🧵1/ Ukraine isn’t just fighting Russian troops - it’s battling remnants of its Soviet military past.
A new generation of generals is clashing with old thinking that threatens battlefield effectiveness.
Here's why that matters now more than ever:
2/ Maj. Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi is at the center of this shift.
After a deadly Russian strike killed over 70 trainees on June 1, Drapatyi resigned in protest, saying an army “where no one is responsible for a defeat is dying from within.”
3/ His resignation stunned many.
Drapatyi, just 42, was Ukraine’s ground forces commander.
A decorated officer who’s been fighting Russians since 2014 and who represents a new, reform-minded generation of Ukrainian leadership.
4/ Two days later, Kyiv quietly reassigned him to a new role: commander of Ukraine’s joint forces.
It was likely an attempt to keep him in the fight while managing political fallout.
5/ This isn’t just personal.
Drapatyi’s struggle reflects a larger battle inside Ukraine’s military: new officers shaped by war vs. Soviet-trained commanders like Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s current commander-in-chief.
6/ Many frontline soldiers believe Drapatyi’s approach works.
He emphasizes initiative, accountability, and flexible tactics.
Older commanders, critics say, rely on rigid top-down control that causes unnecessary casualties.
7/ In May, Maj. Oleksandr Shyrshyn of the 47th Brigade publicly criticized “clueless generalship” and “stupid missions” during the Kursk offensive.
His frustration reflects growing discontent among field officers.
8/ Drapatyi is famous for taking initiative.
In 2014, he led a dramatic armored breakout through Russian territory.
In 2024, he stopped a major Russian push near Kharkiv and helped stabilize the front.
9/ Once appointed, Drapatyi pushed reforms - replacing ineffective commanders, modernizing training, and focusing on battlefield accountability.
His leadership style earned trust among troops.
10/ Yet Ukraine’s warfighting suffers from old habits: excessive bureaucracy, suppression of initiative, and command structures that reward loyalty over performance.
11/ One Ukrainian soldier said: “If I fire extra shells preemptively, I spend hours justifying it with paperwork. It kills initiative.”
Others said Drapatyi is one of the few leaders who listens and acts.
12/ As drone warfare intensifies, Ukraine needs leaders who adapt fast.
The new UAS chief, Robert Brovdi, is reportedly targeting 35,000 Russian casualties a month, with tactics focused on eliminating drone operators.
13/ Ukraine’s military began shifting toward NATO-style mission command after 2014, but old ways persist.
Winning will require a full break from the Soviet system, both in spirit and structure.
14/ The stakes couldn’t be higher.
As NATO’s new Supreme Allied Commander Europe said, Ukraine can still win.
DeepState has reported the systematic submission of false reports by some units of the Vuhledar tactical group, which has created a distorted perception of the situation on the line of contact. pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/…
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1/ The last thing Putin expected from his bunker in Moscow in early 2022 was that his army would be ground down fighting for mere inches of territory 3.5 years into the invasion.
For the past two years, Kyiv has also increasingly brought the war home to Moscow’s elites.
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2/ In the days leading up to May’s Victory Day parade, Ukrainian drones were already buzzing near Moscow.
Kyiv said China asked Ukraine not to strike Moscow while Xi Jinping was in attendance, likely because it doubted Moscow’s ability to protect him. newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/zelenskyy…
3/ For years, both Russian and foreign observers saw Putin as a shrewd, calculating statesman—a leader whose luck and timing always seemed to favor him, until his army met the Ukrainians on the battlefield. lowyinstitute.org/the-interprete…
1/ As Russia’s invasion nears its fourth year, Moscow is struggling to replenish its ranks and is increasingly turning to foreign fighters to sustain the Kremlin's colonial war in Ukraine.
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2/ In early October, Ukrainian troops captured a 22-year-old Indian fighting for Russia.
He claimed he’d been arrested while studying in Russia and was forced to sign a military contract to be freed — trained for just two weeks before being sent to the front.
3/ Russia has reportedly recruited tens of thousands of foreigners from the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia through social media campaigns.
Many were promised non-combat roles and citizenship — only to end up on the battlefield.
1/ Russia is shutting down its own internet to stop Ukrainian drones.
As Kyiv’s long-range strikes reach deep into Russia, the Kremlin’s answer has been to flip the switch—cutting mobile data across dozens of regions and plunging parts of the country offline.
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2/ The blackouts are meant to block Ukrainian drones that rely on Russian LTE networks for navigation and to stop Russains from posting about the strikes.
But they’re also cutting off millions of Russians from payments, transport, and digital life.
3/ Russian lawmakers are now defending internet blackouts as “necessary for security.”
Duma official Vladimir Gutenev said: “Don’t turn into a ‘hipster’ who lives only in central Moscow; life isn’t limited to comfort.” themoscowtimes.com/2025/07/16/rus…
1/ Russia is running out of soldiers (higher cash amounts to pay them) — and it’s now importing them.
Also, import soldiers = less social problems w/ less 🇷🇺 deaths
With more than 1M+ casualties, Moscow is sourcing fighters from Cuba to North Korea to keep its war going.
🧵
2/ Ukrainian officials warn that as many as 25,000 Cubans could soon be fighting for Russia — which would make them the largest foreign contingent on the battlefield. tvpworld.com/89211810/at-le…
3/ Why Cuba? Money and coercion.
Recruiters reportedly promise about $2,000 a month — in a country where the average wage is roughly $20 a month.