Major Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, Israel’s Former NS Advisor, and a person whose opinions Netanyahu admires, was interviewed last weekend by Lior Kodner on Haaretz’s podcast.
These were his main points regarding the war in Gaza and Israel's strategic situation:🧵
These were his main points regarding the war in Gaza and Israel's strategic situation:🧵
1. "Let’s start with the bif picture: The war we are in was forced upon us on October 7. Since then, the State of Israel has been managing it very wisely. First and for most, by not being tempted by all sorts of proposals to expand the war simultaneously on several fronts.
2. In the first stage, we dismantled Hamas as a military organization. It no longer exists as an organization, but it does exist as a bunch of cells that still operate in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is no longer the threat it once was.
3. Then, a little earlier than planned, we embarked on a war against Hezbollah. The Pager Operation turned out to be a great success, and almost all of Hezbollah's ability to fire at us was neutralized, and its leadership was destroyed.
4. Following the fall of Hezbollah, and the weakness of Iran which was revealed in our attack in Iran in October - the Syrian regime fell. This happened because the forces around Syria realized that Assad was weak and sent the rebels to finish the job there.
5. Finally, Iran gave us the opportunity to attack it, because it directly attacked us twice. As a result, we went on a very, very (!) successful 12-day war in Iran.
6. Now we are faced with two big questions. One question is how to end the war in Gaza, and the second question is how to make sure that Iran does not regain the ability to produce nuclear weapons and missiles.
7. As to Hamas: Today, militarily, it is no longer a threat to Israel. Today there is no central force in Hamas that is capable of managing the forces, gathering intelligence on the State of Israel, producing weapons, or managing smuggling into the Strip in an orderly manner.
8. But there are things that Hamas can still do. First, Hamas is still the dominant force in the Gaza Strip, it still has many cells that are capable of operating against the IDF, and it still holds Israeli hostages.
9. It is also still able to prevent any external body that wants to manage and rehabilitate the Strip from doing so unless that body allows Hamas to de facto control the Strip.
10. Therefore, what Israel wants to achieve is that Hamas will no longer be a force within the Gaza Strip, and this is the next step that must be decided upon.
11. Contrary to what some are suggesting – we cannot simply declare that we have won and leave. What this means is that Hamas will continue to rule Gaza. This also means that Hamas will recover and be able to rebuild its power so that we will face a difficult event again.
12. It will slowly gain strength and attack the State of Israel again. Not necessarily another October 7, because I hope we have learned a lesson, but another heavy event for sure.
13. For decades we said that we would wait it out and postpone dealing with things, and in the end, what we got was October 7. And the question that the State of Israel is facing right now is: Are we returning to the same DNA of procrastination?
14. The problem with that is that it clearly goes against the State of Israel's will to return home the 20 surviving hostages who remain in the Gaza Strip as soon as possible. This would put them in great danger, and therefore it is not an easy decision.
15. If Israel finishes the job, there will still be some threat from Gaza, but not an organized military waiting to attack us. The IDF will occasionally have to go in and out, but this will be a defined problem, not a situation of military threat to the State of Israel.
16. Here, it must be said, the question is no longer a professional question; it is a question of values, and my opinion is no better than anyone else's opinion here.
17. What I can say is that the deal to end the war in exchange for hostages, if Hamas remains in power, is a surrender to Hamas. This would be Hamas’ narrative: that it won the war. This will affect not only Gaza but the whole way Israel is perceived in the region.
18. Israel cannot just say “We have won” and leave Gaza, because reality is also a factor here. The same is true for Iran – we will have to make sure that they do not redevelop nuclear weapons and missile capabilities against the State of Israel.
19. A war does not end when you decide that you are finished with it, but rather with the question of how it really ended. If Hamas still controls the Gaza Strip at the end of the war, then it will be very difficult to say that we have defeated Hamas.
20. What will the final stage of the war in Gaza look like? Broadly speaking, it would be similar to the first part of the war, now applied to the 25% of the Strip that we have not yet conquered, mainly out of fear for the lives of the hostages who are there.
21. I estimate that occupying and cleansing them of Hamas will take about six months. When this happens - we will truly be able to talk about "the day after," that is - who will enter to take on civilian responsibility.
22. In the current situation where Hamas controls the Gaza Strip - nobody will enter the Strip to control it. The most we can have, is a “Lebanese Model” in which there is an entity that provides the framework, but underneath it controlled by an armed terror organization.
