Note of caution: I would not put too much weight on the leaked DIA assessment: it’s low confidence; it came too quickly; not available in full text; it got politicized; and done by one of the least impressive outfits of the USIC, if I may stick my neck out just a little bit.
First off, proper BDA needs to be done on the ground in Fordo, in ways that are highly likely very difficult to pull off, given the nature of the damage, and therefore need time. The IRGC, obviously, has the best ground access.
The IRGC, however, also has the an interest in misdirection and deception, in both public and private statements, given that they know they are owned — meaning any SIGINT here is perhaps not as reliable a source as it otherwise might be.
Israel highly likely has better ground access to sensitive sites than any U.S. intel agency. The IDF also has more skin in the game here. Therefore I would put most trust in Israeli intelligence assessments for now, for sure at this stage of the cycle. ynetnews.com/article/rk11qv…
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It appears that foreign influence operations on this platform are picking up, as expected. So here are a few high-level observations. Under normal circumstances I would write a proper longer piece. But in the interest of time, here you go. A few trends, questions, and hypotheses:
Most of the exposed Russian tradecraft is sloppy, and often the engagement on X is fake. But not always. One day after this remarkable WIRED story came out, the U.S. IC confirmed the attribution to Russia to reporters (Confirmation npr.org/2024/10/22/nx-…) wired.com/story/russian-…
The U.S. IC is reacting very fast. They expose content as foreign malign influence without amplifying it at the same time. That is excellent. It would be even better if there was one central reference point for all announcements, including press-call drops, perhaps with delay.
"Influence and Cyber Operations: An Update," the new OpenAI threat intelligence report, out a few hours ago. The document is interesting for one specific reason that hasn't been mentioned in public reporting so far cdn.openai.com/threat-intelli…
This is the money paragraph, from today's OpenAI report "Influence and Cyber Operations: An Update."
tldr: AI labs sit at a middle section of adversary kill chains—if staffed & equipped properly, the labs are potentially uniquely well positioned for threat intelligence insights
The report also has some interesting LLM TTP examples
JUST OUT — September was a wild month for scholars of modern covert influence operations. No longer do we have to rely on a campaign's digital footprints alone. My first analysis of ~3K leaked internal files and fresh FBI evidence on "Doppelganger."
This video was an internal production by the Social Design Agency, a disinformation firm in Moscow, produced in early August 2023, likely to be viewed by Vladimir Putin. Note the memo reproduced in the description, discussing the video.
Several weeks ago German media (WDR, NDR, SZ) received a leak of internal files from the biggest Russian disinformation contractor, Social Design Agency, often referred to as Doppelganger. "Western security officials" confirmed authenticity. First story by @FlorianFlade et al
Another exclusive @tagesschau, this one is excellent. I wish they would excerpt or screenshot the source documents though tagesschau.de/investigativ/n…
If I taught my DISINFORMATION class again, and if I wanted to include a session on the most self-defeating, the most unethical, really just the dumbest influence campaigns in history, this one would be close to the top of the list. reuters.com/investigates/s…
Okay, first, the DoD deserves some credit at least for openly admitting it was engaged in this kind of covert influence activity, when asked by Reuters.
This is pretty much the textbook example for an unethical influence operation: calling into question the effectiveness of a vaccine (that was later WHO-approved), without evidence, during a deadly pandemic, at a moment of global uncertainty, lockdowns, even panic.