques yet of Ukraine’s costly decision to hold Bakhmut.
Here's what you need to know. 👇
#Ukraine #Bakhmut #MilitaryStrategy
2/25
The core argument?
⚠️ Ukraine's decision to hold Bakhmut in late 2022 was a strategic blunder.
Rather than preserving its momentum from prior victories, Kyiv fell into a Russian trap—and paid the price.
Let’s rewind.
3/25
In early 2022, Russia failed to seize Kyiv, notably due to its failed assault on Hostomel airport.
This exposed severe logistical weaknesses and forced a retreat from northern Ukraine.
➡️ Momentum shifted to Ukraine.
Comment Israël a infiltré l’Iran : guerre de l’ombre, renseignement, guerre cognitive (1/25)
L’étude de Grigorij Serscikov (2024) lève le voile sur les opérations du Mossad en Iran. Sabotages, assassinats ciblés, guerre psychologique : un modèle stratégique de guerre de l’ombre.
2/25
Depuis 2007, Israël a mené des dizaines d'opérations clandestines en Iran :
• Assassinats de scientifiques nucléaires
• Cyberattaque Stuxnet
• Exfiltration d'archives nucléaires (2018)
• Sabotages de sites sensibles
Le Mossad agit au cœur de Téhéran.
3/25
Comment cela est-il possible, dans un régime aussi sécuritaire que l’Iran ?
Réponse : failles internes massives dans l’architecture du renseignement iranien. Le Mossad a exploité ces vulnérabilités avec une précision chirurgicale.
1/25
Forget what you think you know about Wagner.
They're not just a criminal enterprise or Putin’s thugs.
A 2025 study by David Jaklin reveals something far deeper:
👉 Wagner is state-linked, GRU-enabled, and strategically vital to Russia’s global playbook.
2/25
Wagner’s origins date back to 2014, but its ideological and operational roots are older.
It’s the product of a paramilitary–intelligence nexus, carefully crafted to serve Russian interests without accountability.
Hybrid warfare in its purest form.
3/25
🔍 Two men shaped Wagner:
Dmitry Utkin, GRU officer turned field commander, admirer of Nazi ideology.
Yevgeny Prigozhin, criminal-turned-caterer, turned oligarch, turned PMC boss.
Together, they became the face of Russia’s plausibly deniable warfare.
The CIA has long operated as America’s “secret State Department”—especially in regions where formal diplomacy is impossible. One of the clearest examples? Iraqi Kurdistan.
🕵️♂️🇺🇸🇮🇶 #CIA #Kurdistan
2/24
In Iraqi Kurdistan, U.S. relations began not through embassies, but via covert intelligence channels—especially with the CIA building direct links to Kurdish tribes and militias long before any official State Department involvement.
3/24
The article traces CIA–Kurdish ties back to 1947, when Archie Roosevelt (son of Theodore) met Kurdish leaders. The conclusion? Kurds were nationalist, not communist. That opened the door for deeper cooperation.
🧵 THREAD (1/25):
What do 🇩🇪Germany and 🇰🇿Kazakhstan have in common when it comes to project management?
Not much—until you realize both are being transformed by the rise of projectification.
Let’s dive into the most fascinating PM study of 2025.👇
2/25
First, the term projectification.
Coined in the 90s, it means this:
“The increasing use of projects as a form of work organization across all areas of society.”
We’re not just talking startups or engineering. We’re talking government, schools, hospitals, NGOs.
3/25
As projectification spreads, the need for professional project management grows.
But how do societies professionalize it?
Spoiler: it depends on the invisible hand of their institutional logics.