1/8 Caixin: "Chinese policymakers are stepping up efforts to stamp out rampant “involution-style” competition across a range of key industries. Since a Politburo meeting in July last year, addressing the problem has become a top priority because of...
2/8 the damage it’s causing to the economy by distorting market pricing, eroding corporate profit margins, and undermining industrial efficiency."
And yet the article also notes that "in the second quarter, the national industrial capacity utilization rate fell to 74%."
3/8 What Beijing calls "rampant involution-style competition", in other words, seems to me like a natural response to rising excess capacity among businesses that don't have hard budget constraints: if you can't reduce production, do anything else you can to clear inventory.
4/8 In that case, I'm not sure how helpful it is to call for less "involution-style" pricing competition while still growing capacity faster than domestic demand. If the growing imbalance does not show up in declining prices, it must show up in some other, equally-disruptive way.
5/8 Caixin adds that "although the government has previously acted to stop price wars caused by overcapacity and insufficient demand, those efforts mainly targeted companies in specific industries."
6/8 "But this time," it continues, "the authorities are also gunning for the local governments whose support and subsidies have helped create a distorted landscape that’s propping up inefficient and unprofitable companies that would otherwise be forced to exit the market."
7/8 That, to me, is the crux of the problem. Local governments are not "propping up inefficient and unprofitable companies" because they like to lose money, especially now, when financing has become so difficult and they are cutting back on spending.
8/8 They're doing it because they have to meet unrealistically high GDP growth targets, which means they must fund more investment and more production whether or not either makes economic sense.
Until China sharply lowers its GDP growth target, I don't see how this gets resolved.
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1/9 This $400 billion investment fund deal with Japan may indeed be "unprecedented", but its hard to see how it helps to address any of the reasons for the US trade imbalances. nytimes.com/2025/07/23/bus…
2/9 It does not change the demand-supply imbalances in Japan or the rest of the world, and it does not change the US role in absorbing the resulting savings imbalances.
In other words it will have no impact on the US trade deficit.
3/9 Some might argue that by converting a portion of Japan's export of capital to the US from portfolio investment to direct investment, it is in fact increasing the total amount of investment in the US economy, and that is a good thing.
1/4 Goldman Sachs Group calculates that "wages grew 3.9% from a year ago in the second quarter — the lowest reading on record, with the exception of the pandemic years." bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/4 The only sustainable way to raise the consumption hare of GDP is to raise the household income share. If, instead, household income is growing more slowly than GDP, then either consumer debt must surge or the imbalances must get worse.
3/4 The NBS release claims that household income in the first half of 2025 grew by 5.4%, roughly in line with GDP, although they also note that median household income only grew by 4.9%, which is probably a better proxy.
1/8 Interesting SCMP article on Beijing's attempt to root out local government financial mismanagement: "The focus on addressing systemic inefficiencies has taken on greater urgency in light of China’s economic difficulties." sc.mp/4zrzt?utm_sour…
2/8 The article continues: "The country’s budget deficit reached a record 2.65 trillion yuan between January and April – a 50 per cent increase compared with the same period last year."
3/8 But while it may seem helpful to focus on fraud and obvious examples of mismanagement as part of getting the budget under control, these in fact represent a very small part of the real problem. The real problem is that as long as China sets an unrealistically high...
1/14
Much interesting stuff in this new paper by Tamim Bayoumi and Joseph E. Gagnon, including their claim that "the persistence of the US current account deficit reflects inflows associated with the size of US financial markets and perceived safety of its...
2/14
assets, with net inflows ebbing and waning depending on financial sentiment about prospects for the US economy."
The idea that capital account imbalances can drive trade imbalances may seem counterintuitive to many, but it is implicit in how the balance of payments works.
3/14
It is important to work out the implications on the US economy, which have to do with far more than just whether or not the US runs a trade deficit. Because every country's internal account must be perfectly consistent with its external account, changes in...
1/10
According to Bloomberg, China’s share of US imports fell to 7.1% in May, the lowest since 2001, and less than half of the 14.8% in September 2024.
But while that may seem like progress on the trade front, in fact it isn't.
2/10
The US trade problem is not a China problem so much as a problem with the role of the US in accommodating global imbalances. It does this as much through its capital account as through its trade account. What matters is the overall imbalance, not the bilateral imbalance.
3/10
To confuse the two means failing to note that even as the US deficit with China contracts, the overall US deficit continues to rise.
And what's more, the overall Chinese surplus also continues to rise. That's not just a coincidence.
1/8 Robert Skidelsky, who has written great books on Keynes' life and work, wrote (with Vijay Joshi) a really good essay—way back in 2010—on the problems of unbalanced trade, and why Keynes' bancor proposal at Bretton Woods made so much sense.
@RSkidelsky robertskidelsky.com/2010/06/23/key…
2/8 As the revival of interest in Keynes' bancor proposal gathers pace, it is worth pointing out the similarities to his proposal and to more recent proposals in the US and elsewhere that deficit countries place a kind of Tobin tax on all capital inflows.
3/8 The way bancor worked was by taxing the capital flow component of persistent surpluses. Surplus countries, of course have to acquire foreign assets to balance their surpluses, in the same way that deficit countries must give up claims on assets.