23. That also means that if don't defeat Hamas, the Gazans will suffer the most. They will live under Hamas rule for the next century, and Gaza won't be rebuilt because no one will agree to spend a dime on rebuilding Gaza knowing that this money will go down the drain.
24. The Saudis will not agree to rebuild Gaza in such a situation as well, and it has nothing to do with the question of whether Israel will recognize a Palestinian state or not.
25. In general, the question of who will enter to take responsibility for Gaza has nothing to do with the question of Israel recognizing the PA.
26. I personally think that it is not a problem that the PA will enter the Gaza Strip after we defeat Hamas there, but right now they are not really ready to enter Gaza as long as Hamas has power there.
27. Regarding the claims about the humanitarian situation in Gaza: In reality, there is no famine in Gaza. “Famine” means that most people are hungry most of the time. This is not the situation in the Gaza Strip.
28. It may be that in certain areas, because of the way Hamas manages things, there are hungry people, but Israel sends lots and lots of aid into the Gaza Strip. When there are hungry people in Gaza, it is only because Hamas takes over the aid and distributes it to its gangs.
29. In all the pictures, you see Hamas members eating plenty of food. They decide not to distribute the food to everyone in the Strip and then throw the blame on us. In practice — at no point was there a food shortage in Gaza and there was no hunger in Gaza.
30. I also do not accept the claim that Israel tried to do a transfer in Gaza. Trump said that he would let people who wanted to emigrate from Gaza emigrate, but the State of Israel does not carry out a transfer in Gaza and does not forcibly remove people from the Gaza Strip.
31. The Gaza Health Foundation was not a flop as some people claim. Yet, it is clear that at the moment it is not a sufficient solution to the situation and there are problems with it. Yet, we have to ask what is the alternative.
32. In reality, the only alternative we had was to not create this possibility, to allow Hamas to control the distribution, and to let it starve the residents of Gaza and then blame Israel for it. Hamas benefits from some residents of Gaza dying of hunger so it can blame Israel.
33. Regarding Israel’s situation in the international arena: There are many countries in the world that are now pressuring us to establish a Palestinian state. I think it would be a terrible mistake to do this right now.
34. Importantly, that is also what the absolute majority of Israelis think after October 7. No one would agree to take this risk so close to Israel’s population masses.
35. I think the State of Israel can withstand this pressure, and I do not see a scenario in which a Palestinian state is established soon. You can't force a democratic country from the outside to do something that 80% of its population thinks will harm it.
36. Beyond the story of the Palestinian state, there is great pressure on Israel to end the war. For now, there is no such pressure from Trump, and if there is in the future - we will have to figure out about what to do.
37. The pressure comes from Europe, and it is much less important. Why so? Because in the end, Europe did not help us much in this war - not in Gaza, not in Lebanon, not in Iran, not in dealing with the distress of the war.
38. Therefore, I think we should take Europe into account only to the minimum necessary. It is unpleasant that there are demonstrations in Europe or that Israeli tourists are being harassed. It is important, but not important enough for us to sacrifice our security for it.
39. Regarding the talk about establishing settlements in the Gaza Strip — this is Israel's plan. It was a mistake for Israel to leave the Strip in the first place in 2005, but that doesn’t mean that it is smart to try to go back there.
40. It would hurt us in the international system, and it would also make it difficult for us to do anything we want to do in Gaza in the future. What we do need to do is ensure that there is a one-kilometer perimeter adjacent to the border that cannot be entered.
41. As to Syria, we don't know whether the regime will survive and what way it goes. But we took a good position by expanding the space we control and by destroying the old army. Even if the regime goes astray - it will take a long time for it to become a threat to us.
42. Therefore, in summary, our strategic situation is much better. This means that we can significantly reduce the security pressure, but we will have to invest a lot of money in a massive arms race because we have spent everything we had.
43. We will also need to prepare new surprises for our enemies, and it means that our security spending will increase significantly - not because of what happens at the borders, but because we need to prepare the army for the next war, the timing of which we cannot anticipate.
You can listen to the full interview (Heb), initiated by @liorkodner here:
@liorkodner I would like to remind you that the podcast summary series that I write here has been a personal project of mine for some time, unrelated to my work at TheMarker.
Yet, you are welcome to follow me for both purposes.
May we have better days,
Uriel
Yet, you are welcome to follow me for both purposes.
May we have better days,
Uriel
@liorkodner Lately in my podcast summaries series:
https://x.com/udschachter/status/1935861500431794644
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